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Citizenship and Citizenship Identity in England and Scotland.......................... 61
Devolution and Citizenship............................................................................. 61
Young People’s Views of Citizenship.............................................................. 62
Voting Patterns in Britain................................................................................ 64
Citizenship Education..................................................................................... 66

**Attitudes to multi-culturalism, Racism and Xenophobia**............................... 67
Austria............................................................................................................. 67
Germany.......................................................................................................... 68
Spain.................................................................................................................. 70
Legislation........................................................................................................ 70
Immigration in Spain....................................................................................... 72
Attitudes of young Spanish people towards immigration............................. 74
UK.................................................................................................................... 76

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ....................................................................................... 78

**Discussion of Key Concepts**......................................................................... 78
Bibliography of Austrian Research related to National & European Identity, Citizenship and Racism............................................................... 81
Bibliography of German Research related to National & European Identity, Citizenship and Racism............................................................... 84
Bibliography of Spanish Research related to National & European Identity, Citizenship and Racism............................................................... 95
Bibliography of Czech and Slovak Research related to National & European Identity, Citizenship and Racism............................................................... 97
Bibliography of British Research related to National & European Identity, Citizenship and Racism............................................................... 102
Introduction

This report begins with a theoretical discussion around the key concepts for our project, Orientations of Young Men and Women to Citizenship and European Identity: ‘nation’, ‘identity’, ‘citizenship’, ‘national identity’, ‘citizenship identity’, ‘European identity’, ‘European citizenship’. The discussion of ‘identity’ is longer than that of the other concepts because this is the key organizing concept implicated in all of the others.

The second part of the report discusses previous studies of relevance to our project. Our study explores the views and experiences of young men and women, aged 18-24, concerning their identity, citizenship and attachment to locality, nation and Europe. We have chosen to talk to young people in a city or a cluster of neighbouring towns in five sets of paired localities, ten localities in total. In four cases, the pairs of localities are two autonomous parts of the same nation states (Vienna in contrast to Vorarlberg in Austria; East Germany, in contrast to West Germany; Madrid in contrast to the Basque Country in Spain; England in contrast Scotland, in the UK). Here our study cites are Vienna and the Bregenz area of Vorarlberg, Chemnitz and Bielefeld, Madrid and Bilbao and Manchester and Edinburgh. Our final paired localities are two nation-states that were previously one state, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Here our study cites are Prague and Bratislava. In each case, these regions or nations have interlinked but contrasting histories of connection to the rest of Europe and the European Union. The studies that are reviewed in this report, therefore, pertain in particular to those nation-states and regions. We have looked at studies that focus on regional, national or European identity or citizenship identity and associated work on racism and xenophobia.

This published report is an edited version of the sequence of State of the Art papers published on the project website (http://www.ed.ac.uk/sociol/youth). There you will find the general theoretical discussion followed by specific contributions in terms of reviews of relevant national literatures from each team. These reviews took slightly different forms because of the different topic foci of national literatures and the different range of academic disciplines represented in each team. There were also difficulties in separating out the literature reviewing task for the State of the Art report from our ‘Socio-Demographic Reports’, also published on the website, providing profiles of young people in specific national contexts. Issues such as ‘citizenship education’ or ‘political engagement of young people’ emerge naturally both from reviewing general literature on orientations to citizenship and European identity and in collating information for a background ‘socio-demographic profile’ of the population of young people who are the subject of our research. The Austrian team, for example, provided a single report integrating their contributions to the State of the Art report and their Socio-Demographic Report. This published report only includes the topics that are addressed in all the national reports and readers should consult our website for additional material. Parts of it have also been published elsewhere. For example, most of the discussion of concepts has been published as ‘Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for European Citizenship Identity’ in Sociológia: Slovak Sociological Review, 2002, 34, 507-532.
The production of the State of the Art Report was a difficult theoretical task because the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘citizenship’ are both nodes in large interdisciplinary literatures. Not surprisingly, given our own interdisciplinarity and different national contexts, there are different emphases on particular theoretical traditions across the teams in our project. Our task is to make this a strength that feeds into productive dialogue throughout the project, both with each other and with the wider academic community.

**Discussion of Key Concepts**

**Nation**

In summarizing the history of the contested definition of ‘nation’, David McCrone (1998) reminds us that there is no agreed set of ‘objective’ criteria that constitute a nation such as common language or religion or a particular history of state formation. He explains that most contemporary theorists reject the possibility of an ‘objective’ definition. The current orthodoxy is that a nation exists when a critical mass of people believe that it exists. Perhaps the most widely quoted definition of ‘nation’ in these subjective terms, at least among contemporary social analysts, is Benedict Anderson’s (1991) ‘imagined community’. The term nation-state suggests that the people we imagine ourselves as sharing a community with and the citizens of the state we inhabit are one and the same. David McCrone explores the origins of the common confusion of the ideas of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ and illustrates with a British example: ‘We talk for example of the “British nation” while (usually) recognizing that it is actually a multi-national state’ (1998, 7).

Theorists of nationalism have tried to identify the social conditions that made the imagining of ‘nation’ as if it were a social group or community possible for large numbers of people at particular historical junctures. Ernest Gellner (1983) argued that a sense of ‘the nation’, nationalism and ‘national culture’ were the products of the development of the modern state, centralized power with the means of generating and effectively delivering standard cultural messages to whole populations. Moreover, emerging centralized state power needed nationalism for its own legitimacy (Poggi, 1978, 1990). While authors like Gellner argue that the nations of the industrial era were newly created as a modern phenomenon, Anthony Smith (1991) argues that the modern sense of ‘nation’ necessarily drew on the prior ingredients of ‘ethnie’, a shared senses of being a people with common descent, history, language and culture. These differences reflect a long running debate about types of nationalism and the relationship between nationalism and the historical circumstances of its production.

David McCrone (1998, 8) notes that the Hans Kohn writing in 1945 tried to distinguish ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ nationalism. Kohn suggested that ‘western’ nationalism developed in situations where cultural notions of imagined community coincided with political territory governed by emerging modern states and nationalism celebrated the nation-state emphasizing the common ground of nation and citizenship. ‘Eastern’ nationalisms on the other hand developed in situations in which there was no correspondence between cultural notions of common identity and the political territories of states, hence nationalism emphasized ethnicity and tradition in efforts to disrupt state boundaries by asserting alternative sources of solidarity. A number of contemporary
authors, including Rogers Brubaker, continue to deploy a distinction between ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ forms of nationalism and explain their significance in historical terms. Brubaker compared the histories of nationalism in France and Germany as expressing different principles, the law of the soil versus the law of the blood. In France more or less all living on French soil, regardless of their origins, were French but in Germany, being German depended on lineage, on descent. David McCrone (1998, 2000) questions whether this is indeed a distinction of lasting value between types of nationalism rather than a description of the various and complex relationships between nationalism and citizenship which slides into confusing the concepts of nationalism and citizenship.

Identity
A number of authors have recently commented on the diverse uses being made of the term ‘identity’ (e.g. Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Hall and Du Gay, 1996; Jenkins, 1996, Roseneil and Seymour 1999, Williams 2000). The American authors Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) have argued that as a concept ‘identity’ is being stretched to the point of meaninglessness by a wide range of current uses within social science. They express some regret that ‘strong’ versions of identity, which assume a fundamental and durable sense of selfhood, have been eclipsed by ‘weak’ versions that stress the fluidity, impermanence, complexity and context sensitivity of identities rather than identity. ‘Soft’ versions include authors influenced by postmodern critiques of meta explanations and what has sometimes been referred to as the ‘cultural turn’, in describing a shift in explanatory emphasis from the alleged power of social structures to a claimed diffusion of power in language, cultural signifiers and discourse. Recent work has often stressed that individuals have multiple or hybrid identities and even within one setting may appeal to a range of identities. Moreover, it has become common to emphasize the process of making and claiming identities; identities are not attributes that people ‘have’ or ‘are’ but resources that people ‘use’, something that they ‘do’ (Hall, 1996).

For Brubaker and Cooper there are more conceptually helpful ways of describing the relevant aspects of ‘what people do’ by way of constructing, locating and presenting themselves rather than collapsing all into what they describe as the ‘flattening rubric of identity’ (2000, 9). They suggest that it is better to disaggregate processes such as the categorization and identification of self and others, the building of self-understanding and the construction of feelings of ‘groupness’ or belonging with others. Even the processes of identification with others can be further broken down according to whether it involves classifying self or others by a taxonomy that does not imply knowing others in the category (for example, white, Scottish, working-class, woman, teacher), or identifying self or others by a living relationship or web of relationships (friend, colleague, lover). Both categorization and identification help develop self understanding and sense of belonging with others. Brubaker and Cooper argue that neither a person’s cognitive and emotional sense of who they are and how they are socially located, nor their sense of connection to others or of belonging to a distinctive bounded group, can be reduced to a single process. The case for disaggregating ‘identity’ into a series of processes applies with equal measure to such specific postulated identities as ethnic identity, local identity, national identity and European identity.
Within our project there are a range of views concerning the need to disaggregate identity into a number of processes and conceptual tools. It may be that Brubaker and Cooper overstate the shortcomings of current theorizing of identity or identities. Many theoretical traditions within sociology and social psychology offer accounts of identity that itemize a package of processes. Moreover, authors who theoretically stress the fluidity of identity often also acknowledge and attempt to explain everyday common sense perception of continuity of self, and a not unusual sense that many people have of always being ‘much the same’. It remains widely taken for granted that some sense of continuity of self, the anticipation of a future and a memory of the past, is intrinsic to the human condition and this is often implicit, if not openly acknowledged in much social theory. A combination of diversity and fluidity on the one hand and of core and continuity on the other is not a paradox for traditions that discuss the social construction of ‘the self’.

For example, the concept of ‘the self’, as used in symbolic interactionist accounts, makes it clear that people have only one self but many aspects of self-identity. Some authors use the distinction between ‘personal identity’ and ‘collective identities’ to capture the dynamic between a subjective sense of a solid, complete and continuing self, a ‘personal identity’, and many other subjectively partial identities that derive from membership of categories and groups. However, ‘collective identities’ may not capture the whole repertoire of more fleeting and occasional identities adopted by an individual. Some social psychologists prefer the term ‘social identity’ to ‘collective identity’ but are sometimes using ‘social identity’ to mean essentially the same thing as ‘collective identity’. For example, within our team Ros, Grad and Garcia have argued that while personal identity tends to be the result of our frequent, intense and face-to-face interactions with people from the most immediate contexts, such as those of the family or friends, social identities tend to be the result of our identification with wider, abstract entities that revolve around a consensus or social norm, and for which face-to-face interaction with all its members is not necessary in order to identify with the social category in question. Moreover, following Tajfel (1978, 1982), some social psychologists use both personal identity and collective identity to mean relatively context specific and changing aspects of sense of self, the former referring to a sense of one’s own uniqueness and the later to a sense of what is shared in common with others. It is clear that when the terms ‘personal identity’, ‘social identity’ and ‘collective identity’ are used in these ways, that all three are in fact social in the sense of shaped by social interaction. The notion that we are shaped by social interaction does not reduce individuals to social dupes who always do as prompted by others. Making connection with and differentiating oneself from others are basic processes of social interaction. Resistance is always a possible reaction to direct prompting to do something or to be a particular sort of person but resistance is also a socially shaped response. Thoughts and feelings when alone remain social in the sense that the food for thought and feeling is never devoid of social origin.

The thoroughly social nature of even the inner world of private thoughts and feelings is not taken for granted in all theoretical traditions. For example, some contemporary psychologists writing about socialization continue to take for granted a pre-existing inner
world that is not socially shaped and has to be aligned with an external social world. This
seems to be the case in the socialization theory of Hurrelmann (2001) and others
(Faulstich-Wieland, 2000; Tillman, 2001). Hurrelmann’s account is explained by Fuss et
al as follows: ‘Here, socialization is understood as a process of developing the personality
through dealing with the inner reality (body and psyche) and the outer reality (social and
ecological environment). Following ecological-system theory and reflexive-action
theoretical approaches, the crossing of personal individuation and social integration
forms the essence of socialization theory. While individuation means the process of
developing an individual personality structure with unmistakable cognitive, motivational,
linguistic, moral and social characteristics and their respective competences, integration
marks the process of becoming part of the society respectively of adapting to social
values, behavior standards and demands. For the young person coping with tensions
between individuation and integration arises the chance to develop an own I-identity for
the first time in their life. This I-identity comprises the subjective feeling of
unmistakability and uniqueness of the own person (‘personal identity’) as well as the
feeling of acceptance and recognition by the social environment (‘social identity’). For a
successful process of socialization both components have to be related to each other and
connected. With this, the development of personality in the period of youth is put into a
social context which influences the individual and – at the same time – is influenced,
changed and formed by the acting individual. In this sense, socialization theory
understands the human being as a creative interpreter as well as an active engineer of its
own development and its social environment’ (an edited version of Fuss et al. on our
website).

While this account shares much in common with the traditions of symbolic
interactionists, it underplays the extent to which inner and outer worlds are always
mutually socially constructed and the extent to which ‘personal identity’ is also social.
Some other social psychologists use the distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘collective
identities’ to suggest a tension between a private inner self and a social self built up
through the combined membership of collectivities. However, this also over-simplifies
the personal and the social as if they were separate spheres rather than interdependent and
as if each sphere was without internal complexity and contradiction. Yet psychologists
and sociologists also recognize that social worlds often contain contradictory demands
and conflicting expectations and that a stable sense of self can include deep feelings of
ambivalence and regular points of indecision and oscillation.

One Self: Many Identities, Some ‘Primary’
In the traditions of symbolic interactionism and phenomenology, or their contemporary
derivative referred to as ‘social constructionism’, a sense of self, as an individual who is
at the same time unique and has something in common with others such that he or she
can mentally put oneself in their place, is the essence of being human. This sense of self
cannot develop without social processes. Interactions with others, the symbolic
exchanges of gestures and language in which meanings are negotiated, provide the
content and perhaps even make possible the inner dialogue that people have with
themselves about themselves. Practices of reflecting on what I think of myself are
inevitably intimately related to practices of reacting to, anticipating and managing what others think of me and what I give away concerning what I think of them; practices that are learned in social interaction. Our sense of self is an ongoing product of our everyday social interaction. At the same time, a sense of continuity and biography, past and future, is part of our present self in memories, habits, stocks of knowledge, feelings, expectations and aspirations. A basic sociological assumption that is also shared by many social psychologists is that all aspects of identity are socially shaped. While it may be possible to speak of a person as having a private self or to contrast personal identities and public identities, even the former are a product of social processes. Richard Jenkins sums up this orthodoxy as ‘All human identities are in some sense – usually a stronger than a weaker sense – social identities’ (Jenkins, 1996, 4).

As Goffman (1969), Strauss (1969) and Berger and Luckmann (1966) classically documented, in social interaction humans sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously present different faces to others. This can be experienced as deliberately donning a false mask or as enjoying or playing up an authentic aspect of the self. The notion of presenting different faces to others suggests that the faces are already to hand but it also possible that different faces are being constructed for others in the process of interaction. What may be going on is an attempt to negotiate a version of the self that has not been the subject of previous interactions with others or, even, previous dialogue with the self. It is a matter of debate whether the term ‘identities’ should be used to encompass statements about the self that only occur in some social contexts and not others and are ephemeral performances rather than established facets of the self. Certainly for some authors, identities need not be experienced as a constantly defining characteristic of the self, although some identities may be experienced in this way.

Goffman eloquently demonstrated that humans are constantly giving off messages about themselves, verbally and non-verbally, as they try to manage a presentation of the self as a competent person. If every different message about the self were to be labeled a separate identity, then identities are very, very many indeed. In contemporary sociological literature, some authors use the term ‘identity claims’ (Bechhofer, et al. 1999, Kiely, et al, 2000, 2001; McCrone et al, 1998) to characterize statements about the self. The phrase ‘identity claim’ leaves open the nature of the subjective experience – whether authentic or consciously false, deeply felt or playful. The work of these sociologists has focused not on inner psychological states but on the social contexts in which identity claims are made, seeking the context specific rules that make some claims possible and liable to succeed and others impossible or liable to be challenged.

Subjective experiences, nevertheless, remain a matter of significance for understanding identity or identities for many authors in both sociology and psychology. Symbolic interactionism and its associated theoretical traditions emphasise inner dialogue and the self-reflective nature of everyday actors. However, more than conscious cognitive processes are conceptualized as being involved in developing or maintaining a sense of self. Indeed, there is a strong suggestion in literature informed by such traditions that much of our ‘primary’ or ‘core’ sense of self is emotional rather than cognitive and that some of it is unconscious. Social constructionist authors argue that what we feel, as well
as what we think about our feelings, how we hold ourselves physically, how we experience bodily functions, as well as what we consciously think about our body are profoundly influenced by social interaction. Much of what we often take to be ‘natural’ about ourselves, for example, our sense of our sexuality and gender, is radically shaped by social interaction (Gagnon and Simon, 1973; Jackson, 1982; 1999). This and other theoretical approaches widely adopted in social science, acknowledge the possibility of tacit knowledge, things that are learned more by practice and doing than thinking, and are not fully accessible to conscious thought. Many practices of language use and rules of social interaction are unconscious in this sense. We can learn habitual ways of thinking and doing things, unconscious practices that bracket off and take for granted many aspects of both identity and social reality. As humans, we are all born into social settings where systems of symbolic interaction predate our existence. While language, customs and all humanly constructed systems are only sustained through creative use and are constantly open to change, a sense of their existence as prior to the self can result in them being taken for granted as unchanging frameworks for social interaction. However, unconsciously learned and habitual practices always remain open to being brought back into conscious thought and to being recognized as potentially able to be changed. They are not the equivalent of the subconscious in psychoanalytic theory.

For symbolic interactionists and social constructionists, because identities are maintained as well as produced through social interaction, they are always open to challenge and renegotiation in social interaction. Nevertheless, some aspects of self may become more primary, that is more core or fixed feeling, than others in the path of individuals’ biographies (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Jenkins, 1996, 21). The development of ‘tacit knowledge’ and unconscious habits permits the possibility of unconscious patterns being more firmly established by cumulative repetition from early life. Also some extra weight is placed on the emotional potency of parental or other caring relationships in early life for shaping the primary aspects of the self. Personal, emotionally-charged relationships are viewed by social constructionists as more significant for identity than other relationships throughout life. For example, a leading symbolic interactionist of the 1960s, Peter Berger and his coauthors (1964, 1966), gave particular weight to interactions with ‘significant others’, emotionally important, ‘close’, others, in terms of the work of building a primary sense of identity in childhood and maintaining identity in adult life. ‘Significant others’ are especially potent when they have the monopoly over emotional life, as parents do in early childhood. Gender identities, views of self as a particular sort

1 While the tradition of symbolic interactionism in particular is sometimes accused of being over cognitive and neglecting the place of emotions in structuring human life, the enhanced significance of ‘significant others’ is because these are emotionally charged relationships that people care more about than others as well as because they involve more intense social interaction. Moreover, the nature of that more intense social interaction is emotionally charged, expressed in projects of speaking and doing that also give off feelings such mutual care and commitment or anger and resentment. A sophisticated social constructionist account must acknowledge that patterns of feeling are being constructed by participants in social interaction not just ways of thinking and doing things.

2 A number of authors have suggested that adult partnerships have taken on an emotional monopoly that is as profound as that of the mother child relationship in early childhood. The notion that an adult sense of identity is particularly dependent on regular dialogue with an intimate partner has been restated more recently by a number of authors including Anthony Giddens (1992, 1990).
of masculine or feminine, are both particularly emotionally charged and involve a significant accumulation of unconscious practices. Parental figures invariably praise and scold infants from the earliest age as ‘girls’ or ‘boys’ in ways that help invest particular sorts of masculine and feminine with emotional resonance. Stocks of tacit knowledge about appropriate gendered bodily practices and gendered behaviour accumulate from the earliest age and may therefore be particularly profoundly taken for granted and resistant to change in later life.

The Self, Nationality and National Identity

If asked their nationality, most people can give an answer but as the next section discusses this does not necessarily mean that nationality is an important category for them or involves strong feelings of belonging with others of the same nationality. Because many people are citizens of nation-states, for many of us, ‘nationality’ is synonymous with citizenship. For some of us who can take citizenship for granted, nationality/citizenship is a formal abstract way of categorizing the self that does not carry much emotional resonance. Sometimes the concepts ‘nationality’ and ‘national identity’ are used interchangeably, but we take ‘national identity’ to be a narrower concept than ‘nationality’ and to specifically refer to the significance of nationality for a person’s identity, their sense of self.

In theoretical traditions that stem from symbolic interactionism, a strong sense of national identity, of a particular nationality being an important aspect of the self, will only occur if it is constructed in the course of social interaction. It depends entirely on whether nationality is fore-grounded in everyday interactions and invested with emotion. Specific conditions would be required for a sense of nationality to be a primary identity, allowing it to be biographically established early in life and routinely retained as a deeply taken for granted self-defining aspect of the self. This would only be likely if attributions of nationality suffused interactions with significant others and if a background cultural chorus of rhetoric attributing nationality constantly reinforces face-to-face interactions. It was to precisely this type of ‘background chorus’ which Michael Billig’s book *Banal Nationalism* (1995) drew attention. Writing about Britain, Billig noted the extent to which the everyday language used by the mass media, particularly in news and weather reporting, daily invokes ‘us’ and ‘we’ as ‘the nation’. Nationality may be invoked only

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3 In so far as a biography involves the development of ‘primary identities’, there is necessarily an emotional resonance as an aspect of the taken for granted unconscious facet of such identities. Social constructionist theorists, however, have devoted far less attention than psychoanalytic theorists to systematically discussing the consequences of the emotional side of identities in everyday life or the consequences for adulthood of emotional attachments in early childhood. A number of authors, such as Giddens (1992, 1990, 1984), have sought to supplement social constructionist accounts with more psychological or psychoanalytic accounts of the structuring of emotions.

4 Note that we are emphasizing a taken for granted sense of self that involves patterns of emotions, ways of thinking and of doing that are unconscious but without drawing on the Freudian concept of the subconscious. However, note that a number of authors do deploy the concept of the subconscious in trying to explain national identity and argue for the necessity of doing so. See for example, Vogler (2000) for a recent account.
occasionally in particular circumstances and be literally out-of-mind much of the time. On the other hand, it may be constantly referred to by significant others as if it should be a self-defining aspect of the self.

Scholars of nationalism draw on a range of theoretical traditions and not all put the same weight on face-to-face interaction. Moreover, they do not all agree concerning whether a sense of nationality is typically a primary identity or only becomes highly emotionally resonant and profoundly self-defining in very specific social circumstances. For example, Anthony Smith claims ‘Of all the collective identities in which human beings share today, national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive’ (1991, 143), while Richard Kiely and David McCrone use empirical work to note that ‘in their everyday interactions, people’s national identity is often seen to be of little immediate relevance’ (2001, 34). Studies of how people deploy their national identity in naturally occurring everyday interactions remain relatively rare, although a growing number of scholars are emphasizing the need for such empirical work. Theorists of nationalism have often documented the public rhetoric of politicians and pundits without attempting to discover how their words are used by everyday listeners in the construction of what Anthony Cohen (1996) calls their ‘personal nationalism’ through attributing their own sense to the otherwise vacuous rhetoric.

Social Categorisation and Categories versus Groups

It is conventional to distinguish processes of categorizing self and others from processes of coming to feel as a sense of common identity, we-feeling or belonging with others (see for example Pearson, 2001, 16-17; Jenkins, 1996, 23, 80-89). Some categories are more consequential for a person’s sense of self than others. Categorizations that have powerful social consequences such as determining patterns of interaction, or allocation of resources are more likely to have psychological effects modifying the sense of self. Nevertheless, a person who has been consequentially categorized might refuse to see himself or herself as having anything in common with others who are similarly categorized.

Official categorizing, the prerogative of state agents, is often particularly consequential, for example, categories such as ‘citizen’, ‘criminal’ and ‘mentally ill’ provide grounds for either access to or denial of rights and benefits. As labeling theorists have long noted, informal labeling can also be very powerful. Ethnographies of children’s classrooms and playgrounds document the use of labels, such as ‘bully’, ‘sneak’ or ‘sad’. Those who are so labeled as not worth knowing because of some claimed and denigrated aspect of themselves can feel their own sense of self challenged in the process. In Britain, a number of authors have documented how school ground labeling often draws on categories of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender and class in practices of derogatory naming (Connolly, 1998; Hall et al. 1999; Hey, 1997; Mac an Ghaill, 1994; O’Donnell and Sharpe, 2000; Padfield, 2001). Psychologists have long been concerned with the psychological consequences of classifications and have paid particular attention to the tendency to stereotype members of categories as if they all shared the same attributes, both exaggerating sameness among members of the category and their difference to members of other categories. The more consequential it is to be named as a member of a particular category the more likely the category is to be taken to heart; developing a sense...
of commonality with others is one possible effect. It has been argued, for example, that the authoritative naming by medical experts of ‘the homosexual’ as a type of person, opened up new possibilities in constructing identities, shunning the category homosexual and distancing oneself from it and adopting the category and constructing an identity around homosexual practices (Foucault, 1978; Weeks, 1981; Macintosh, 1968). In other words, the naming of a new category made possible new identities for some people who had not actually been directly labeled but could imagine commonality with those who had been so labeled.

Within social psychology, one of the more explicit attempts to deal with the consequences of categorization and group membership for identity is the ‘Social Identity approach’ pioneered by Tajfel and Turner (e.g. Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Turner, 1984, 1987). Widdicombe and Wooffitt summarises its key concerns as follows: ‘It asks how social groups and categories become psychological entities and influence individual self-conceptions and behaviour’ (1995, 37). Tajfel and Turner were concerned to link psychological consequences to social circumstances, for example, noting that the pre-existing power and status hierarchy among social groups would have psychological consequences for membership of any particular group. Nevertheless, Widdicombe and Wooffitt, working in the tradition of discourse analysis, criticize Tajfel and Turner for underplaying the extent to which the individual is socially shaped and for misunderstanding the processes of social shaping. They re-emphasise that categorization is not always profoundly consequential for identity5. Using the example of young people who had adopted visible youth culture styles such as ‘punk’ or ‘rocker’, they demonstrate that people who have taken on badges of a group’s identity nevertheless may choose to selectively resist identity attribution, using a range of strategies to reject being categorized as group members, challenging aspects of culturally available stereotypes of their group, using devices to claim ‘being normal’ and being individual. They draw on and develop the tools of discourse and conversational analysis to map the tacit procedural knowledge of inference-rich language and conventions of conversation deployed by young people in this process of resisting and embracing categories.

Paying attention to the theoretical distinction between categories and groups and the conditions necessarily for the latter is suggestive of a range of possible meanings for ‘being European’. Unlike an abstract category, a group is a meaningful social entity for its members. In some circumstances, a named human collectivity with no previous social connection between its members can turn into a social group that recognizes itself as such. This is most likely when the naming is consequential and there are no barriers to interaction among those named that would otherwise prevent a collective response, whether it be living up to the name or by resisting the attributions implied by the name. A

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5 Widdicombe and Wooffitt share the sociological starting premise that human identities are social, and argue that Tajfel and Turner profoundly underplay this by mistakenly theorizing the individual as if she or he has a pre-social existence outside of and prior to group membership. They also argue that Tajfel and Turner underestimate the extent to which individuals remain creative social actors by over stating the psychologically determining effects of group membership. The only creative potential Tajfel and Turner attributed to a group member once he or she identifies with the group and is operating as a group member is a capacity to work collectively to re-categorize the group in relation to one or more other groups, thus effecting social change through changing social categories.
group maintains a sense of itself as a group through group-oriented activities and the interaction of its members. The more intense group interaction is and the more that ‘significant others’ are drawn from the group, the more consequential for personal identities, groups are. In other words, the more likely it is that group membership will become a ‘primary identity’. The ‘ punks’ and ‘rockers’ interviewed by Widdicombe and Wooffitt had not adopted ‘punkness’ or ‘rockerness’ as a primary identity and it is possible that they did not imagine punks or rockers as a community or a have a strong sense of belonging to a group. In many circumstances to call oneself ‘European’ will be an abstract classification not a declaration of a sense of membership of a group, although it could be so in some circumstances, such as participation in clubs and activities self-consciously badged as European, for example, the European Youth Parliament.

It is very important to note that very large collectivities can only be experienced as meaningful groups rather than abstract categories when they are imagined as if they were groups and interactions with subsets are treated as representing interactions with the whole. The distinction between a collectivity of unknown individuals and groups, whose members interact with each other and are known personally to each other, remains important, even if a collectivity can come to feel like a group, despite not being a group. Special conditions are needed for this imagining of a group to be possible and social interaction with actual groups are likely to be involved as well as interaction with individual significant others. When people do have a sense of something in common with either other nationals or other citizens that is significant to their own sense of self, it is important that we understand what type of nation or state they are imagining. Debates about the formations of nation-states and nationalism in previous centuries continue to rumble on in discussions of individuals’ sense of national identity in the present and are suggestive of what would be necessary for a pervasive European identity.

‘Othering’ and boundary work

The extent to which strong national identity can exist without chauvinistic tendencies of celebrating ‘own nation’ and denigrating and excluding foreigners is still debated. There is a wide spread and often unexamined assumption in much social scientific commentary, that the process of identifying the self with a particular group necessarily involves generating some form of antagonism towards those who are not in the group and that building a sense of self identity will necessarily involve designating some people as ‘others’ who are not only distanced from the self but negatively stereotyped. The suggestion that negative ‘othering’ is a necessary part of the process is an additional assumption to the widely accepted view expressed by Jenkins (1996) that emphasizing difference from others as well as similarities to others are key aspects of the human business of carving out a self identity. Stuart Hall is one of number of authors who uses the term ‘Other’ to suggest the negativity of ‘othering’: ‘identities are constructed through, not outside, difference …through the relation to the Other’ (1996, 4-5) and Delanty makes this clear by using the term ‘non-self’: ‘all identities are based on some kind of exclusion, as the identity of the self can be defined only by reference to a non-self’ (2000, 115). Some theorists have taken the assumption of this sort of principle much further. Zygmunt Bauman, (1998, 1995,1992, 1990) for example, talks of a basic human
need to divide ‘strangers’ into friends and enemies and explains the holocaust as an extreme result of the difficulties that large scale and complex societies have with strangers. Symbolic interactionists assume that processes of differentiation of the self from others are basic to developing a sense of self but at the same time this involves the self-reflexive ability to anticipate the reactions of others to oneself and to imagine oneself in the place of others. The ‘other’ then is neither wholly alien nor necessarily hostile. A wide range of empirical work indicates possibilities of differentiation without negatively stereotyping; strangers, even those seen as being very different in terms of how they do things, need not necessarily be enemies. Clearly processes of negative ‘othering’ are common and aspects of many societies and social groups but they are by no means universal and are not built into all theoretical understandings of identity processes.

In Social Anthropology there has been a long tradition of attendance to how boundaries between groups are expressed in social interaction and to the boundary work involved in socially constructing significant differences between groups. The classic work is that of Fredrick Barth (1969) on ethnic groups and boundaries. Exclusive ethnic groups involve interactions that ascribe significantly different identities to members of their own and other groups; differences in identity are presumed to flow from their different origins and background: ‘dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest’ (1969, 79). The maintenance of difference requires the reproduction of very particular social circumstances involving both contact and clear limits to contact. This structuring of contact restricts interaction and protects the culture of each group from the possibility of modification by the other. Barth stresses that not all recognition of difference and distinction involves the coordinated social activity that creates a boundary and that a boundary need not mean antagonism. He cites as evidence the work of Tone Bringe (1995) on the ethnic conflict in Bosnia. Bringe documented the very limited ways in which people defined themselves in terms of ethnicity prior to the period of violent conflict, being connected by neighbourliness, kinship, love and friendship. These senses of connection and of limited salience of ethnicity were transformed as rumors and experiences of inter-ethnic violence increased, boosting the ‘boundary-based components of people’s identities’ (Barth, 2000, 32).

McCrone has commented that ‘we know nationalism grows best in a medium in which there is an Other – an enemy against which we can measure and develop our identity’ (1998, 184). He suggests that the presence of an obvious ‘Other’, expressed for example through consolidated racism towards illegal immigrants into the Europe Union, is one set of conditions that would assist in ‘European’ becoming a more significant identity to rival national identities. It is important to acknowledge that this type of racism is a problem in many of the member states of the European Union and the potential for the politicization of migration issues in accession states that border the EU and Schengen region (see for example Wallace, C. and Haerpfer, CH, 2001). However, this is clearly

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6 Barth also identifies boundary drawing as cognitive manoeuvre and seeks a ‘theory of cognition’ rather than simply an interactionists account of boundary work.
not the only possible route to ‘feeling European’ and the social conditions necessary for alternative routes may also flourish.

Identity, Agency and Structure

In their texts on identity, both Robin Williams (2000) and Richard Jenkins (1996) note that the attraction of the concept of identity for social science is the part it plays in debate concerning the relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’; that is between a sense that individuals are externally controlled, shaped by social institutions, classification systems, rules and arrangements that have an existence independent of any particular individual, or have internal control, as creative actors shaping their social world. ‘One of the attractions of the concept of identity – resulting in part from its complex multivalency – is that it seems to promise some way in which important aspects of agency and structure can be adequately integrated, or at least brought into closer and more harmonious alignment’ (Williams, 2000, 58). Williams organizes his text by delineating theoretical traditions in terms of the way that ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ are balanced in conceptualizing identity. Not all relevant prominent theorists are attended to in the discussion, for example both the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1984) and the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990) is totally absent, but Williams nevertheless offers an insightful summary of the field. He notes that when more emphasis is placed on ‘agency’, identity is viewed as the subjective achievement of rational individual subjects as ‘a personal effort to sustain the unity of the self among a multiplicity of potential identities’ and when more emphasis is placed on ‘structure’, identity is either ‘a reflection of individual membership of particular social categories or collectivities’ (Williams 2000, 55) or a product of cultural messages and discursive practices that name, classify, discipline and encourage individuals into particular identities. When primacy is given to neither ‘structure’ nor ‘agency’, identity is ‘the outcome of inter-subjective work in which selves and others are mutually constitutive’ (Williams, 2000, 80). The latter is the position that most sociological theorists strive to attain. Williams’ account focuses particularly on narrative theorists, later twentieth century symbolic interactionists and the radical development of these traditions in the work of ethnomethodology, conversation and discourse analysis, being a proponent of a particular form of the latter. In Britain, variants of discourse analysis that draw heavily on ethnomethodology have been adopted by a number of social psychologists as their preferred approach to the study of identity (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Parker, 1990, 1992; Widdicombe, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995).

Within sociology, a standard critique of accounts of identity that primarily focus on agency is that failure to acknowledge and theorize unequal distributions in the material and cultural resources used in identity making. This failure amounts to neglect of a key disciplinary concern, that of understanding social inequality. The adequacy of attempts at balancing or dissolving the duality, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, is therefore sometimes judged by success in both acknowledging agency and explaining constraints on people’s identity making capacities. What critics seek is recognition of the visible durability of socially constructed categories of inequality such as social class, racialised groups and gender. Symbolic interactionists, such as Peter Berger, acknowledged limits on people’s
creative agency but saw these primarily in terms of the interactional conformity, the taking of things for granted that necessarily flow from being born and socialized into pre-existing ways of doing things, language, customs and systems of ideas, that predate the existence of any individual. However, this did not go far enough towards acknowledging the consequences for many sociologists of the unequal conditions in which people constructed identities. For example, the resources that arguably might be the raw materials of a ‘European’ or, for that matter, a ‘cosmopolitan’ identity are not equally distributed. The former might include experience of travel across the territories of Europe, command of several European languages, and knowledgeable fluency in discussions of ‘European’ music, art and literature. In some parts of Europe, these are forms of a social and cultural capital that is only available to relatively privileged minorities. Being ‘European’ was arguably the typical state of affairs for the upper classes of Europe prior to the First World War when the ‘grand tour’ of Europe was often part of the socialization processes that consolidated young adult’s class position. In the present, young people both within and across European nation-states arguably have to negotiate very different constraints and opportunities for mustering experiences of ‘being European’. For example, there is considerable variation in rates of youth unemployment and the precise education and welfare package offered to young people (Bynner et al. 1997; Chisholm et al 1995; Nagel & Wallace, 1997). There also remain marked differences between Northern and Southern Europe in terms of patterns of leaving home and young people’s access to living independently of family households. These are partly the consequence of differing welfare regimes and the distribution of housing resources but also reflect cultural differences in attitudes to family, gender and generation (Iacovou, 1998).

While symbolic interactionists gave primacy to ‘significant’ others, authors more concerned with power and inequality have taken a particular interest in whether there are particularly powerful agents or sites of operation that enable some sectors of the population to advance or constrain particular identities among others. For example, much feminist informed work trying to understand the reproduction of gender has looked at how particular powerful and predominantly male sets of actors—governments, state sanctioned experts, managers of global mass media, military-industrial complexes and multi-national corporations for example—have promoted particular versions of femininities and masculinities.8 Scholars of nationalism have often been particularly concerned with the imagery, symbolism and messages about nation constructed by the state. Reicher and Hopkins (2001), for example, have analysed the messages about nationalism in the speeches of UK politicians. However, it is only relatively recently that researchers have attempted to explore how messages are received, read, worked with and made personal by ordinary people.

Many authors with an interest in explaining structural inequality draw eclectically from different theoretical sources. For example, Stuart Hall acknowledges debts to

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Althusserian Marxism, therefore also indirectly to Freud, and to the philosophy of Michel Foucault. While repudiating a notion of a fixed, ‘core’ or ‘real’ identity, Hall recognizes that a sense of identification with others often comes to feel enduring and ‘natural’, rather than ephemeral despite the fact that identification is ‘a construction, a process never completed – always ‘in process’ (Hall, 1996, 2). He clearly remains interested in not only how identities come to feel fixed but also the way the process of this fixing is implicated in the reproduction of social inequality. He refers to Althusser’s account of the effect of ‘ideological state apparatuses’ in his own account of how subjects are ‘hailed’ by discourse and through their own discursive practices construct identities that ‘chain’ or ‘suture’ them to particular positions or clusters of meanings in the ‘flow of discourse’ (1996, 6).

Pierre Bourdieu (1998, 1990, 1977) is an author who is particularly obviously concerned to simultaneously theorise identity and inequality. He tries to explain how by inhabiting privileged or disadvantaged social contexts, associated, for example, with particular class backgrounds, people will acquire distinctive sets of predispositions as aspects of their embodied self-identity. This in turn will ensure that they are at ease in and likely to choose to recreate different distinctive types of social contexts, helping, for example, to recreate class distinctions. The concepts of social capital and cultural capital were developed by Bourdieu in the 1970s to help describe the distinctive accumulation and transmission of resources by social groups that in turn match individuals to different sorts of positions in their society. The concept of social capital is enjoying new popularity and being given new explanatory weight although not always with reference to the work of Bourdieu. For example, claims concerning deficiencies in social capital for sectors of the population, particularly the lack of social ties that enable bridging between social worlds, are being used as an explanation for social disintegration (Putnam, 2000) and corrosion of character (Sennett, 1998). Putnam makes a distinction between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ types of social capital and suggests that both in combination are beneficial for a society. The former is a network of social relationships that bind people to others like themselves. ‘Bonding social capital’ without ‘bridging social capital’ would be characteristic of ghetto communities or other homogeneous communities whose biographies have resulted in few links beyond the community, perhaps because of limited mobility and the concentration of employment in a particular local industry. It might also be a consequence of choosing a very ‘privatised’ and family focused life-style that does not take up opportunities to make wider ties. ‘Bridging social capital’ on the other hand are social ties that link people from otherwise diverse social worlds. The concept of ‘bridging social capital’ begs the question of what kind of trans-European bridging would promote a European identity. One possible ‘European’ or more ‘cosmopolitan’ identity might be based on links between privileged elites, financially, socially and culturally able to travel Europe and imbibe high European culture, interacting on the basis of equivalent social and cultural privilege. However, it is theoretically possible that other types of ‘European’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ identity could form around pan-European social networks that are not restricted to an elite privileged class. However, although environmental and peace movements would wish it to be otherwise, there are currently no obvious examples of organizations or social movement that are sufficiently vibrant to generated significant
Europe-wide flows of social interaction, fostering personal connectedness and common cause among very large numbers of young people across Europe.

‘Citizenship Identity’?

Nationality and citizenship are analytically separate. David McCrone and Richard Kiely define the difference as follows: ‘nationality and citizenship actually belong to different spheres of meaning and activity. The former is in essence a cultural concept which binds people on the basis of shared identity – in Benedict Anderson’s apt phrase as an ‘imagined community’ – while citizenship is a political concept deriving from people’s relationship to the state.’ (McCrone and Kiely, 2000, 25). Citizenship is most commonly conceptualized as a package of rights and duties bestowed on individuals by the state. T. H. Marshall described citizenship as a ‘status’ in his classic account: 'Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (Marshall, 1950: 28-29). Although the use of the term ‘bestowed’ may suggest the passive receipt of rights from above, Marshall was in fact writing in England about aspects of British citizenship that had been fought for and conceded by a resistant state. His account of the progress of citizenship acknowledged a history of struggle. The 18th Century was the period in which people gained civil rights, such as the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest. The 19th Century was associated with political rights such as the right to vote. He described his own century as the century of social rights such as the right to protection from poverty and ill health.

Present-day Europe consists of nation-states. However, the extent to which all living within the boundaries of nation-states have become citizens, fully included in the ‘common good’, varies. All nation-states contain people who are not recognized as citizens and not all who are formally citizens have equal access to the rights of citizenship. At the time that Marshall was writing about the extension of social rights and emphasizing equality in his definition of citizenship, the architects of the British welfare state gave women lesser citizenship than men. Like children, they did not have direct access to social rights but indirect access as dependents of male workers (Pascall, 1997). Across Europe, some welfare regimes and with them the social rights of citizenship, are consciously crafted to retain prior social inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Lewis, 1992) and often specifically gender inequalities (Hantrais and Mangen, 1994; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver, 1999; Sainsbury, 1996). The tendency of welfare regimes to offer less citizenship to those who have not served their time as economically independent workers is perhaps increasingly consequential for young adults. The extension of the semi-dependence of young adulthood through lengthened periods of education and training across Europe has been accompanied by partial rather than full citizenship rights (Jones and Wallace, 1992). Young adults, with the formal political right to vote are often denied full social rights. For example, in Britain young people are not given the same right to a minimum wage or to financial support as older adults. A number of legislative changes and directives issued by the European Union have tackled gender inequality and have arguably enhanced the citizenship of women. In Britain this has not obviously resulted in women having more awareness of their Europeanness or being more attuned to their
European citizenship identity than men. The lesser citizenship experienced by young people is not being directly tackled by the European Union but evidence such as Eurobarometer (1997) suggests that young people are particularly enthusiastic about the rights to travel and work across Europe that have been promoted as part of European citizenship.

In a Europe in which citizenship is denied to many in-migrants who seek it, it is easy to assume that citizenship is recognized by those who have it as a ‘good’. However, what the term ‘citizenship’ actually means in any one place depends on the particular local history and politics of its usage. Ann Phillips (1993), has documented how sections of the political Left in Britain throughout the twentieth century, denounced the language of citizenship as a ‘bourgeois charade’, creating a spurious sense of equality to disguise the invidious inequalities of class division. To substantiate their claim they suggested that the expansion of citizenship had made little difference in terms of social justice or equality between citizens; for example, universal suffrage had not quickly resulted in a more socially and economically equal society, or even proportionate political representation for women or the working-class. Other sections of the British Left embraced the rhetoric of citizenship, seeking the opportunity to develop a particular version of ‘active citizenship’ through extensions of participatory democracy. The Women’s Movement slogan of the 1970s, ‘the personal is political’ resonated with a more general politicisation of close-to-home issues among radicals of the New Left in that period – sites such as the housing estate, the community centre, the local nursery, the workplace were foci of action and mobilisation from which to seek influence on wider decision making about housing, communities, childcare and work. This type of politics sought an answer to the left critique of citizenship as, at best, affording formal equal rights and duties but actually doing nothing to give people equal access to key decisions that determined the distribution of goods and benefits.

Debate continues around notions of ‘the good citizen’, and over how to promote ‘active citizenship’ through ‘citizenship education’ directed particularly at young people. The more radical acknowledge the problematic nature of defining ‘good citizenship’ given inequalities and differences between people and the lack of underprivileged voices in any definition of the common good. The term ‘citizen’ carries a different history of ideological baggage in former state socialist societies. For example, Ladislav Machacek suggests that it is only in recent years that the term ‘civil society’ is returning to the language of Slovakia. He notes that the term citizen was often associated with being ‘citizens of gypsy origin’ a group stereotyped negatively by many in the non-gypsy population; the terms citizen became discredited and rarely used (Machacek, 2002). In his analysis, the concept of citizenship is being rehabilitated as commentators perceive civil society as contradicting loss of freedom and dictatorship, and citizenship becomes associated with the idea of freedom and democracy; ideals that sit uneasily with racial prejudice.

Hall, Williamson and Coffey (1998) make a strong plea for recognizing that people’s sense of themselves as citizens is rarely an identity but rather a simple acknowledgment that they are classified as such by their government. Speaking about Britain, they argue:
‘Thinking commonsensically of what purchase citizenship as an identity has among young people, the immediate answer has to be ‘very little’; indeed, most of us only really think of ourselves as citizens, first and foremost, when we are at passport control. As a status attributable to an individual by virtue of a relationship with the state, citizenship has a rather formal and asocial character, too cumbersome for use in everyday and personal complexities of social interaction. And it is in social interaction – at home with the family, and in peer groups – that young people are most actively involved and interested in negotiating their emergent social identities. This negotiatedness of social identity stands in contrast with citizenship, which is, more often than not, a matter of no negotiation at all, even between individual and the state. Shore and Black (1994) make this same point about citizenship of the European Union’ (Hall, Williamson and Coffey, 1998, 309-10)

Their reference to the empirical reality of young people’s lives may be more relevant to Britain and even there, possibly only applies to the majority who have had no trouble in acquiring their passport or other experiences causing contemplation of the power of the state to withhold citizenship. Their plea to separate citizenship off from identity can be interrogated on theoretical grounds. Referring back to the earlier discussions of social categorisation, note that it was then argued that allocation to an abstract category that is highly consequential, modifying patterns of social interaction and life-chances, is also inevitably consequential for identity. Hence it can be argued that in some circumstances, citizenship, the denial of citizenship, or perhaps the experience of partial citizenship will result in self-orientation to the category as an aspect of self-identity. If we restrict our understanding of citizenship to that of a ‘status’ in Marshall’s sense, the empirical issue becomes if and when citizenship is experienced as consequential. For example, is the entitlements to live and work in Europe, which flows from citizenship of a member state of the European Union rather than nationality, consequential in this way for some young people? This entitlement is not likely to be salient to those whose horizons and ambitions do not go beyond local employment and training. Moreover, there is always the danger that the consequentiality of citizenship will be confused with nationality, since state rules for the allocation of citizenship invariably invoke nationality to a greater or lesser degree. The issues become different if citizenship is conceptualized not just as a status that can be given and taken by the state but also as social practices of engagement with civil society over governance issues at a personal and local level. This focuses attention on the types of social engagement that young people have with their society and the extent to which they attempt to consciously participate in shaping immediate environments for themselves and others. As matters of interaction these engagements will necessarily be consequential for identity, even if not self-named as citizenship-identity. Indeed, this is the line of empirical work pursued by some British researchers under the ESRC funded programme Youth, Citizenship and Social Change.9

9 See in particular the studies Negotiating Transitions to Citizenship headed by Professor Ruth Lister (see Noel Smith et al. (2002)) and A longitudinal study of young people’s involvement in social action headed by Dr Debi Roker (Eden and Roker (2002)).
Contrast the claims made by Hall, Williamson and Coffey about the experience of citizenship with the discussion by Prina Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis who go much further in blurring citizenship identity and national identity in their claim that citizenship is ‘a complex, ambiguous imaginary’ (1999, 2), ‘much more than simply the formal relationship between an individual and the state presented by an earlier liberal and political science literature. Our alternative approach defines citizenship as a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging’ (1999, 4). Werbner and Yuval-Davis argue that tension between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ is inherent in democratic citizenship that both enables the opening up of freedom to be different and puts limits on difference. ‘It orders conflict, channels and tames it; it labels and classifies collective differences; it determines how, where and when difference may legitimately be ‘represented’, and who counts as ‘different’ in the political arena, itself a social construct. Citizenship defines the limits of state power and where a civil society or the private sphere of free individuals begins. These opposed impulses are part of what makes citizenship, for subjects themselves, such a complex, ambiguous imaginary’ (1999, 2). While Hall and colleagues are no doubt correct that the term citizenship is not on the lips of many young people, the issues identified by Werbner and Yuval-Davis as issues of citizenship are matters of local and personal concern confronted daily not simply on national border crossings.

The processes of categorizing similarity and difference are identified by Werbner and Yuval-Davis as part of this contradictory dynamic of democratic citizenship in much the same way as they are in discussions of national identity. The possible consequences these authors pick out are not only the bleak message of Bauman. For Bauman (1998, 1995,1992, 1990) the constant potential for ‘othering’ implicated in citizenship is the temptation of fostering ‘sameness’ through the manipulation of nationalism and to eradicate difference through the extermination of ‘strangers’. Werbner and Yuval-Davis emphasise an alternative possibility for democratic citizenship to expand notions of rights beyond the narrow territoriality of nation states. They suggest that fully participating in democratic citizenship means agency, being a conscious active subject in dialogue with other citizens, and that this in turn sets the conditions for an expanding understanding of citizenship into ‘a charter for human rights which is uncircumscribed territorially and which envisages, in Claude Levi-Strauss’s words, a ‘humanity without frontiers’ (Levi-Strauss 1966: 166): the ethical, physical and cultural survival of the human species in all its totemic diversity’ (1999, 3). A European citizenship identity would then simply be a stepping-stone to a more global identity. Both the totalitarian state and the pursuit of human rights without frontiers are theoretical possibilities in their conceptualization of citizenship, and hence, given appropriate conditions, both remain theoretically possible futures for European citizenship.

It seems that ‘citizenship’ like ‘identity’ is an elastic and inference rich concept that bundles together complex social processes. Theoretically, there are grounds for assuming that in some social contexts and for some individuals, awareness of being a citizen will be significant for processes of identity. In other words, being a citizen will be associated with some or all of the following processes: the categorization and identification of self and others, the building of self-understanding and the construction of feelings of
‘groupness’ or belonging with others. Where, when and how ‘citizenship identity’ becomes important is an empirical matter but different theoretical approaches suggest different foci for investigation. While symbolic interactionists would concentrate on interactions with ‘significant others’ as the key site for identity formation, in discourse analysis all naturally occurring conversations are sites of construction of selves. Those who note that ‘citizenship’ and ‘identity’ are bridging concepts between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ and are also concerned to understand the reproduction of social inequality, require to also theorise the distribution of enabling and constraining resources in which people do the work of constructing their identities and being citizens. Moreover, they may suggest particular attention to interactions with those in positions of power and experiences of being denied aspects of citizenship rights.

Gerard Delanty is his account of theoretical shifts in understandings of citizenship adopts a ‘soft’ construction of identity as fluid and fragmented failing to acknowledge the sense of continuity of the self that interactionists take to be an aspect of being human. Like a number of authors he argues that global cultural forces have undermined many of the once conventional bases for both a more solid sense of self and of social solidarity. This understanding informs his account of the possibilities of European citizenship identity. Like other authors he suggests that Europe lacks ‘the core components of a national culture: language, a shared history, religion, an educational system and a press or media’ (2000, 114) and notes the possibility of ‘a European ethnos emerging around an identity based on exclusion; a supranationality, where the reference point is non-European’ (2000, 115). Here he takes it as inevitable that identity involves ‘othering’ rather than seeing this as a specific instance of identity processes occurring in particular circumstances. However, the main possibility that he identifies for the construction of a European identity is through what he calls ‘constitutional patriotism’ which refers to ‘an identification with democratic or constitutional norms, and not with the state, territory, national or cultural traditions. It is essentially a legal identity, as opposed to a cultural identity. Since a modern society is characterized by both complexity and multiculturalism, there can be no simple form of consensus as a basis for integration. This must instead, therefore, be conceived in terms of the legal system’s neutrality vis-à-vis cultural communities, while at the same time recognizing the diversity of different forms of life’ (2000, 115). However, his own theoretical work and that discussed above suggests that ‘democratic or constitutional norms’ will be locally interpreted and negotiated in social interaction. To make a ‘legal identity’ that celebrates the fairness and neutrality of the European Union, an aspect of ‘personal identity’ will require everyday social interactions that emotionally invest in and habitually practice, as well as consciously express, this type of active citizenship. It is hard to see how this would be possible without a sense of both continuity of self and of having some influence in and over the social world. This in turn requires local material and cultural resources that foster this particular version of active citizenship. It is also difficult to imagine that the framework of European law would be sufficient to contain this at the level of ‘being European’ rather than a sense of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘global’ citizen.

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10 Notions of fairness and neutrality may also not be gender neutral (Gilligan, 1982).
Discussion of Previous Studies

The literature is organized under a number of headings. However, the previous discussion of concepts suggests the possibility of overlap and confusion between ‘national identity’ and ‘citizenship identity’ at the level of everyday experience.

Regional, National and European Identity

Types of Quantitative Measures

Previous studies have typically approached these topics of regional, national and European identity using survey questions with pre-set choices of answers that can be administered to large samples and yield quantitative data. This necessarily involves using rather simple indicators of these rather complex concepts.

Measures of the relationship between identities like regional, national and European, often assume not only that these are relatively fixed identities but also that they are in relatively fixed relationship to each other in subjective experience. They are conceptualized as potentially being either compatible and nested within each other or as exclusive and antagonistic. One commonly used measurement technique involves a question first applied by Luis Moreno in Spain and often called the Moreno Scale as a form of shorthand. The question is: ‘Which, if anything, best describes how you see yourself’ and then offers choices involving two nationalities that may be relevant to the person. This question was also adapted by Moreno for use in Scotland (Paterson, 2001). The Scottish version is intended to explore the relationship between Scottish identity and British Identity and the choices are ‘Scottish, not British’, ‘More Scottish than British’, ‘Equally Scottish and British’, ‘More British than Scottish’, ‘British not Scottish’ ‘None of these’. It has mainly been used in Spain to measure attachment to an autonomous community versus attachment to Spain as a whole. As our Spanish colleagues note, in no case when this type of question is used, does it register the intensity of the identifications. It presumes that at least one of the categories has significance for the identity of the individual but it does not demonstrate this. In 1997 Eurobarometer adopted this question to ask about national versus European identity.

A second way of comparing ‘regional identity’, ‘national identity’ and ‘European identity’ is through attempting to construct independent identification scales that indicate the direction and intensity of identification and allow their subsequent comparison. There are many different questions that attempt to do this and opinions on whether a single question or item can measure national identity or whether a whole series of questions are required. Single questions have formulations like ‘How important is being [region/nation/European] to you?’ and offer a scale on which the respondent can place himself or herself. There is no agreement among those who argue that national identity is multi-dimensional and therefore needs a series of questions concerning either the precise nature of the dimensions or how they should be measured. For some social psychologists, identity involves ‘pride’ but for others ‘pride’ is part of ‘patriotism’, which is distinguished from ‘national identity’ (see the paper by Stephen Gibson on our website for further discussion of the extent of confusion). In our team, our Spanish colleagues argue that questions that ask about feelings such as ‘how proud do you feel to be’ tap the
emotional component of ‘national identity’ whereas questions that are less explicitly about feelings might tap a cognitive level.

In a paper published on our website, Stephen Gibson further considers some of the issues of measuring ‘national identity’ in Social Psychology. He notes that authors stressing the micro-flexibility of national identity (e.g. Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992; Hopkins & Murdoch, 1999; Hopkins, Regan & Abell, 1997; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000) and problematizing the assumption of national identity as an enduring psychological object, nevertheless, often fail to use measurement techniques consistent with their theoretical position. Standard techniques for measuring context specificity include asking participants to complete scale items on more than one occasion, or randomly allocating participants to different contextual conditions, with either an experimental manipulation of context (e.g. Hopkins et al, 1997, Rutland and Cinnirella, 2000) or more rarely at different ‘significant’ times (e.g. Haslam et al 1992, whose participants responded to scale items before and after the Gulf War of 1991). However, the questionnaire items measuring national identity treat ‘national identity’ as a static object at the point of measurement. Any sense of continuity or process is lost in favour of a ‘picture’ of identity at a single point in time (Condor, 1996a). Awareness of these kinds of criticism has resulted in an increasing number of qualitative studies to complement and supplement quantitative work and occasionally as an alternative to quantitative approaches.

National and Comparative Identities in Austria


Max Haller and Stefan Gruber report empirical findings of a survey on national pride, patriotism and nationalism which was carried out in 1995 as part of the ISSP-project (Haller, 1996). The sample size was 1000 and the age group 14 +. It represents a major contribution to the research on Austrian national identity.

The survey confirms a tendency documented by survey questions over the last 30 years: the attitude that Austria is a nation in its own right has gradually gained ground and approaches a universally held view. 90% of the respondents describe themselves as Austrians. Over 80% feel bound up with the country.

What does it mean to be Austrian? Is it linked to citizenship or socio-cultural aspects? The findings show that somebody is accepted as a real Austrian if he/she has both characteristics. Thus, Austria is seen as a socio-political community that includes a cultural as well as a political aspect.
This finding is supported by the attitudes of Austrians towards topics such as immigration, which are linked to the understanding of nationality. With respect to immigration, Austrians generally distinguish between a general immigration which ought to be limited and a positive attitude toward particular groups of immigrants which are thought to “fit in”, such as the German speaking South Tyrolians from Northern Italy. Immigrants are expected to assimilate.

A sense of history can play an important part in constructions of ‘the nation’ and the self as national. Collective myths with respect to the past can help to develop and strengthen a positive self-image. At the same time there are processes to efface unpleasant memories. The territory of contemporary Austria has seen a lot of major changes during the past century alone: until the end of the first World War it was part of a large multicultural empire, after the collapse of the monarchy the first democracy was founded but soon afterwards destroyed again by the authoritarian corporative state. The latter lost its power four years later to the Nazi regime at the beginning of the Second World War. It is only from 1945 or 1955 when occupying Russian troops left Austria onwards that we could speak of a continuity of the Republic of Austria.

It might be expected that there is a correlation between the attitudes towards particular historical phases and the identification with contemporary Austria, but this is not the case.

Other questions concerning the picture of Austria relate to socio-political topics, the role of the Church and religion, the political neutrality of Austria and contemporary political personalities. Considering how the influence of the Church and religion has strongly decreased in everyday life during the past decades, it seems surprising that the respondents ascribe a lot of importance to the Catholic Church for the Austrian nation. There is also a significant positive effect of confession and religiousness on patriotism and national pride. The Austrian political neutrality and its independence within the frame of the European Union are highly valued and correlate with a number of dimensions of national identity. This has probably got to do with the fact that the political personalities Bruno Kreisky and Franz Vranitzky (both social democrats) who were strongly in favour of and defended political neutrality had a very positive image and especially among those who feel very attached to Austria and are proud of Austria. The Social Democrats – at least since 1945 along side the Communists – has been the party that defended an autonomous role of Austria as a small state most consistently. Thus members and voters of the Social Democrats have the strongest Austrian consciousness, while supporters of the Green party have a clearly more distanced position than those of all other parties.

A central topic relates to the distinction between the positive pole of patriotism as a positive attitude to one’s country on the one hand and a nationalistic-chauvinistic attitude, which exaggerates the value of one’s own country and devalues other countries and cultures on the other. Indeed, the analysis showed that there are two dimensions: the dimension of patriotism includes high values on one’s own country, chauvinism and
social exclusion; the dimension of national pride correlates positively with a cosmopolitan and pro-foreigner attitude.

A currently very obvious question is whether the voters of Haider and his Freedom Party have a particular attitude toward the “Third Reich”. The respondents were asked to evaluate a list of statements concerning Haider and National Socialism. Supporters of the Freedom Party were then compared with other respondents. The findings show that there is no strong tendency of the former to have a positive attitude toward National Socialism. This suggests that Haider’s success was mainly based on his criticism of the former governments.

Lastly, the socio-structural determinants of national identity were analysed. Especially patriotism is less marked among younger people and people with a higher educational level and/or occupational status. This might be the result of a generational as well as life cycle effect. The former suggests a long-term decrease of patriotic (also chauvinistic) attitudes. The latter suggests that patriotic attitudes increase with age, since the opportunities to have a say in communal affairs and the interest in the public and private sphere also increase with age. Very low national pride correlates with a significantly lower level of socio-cultural integration, with a lack of trust in socio-political institutions but also in one’s contemporaries in the family and society. Thus, national identity and national pride represent a basic attitude which is related to all other life spheres of the individual and has an enormous impact on the stability of the whole political community (Haller and Gruber in Haller 1996, 61-147).

With respect to differences among the Federal Regions, a survey of 370 Austrians in the Federal Regions of Vienna, Styria and Vorarlberg shows a much higher level of identification with one’s Federal Region in Styria and in Vorarlberg.

**Table 1: Proud to be a citizen of the Federal region:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The low level of regional identity in Vienna might be explained by the urban character of this region. In order to test this, Styria and Vorarlberg were compared. While 43% of respondents in Styria identified with the Federal Region, this was only true for 29% of those living in towns. The difference between urban and rural areas in Styria thus point to an explanation for the low level in Vienna. However, in Vorarlberg the level of identity does not correlate with the size of town.\(^{11}\)

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\(^{11}\) Andreas Neumayer, in Max Haller (project leader) Regional, National and European Identity, research report, Graz 1999: 67-84
With respect to the identification with the European Union there is no significant difference between the Federal Regions.\footnote{Daniela Jarz, in Max Haller (project leader) Regional, National and European Identity, research report, Graz 1999: 287-303}

**Table 2: Feeling of being bound up with the European Union**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>None at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another empirical study is concerned with the national identity among 16 to 19 year old students in Austria (Joseph Langer in Haller, 1996, 327-381). It was carried out in 1994 and relies on expert interviews, group discussions, content analysis of history school books and interviews with students in three Austrian Federal Regions: Tyrol, Carinthia, Vienna.

The main findings of this study show that the majority of young people are conscious of the concept of the nation. It is a more or less defined notion but also a value. At the same time there is a minority of one third, who either do not have a concept of the nation at all or do not feel they belong to a nation for ideological reasons. Their statements range from “don’t know”, to indifference, to conscious disagreement with this political concept. Looking at contemporary youth culture and its symbolic representations, a nationally defined collective identity is no longer visible.

However, the “non-national” minority is not alienated from Austria. They are also proud of Austria but less frequently than those who define themselves as Austrian nationals. In the international comparison (International Social Survey Programme(ISSP) 1995), the level of pride in Austria is considerable. It is only possible to explain this if various forms of collective identity are assumed. National consciousness then only applies to an identity within the nationalistic tradition. The latter can generally be identified by its negative attitude toward foreigners. In this sense the author concludes:

- The feeling of young Austrians is more a “country-consciousness” than national consciousness. The nation as a political programme tends to be associated with a negative collective experience. This constellation makes it possible to ignore the nation as a political tradition and still be a proponent of Austria.
- At the same time it can be observed that where the nation looses its meaning, some dimensions of identification with Austria also loose their significance. Josef Langer argues in terms of individualisation and globalisation theory to explain this: the state as the representative of society steps back behind intermediary organisations which increasingly act on a global level.
What alternatives are there to the nation state, i.e. are there spheres which might be expected to integrate young people? In Josef Langer’s study, there was no clear evidence neither toward localism nor toward globalism. The difference between the local community and Europe is only 10%. The young people felt less related with the local community (55%) than with Austria (65%). However, one quarter to one third of the students show no or only a very low level of relatedness with their neighbourhood, local community, Federal Region, Austria or Europe. Compared with the average of the Austrian population, the young people’s relatedness with social spheres seems to be lower on all levels.

There is another difference between young people and the whole population. While among the whole population localism and globalism seem to be two compatible concepts, this does not seem to be true among young people. Those students who identify with their neighbourhood or local community do not feel equally comfortable with larger geographical units such as Federal Region, Nation or Europe. Further, young people who do not believe in the concept of a nation tend to be localists, identifying with their immediate neighbourhood. Young people who adhere to the traditional concept of a nation are more like the average of the population.

In a debate on identity, even on national identity, social networks deserve attention since they also socialise and influence behaviour. In Josef Lang’s study the peer group was by far the most important social network of the respondents (97%), followed by leisure groups (76%) and the school class (69%). The wider population of the Federal Region or Austria is important for only 40%. Religious groups are least important (21%). 30% of the respondents are members in youth groups: 25% in sports organisations, 50% in conventional youth organisations such as the scouts, and 25% in trendy youth networks such as techno, skaters, punks etc. In the non-traditional groups, membership can be signaled with specific symbols without participating. Social networks can organise around these symbols or they can remain mere categories of lifestyles. The level of commitment is up to the individual. However, the gain in identity is not less than in traditional youth groups.

**National and Comparative identities in Germany**

In Germany, national identity was one of the topics of a large survey of young people know as the Shell survey\(^\text{13}\). The data show a mainly positive perception of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), but without nationalistic arrogance. However, there are significant differences among young people: those living under comparatively adverse

\(^{13}\text{Since 1953 the steeped in tradition and popular Shell-studies are carried out approximately every five years as a representative cross-section of the youth population with various main topics. The first Shell-study, including East and West German youths (1992) was primarily dedicated to the life situations, general orientations and developmental perspectives of young people in the reunified Germany. The following study (1997) was mainly focussed on the future perspectives, the social engagement and the political orientations of youths. Also the latest study ‘Youth 2000’ contains many questions to the relation of youths to politics, especially to the subject ‘Europe’ and ‘perception of Germany’ (see Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1992, 1997, Deutsche Shell 2000).}\)
conditions – above all females and young people from East Germany – assesses Germany as far worse than their peers.

In Germany, previous quantitative studies suggest that both nation and region enjoy a much higher rating in the subjective importance and identification than Europe. People who think of themselves, first and foremost, as European\textsuperscript{14} remain an absolutely minority.

According to the results of Eurobarometer-surveys, the \textit{national state} not only in the FRG commands a far greater commitment than Europe. It is true that the nation-state is no longer the sole organization of the economy or politics due to globalisation. But instead of a more universalistic identity consciousness, this loss of importance has arguably led to a stronger solidarity with the nation and the home region. The maintenance of pursuit of national interests to the debit of other nations as well as the persisting dominance of national policies, institutions and symbols in the perception of citizens is the mainly mentioned reasons for the continuous success of the national state principle. In addition, the fear of foreign determination by a widespread part of population represents a further factor, which promotes the mental retreat into the familiarity of nation state (Minc, 1992, Jeisman and Ritter, 1993, Estel and Mayer, 1994; Jenkins and Sofos, 1996).

Of course there are many other surveys that address the topic of ‘European identity’ in the FRG. These data either come from periodical surveys of opinion research\textsuperscript{14} or from research enterprises with corresponding priorities. One example represents the work of Waldemar Lilli and his colleagues who try to explore the foundations of social identity orientations in different European regions by empirical studies.\textsuperscript{15} Another example is the project ‘National Identity of the Germans’, in which 602 persons from East and West Germany were interviewed about their collective identifications for at least three times between 1993 and 1996.\textsuperscript{16} However, such extensive panel designs represent exceptions. Just as rare are qualitatively orientated approaches for analysing identity relevant problems.\textsuperscript{17}

These studies produce a great heterogeneity of empirical results that can be traced back to the partially different main topics of the studies and their different methodical approaches. However, two findings are repeated very regular: On the one hand the combination of both negative and positive attitudes suggests that young people have very ambivalent attitudes towards Europe. On the other hand, it is clear that national and regional identifications dominate in comparison to European concerns.

\textsuperscript{14} For example, the Institute for Opinion Polling Allensbach carries out an population representative survey to subjects concerning Europe, year by year. The results are regularly printed in the yearbook of European integration (see Weidenfeld & Wessels). Moreover, there is a multitude of so-called ‘flash surveys’ commissioned by public media to measure the current degree of support European integration processes within the population (see Politbarometer etc.).
\textsuperscript{15} Lilli 1994a, 1994b, 1998
\textsuperscript{16} Schmidt 1998
\textsuperscript{17} Honolka & Götz 1999
In Germany, an almost stronger attraction as a source of collective identity comes from the local spheres of the individual, but without replacing the national state as identification reference. Here, the geographic-political categories of relevance range from the specific place of origin to the home region and then the federal state. The great attraction of these categories is primarily explained by their subjective manageable size. This nearness comes more towards the building of an emotionally determined relation than the increasingly abstract, strange and unclear experienced institutions of the state and especially of Europe. According to optimistic interpretations, the new regional consciousness a chance for the end of nationalistic exclusion effects. In this view, a more integrative and universalistic identity consciousness follows more or less automatically from the identification with local entities.\textsuperscript{18} Though the requirement of a social structure has to be met in which the population shows a high degree of ethnic and national heterogeneity. In part, this assumption is valid for the former West Germany, but definitely not for the five new Laender. Besides, it must not be neglected that regional identifications also in Germany include a potential for exclusion.\textsuperscript{19}

Altogether, it remains to notice that in Germany the subject ‘nation’ has not at all finished anywhere between Europe and the regions like many people hoped. Also, in a medium-term perspective, a removal of national identity by a European consciousness is not expected. Accordingly, much analysis refers to a multitude of factors that stand in the way of developing a European community spirit. These characteristics range from cultural features and political traditions of Christian-European history (language variety etc.) to peculiarities of the global situation (retreat to the regions etc.) and the internal structures of the European system (missing of a political reference frame according to the existing indifferences about the territorial reference space, the target direction of integration processes etc.).\textsuperscript{20} The predominantly stated attitude of the German population towards Europe as ‘uninterested positive’ is neither astonishing against this background nor represents an exception. However, many authors point out that the basic assumption of a replacement of national identity by European identity could not be sustained, either theoretically or empirically. Rather than this, it is to assume that a European identity is able to develop – if at all – only in addition to national and regional identities. The identities within the national states – which in fact were already multidimensional – will merely be extended by the new reference point Europe. Therefore, regional, national and European identity could not be demarcated from each other, but have to be understood as integrative aspects of a collective total identity.\textsuperscript{21}

In principle, the politics of the European Union for promoting a European ‘we-feeling’ reflects this opinion. The legally defined respect for and recognition of national identities represents as well as the attempted integration of the regional level into the processes of

\textsuperscript{18} Schm"{u}cker & Hering 1994
\textsuperscript{19} It is true, that in Germany less ethnic-cultural motives like the protection of a certain language, sovereignty demands of certain ethnic groups etc. are central for regional determined conflicts. But many people see the continuously difficult relation of East and West Germans as a kind of mutual exclusion, founding on different regional identities.
\textsuperscript{20} Gephart 1993, Walkenhorst 1999
European unification (‘Europe of Regions’) represent the efforts to overcome the emotional distance and the insufficient agreement of citizens to the European project, by inclusion of existing identifications. To what extent these steps are suitable for solving the problem of European identity and for eliminating the deficit of legitimacy is controversial. A stable and durable feeling of community by the citizens of Europe could not be read from the findings of survey research.

National and Comparative identities in Spain

We reviewed the studies that compare local identities with more cosmopolitan ones. Local identities refer to identification with village, town/city, province or region, whilst more cosmopolitan identities tend to include State-national identity and European identity. As we shall see, in the majority of cases, the dynamic of these identities is dealt with in a dual or exclusive way, and there are few studies that deal with the dynamic of these identities independently.

Indeed, we found only one study that makes a comparison of identification with one’s Autonomous Community, to Spain and to Europe.

Moral (1998), in a representative study on a national scale and in eight Autonomous Communities22, found two factors of ethno-territorial identification: localism is a factor that reflects identification with the closest and most specific ambits, such as village, town/city, province or Autonomous Community (AC), while cosmopolitanism implies identification with more abstract and distant ambits, such as Spain or the European Union (EU)23. Responses from the AC of Madrid place Spanish identity as most important and European identity as least important. In the Basque Country, however, local identity is placed first, and European identity again comes last.

Those aged 15 to 29, as is the case for the population as a whole, identify more with closer and more specific ambits (village, town/city, province and AC) than with the more cosmopolitan ones such as the EU. Level of cosmopolitanism is somewhat higher among young people with a university education (Moral and Mateos, 1999)24.

In order to define ethno-territorial belonging, young people refer above all to subjective elements (feeling like a member of that group) and awareness elements (living in that territory and feeling like a member of that group). This combination of subjective and pragmatic elements is more accentuated among those that attribute a national identity to

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22 Study carried out in 1996 with a sample of 2,500 interviews, distributed proportionally throughout the seventeen ACs (excluding Ceuta and Melilla), and which was extended in the eight ACs with their own language (Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Valencia Community, Galicia, Navarre and the Basque Country) or a significant presence of nationalist representation (Andalusia and Canaries). The sample is representative both at a national level and for these eight Communities, in which a minimum of 300 interviews was set.

23 Anderson (1991) discusses the imagined character of the representation of the national communities.

24 The study by Moral and Mateos 1999 was carried out in 1997. Study representative on a national scale of the Spanish population of both sexes aged 15 to 19. 2,437 interviews throughout the 270 municipal districts and 48 provinces. The sampling was multi-staged and stratified by clusters, first municipal districts, then sections and finally individuals by random routes and with sex and age quotas.
the group to which they belong, and among those with higher educational levels, younger subjects (15-19-year-olds) and those with a left political orientation. Those with a lower educational level and with an extreme right political ideology, prefer an ethnic membership that implies having been born in the territory and being the child of citizens of that territory.

Moreover, little internal mobility is observed. Though 80% of young people were born in the AC in which they currently live, in the Basque Country the figure is 72%, while in Madrid it is only 58%. Young immigrants identify more with their community of residence than with that of their birth (Moral and Mateos, 1999).

One of the ways of approaching identification with one’s Autonomous Community and with Spain is through the procedure used by Moreno (1988). This procedure implies that young people can identify either exclusively with each of the national or AC identities or in a combined way with both of them, but in no case does it register the intensity of the identifications. In the study by Moral and Mateos (1999), young people have a dual identification (with Spain and with their AC) to a greater extent than the general population (55% as against 50%), and this tendency is even more marked among women. Educational level and political ideology affect these results in the sense that the higher the educational level and the more leftward the political orientation, the greater the national – AC orientation, while the lower the educational level and the more rightward the political orientation, the greater the national – Spanish orientation.

The Basque Country differs from Madrid in that there is more identification with one’s province and Autonomous Community. On the one hand, three out of four voters of Basque nationalist parties identify first with their village or town/city and none claim to identify first with Spain. On the other hand, although localism also predominates, among the voters of State-scope parties, identification with Spain displaces to third position the identification with Autonomous Community (Smolzka, 1999).

A second way of measuring these two identities is through independent identification scales that indicate the direction and intensity of the two types of identification and allow their subsequent intertwined combination. Their relational combination is referred to as comparative identity. This can be high when AC identification predominates, null when the two identities have the same intensity and low when state identity predominates over AC identity. The Basque Country is characterized by high comparative identity, that is, identification with AC is greater than identification with Spain. One of the consequences of this high comparative identity is the tendency to positive in-group differentiation and the adoption of acultural separation strategies (Ros, Huici and Gómez 2000).

A third form of measuring Spanish national identification considers its emotional component. In the study by Moral and Mateos (1999), this component is measured as the

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25 Study representative of the Spanish population of both sexes and of age 18 or over. 2,500 interviewees were distributed proportionally throughout 168 municipal districts of 46 provinces corresponding to 17 Autonomous Communities.
degree of pride one feels to be Spanish. While in the AC of Madrid more than 80% feel proud to be Spanish, in the Basque Country the figure reaches only 33%. On comparing the level of pride felt for Spain and for one’s AC, the results are clear. In the Basque Country people feel prouder of being Basque than Spanish, while in Madrid the opposite is found. Moreover, while only one in four young Basques interviewed consider that Spain is their country or nation, the majority of young people from Madrid support this idea.

Some studies analyze the relative importance of the determinant factors of the national character of an AC. Moral (1998) reports that for the Basque Country the language factor, the ethnic factor and the historical factor are, in that order, the most important determining factors of the national character of an AC. Other studies focus on the importance of the vitality of the language for the social identity of these communities (Ros, Bourhis and Azurmendi 1999, Sigúan 1999). In our country, the 1978 Constitution recognized, together with Spanish or Castilian as the national language of the State, the co-officiality of Catalan, Basque and Galician in their respective Autonomous Communities. The adoption of policies of revitalization of the use of regional languages in education, work, the mass media and public institutions has increased the importance of these languages in the definition of the AC national identity. Ros, Cano and Huici (1987) show that Catalan and Basque constitute differentiating elements of the social identity of Catalans and Basques. Moreover, young people with high comparative identity explain the use of these regional languages, as against the use of Spanish, from the point of view of in-group identification (Ros, Huici and Cano, 1994).

Grad (2001a) considers that the implications of these identities are different in political cultures that stress civic or ethnic elements in the social representation of the national group. While identification with a civic identity (such as that of Catalonia) is accompanied by the attribution of greater relative importance to prosocial universalist values (equality, social justice, world peace) versus the importance of values of benevolence (prosocial values that are applied in a particularist way, favoring the endonational group, such as helping, honesty, or the ability to forgive), identification with an ethnic identity (such as the Basque one) correlates with the relative importance of particularist prosocial values versus universalist ones. Likewise, Grad and Ros (1998) show that ethnic (Basque) national identity is incompatible with the Spanish identity, while civic identity (Catalan) is compatible with it. In a similar line, ethnic identity is associated with a higher intensity of comparative identity (in the Basque Country) than civic identity (in Catalonia). Moreover, immigrants into nationalist cultures with an ethnic basis appear to need identification with the dominant identity for their social integration (Grad, 2001b).

Studies that compare national identity with European identity usually employ a procedure similar to that of Moreno (1988). This procedure consists in differentiating exclusively national or supranational identities from combined identities. Interviewees had to choose one of these four possibilities: “just national”, “your own nationality and European”, “European and national” or “just European”. The predominant form of identity in the European population is one’s own nationality or a combination of one’s own nationality
and European. Spaniards are above the European mean in feeling only European (Eurobarometer n.47 and 47.2, 1997).

In the study by Smolzka (1999), subjects were asked whether they felt: “above all a European citizen”, “above all a Spanish citizen”, “A European citizen and Spanish at the same time” or “none of the above answers”. The Spanish population interviewed opted mainly for Spanish citizenship (67.8%), followed by dual Spanish and European citizenship (19.2%), none of these (6.7%), and above all a European citizen (5.8%). Those interviewed in the Autonomous Community of Madrid differed from the national mean in that a lower percentage chose Spanish citizenship (66%), more chose dual Spanish-European citizenship (28%) and fewer chose European only (3.8%). In the Basque Country the “only European” figure was higher (15.7%), Spanish citizenship (34%) and dual citizenship (17.6%) were lower, and the lack of identification with these social categories was significantly higher (34%).

Young Spaniards (aged 18 to 24), like the other age groups, mainly choose Spanish citizenship (61.4%); however, they differ from the other age groups in that more of them choose dual Spanish and European citizenship (25.7%) and more (8.5%) choose “none of the above answers”. European citizenship alone, the option least chosen, overall, is the most popular among those aged 35 to 44 (8.5%). As age increases (from 45 years on), Spanish identification increases and dual identification decreases (Smolzka, 1999).

Comparative identity has also been applied to the comparative analysis of national regional identity and European identity. Huici et al (1997) analyzed the European identity of young people as a function of comparative identity (national/regional community). In a study comparing young university students in Scotland (GB) and Andalusia (Spain), these researchers found that in Scotland, where regional identity is more salient, European identification is associated with beliefs in changes in the political relations of the region with the nation. On the other hand, in Andalusia, where regional identity is less important, European identification is not associated with this type of belief. Thus, beliefs associated with European identity appear to be related to the dynamic of the relations between national and autonomous region identity.

The content of European identity has been studied through the meaning Europe has, by means of questions with closed answers. For young people; the meaning of Europe is related, first, to the ability to go wherever one wants within Europe (35%); second, to a way of creating a better future for young people (34%); and third, as a form of improving the economic situation in the EU (34%). Spain differs in that it scores below the mean in seeing Europe as helping freedom of movement, creating jobs and guaranteeing peace (Eurobarometer 47, 1997).

**National and Comparative Identities in Slovakia**

The period of social transformation in the Czech and Slovak Republics after 1989 led to changes in identification with macro social formations such as nation, state, Europe, humans, etc. This period of time can be characterised by a high dynamics of
reconstruction of social identities, by their complexity and sometimes by the conflicting character of the whole process. The following series of researches, investigating the identity in different generations of people, was undertaken to understand these phenomena.

In 1995 –1998, extensive research was carried out to assess the perceptions of identity by members of various generations on various levels of social life in the process of transformation of the Slovak society.

However, thus far, there has been no empirical work in social psychology directly focusing on European identity. European identity has been more investigated, whether theoretically or empirically, by sociology (Bunčák & Piscová, 2000; Matějů, 2000; Zich, 1999, etc.). Regional identity has been studied only indirectly, in the context of the above mentioned research project in Košice. In addition, regional identity has been conceptualised as an “attachment to place” in the framework of researches on forced relocation of inhabitants from the territory of the Orava dam (Naništová, 1998) and on “environmental dispositions in children” (Naništová & Mésárošová, 2000). However, these researches are little imputing to the domain of identity research.

Comparing the identification within three generations

This project carried out in Košice (Frankovský, 2000a; Bolfíková, 1997; Bačová & Výrost, 1996; Frankovský & Bolfíková, 1996; Baumgartner & Hadušovská, 1996; Lovaš & Pirháčová, 1996) is a research on projective role taking by the members of three different generations (below age 25, aged 25-50 and above 50 years of age). The participants were asked to evaluate their own identification with various social formations and social roles, as well as to project themselves into their predecessors' (people of the same age as the participants who, however, lived 20-30 years ago) and successors' (people of the same age who will live 20-30 years later) identifications.

The oldest generation experienced a stronger sense of belonging to a village/town, region, nation and the Slovak Republic than the middle and the youngest generations. The youngest participants identified more with larger social formations such as Europe (Bačová & Výrost, 1996; Frankovský and Bolfíková, 1996; Frankovský, 2000a) and were rated as such by the two older generations. At the same time, the youngest generation identified the most with the roles of a good expert, wanted to have a leading position in professional life, to travel, to have an active and exciting life.

When projecting into their “predecessors” identifications, the participants imputed to their predecessors a stronger feeling of belonging to a village/town, region, nation and congregation than they actually expressed it. On the other hand, the belonging of

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26 In these researches, the attachment to place is defined as a phenomenon comprising different components of emotional and cognitive experience or symbolic relations of people to concrete places. The emphasis is given to two of its dimensions: dependence on place and identification with place (Naništová, op.cit., p. 377).
predecessors to Central Europe, Europe and humans was rated as weaker than they expressed it. The participants probably thought that the preceding generations identified less with the broader context beyond Slovak frontiers because of linguistic barrier, political system and their limited contacts with abroad (Frankovský & Bolfíková, 1998). However, when evaluating their successors, the participants considered them as clearly oriented toward the formations that transcend the borders of a concrete state (ibid, Frankovský, 2000).

The authors conclude that family membership, parenthood and expertise can be designed as “universal” or “age independent” identities (Bačová, 1996b; Lovaš & Pirháčová, 1996). All three generations refused to make a political career, engage in the national cause and follow a charismatic leader (ibid). This reflects the unfavourable political situation in Slovakia between 1993-1998. The authors conclude the influence of age and of social and historical conditions on the identification with various social formations and roles. They also consider that the evidence of dissimilar identity construction for oneself and for other people living in different historical periods is the most important result of this research project (Bačová, 1996b; Bačová & Výrost, 1996).

Homišinová (1999) focused on the strength of identification with macro social formations according to the ethnic minority/majority membership. One hundred 18 years old students (Slovak majority and Hungarian ethnic minority) participated in the research. The Slovak majority participants identified the most strongly with their village/town, the Slovak Republic and humans. On the other hand, the Hungarian minority participants identified more strongly with bigger social formations such as Central Europe, Europe and humans. As expected, they identified the least with the Slovak nation.

Frankovský (2000b) compared the identification with macro social formations according to the level of education. In general, the participants with elementary education, identified more with micro regions where they lived (village/town region). On the other hand, the participants with university degree identified more with macro social formations such as Europe.

Bačová (1996) argues that the identifications of Slovak and Hungarian participants with the representation of their own ethnic groups are very strong. She found however, that there is a difference between the structure of ethnic identity of Slovak participants from villages with mixed Slovak-Hungarian population and the structure of ethnic identity of Slovak participants from ethnically homogeneous Slovak villages. The ethnic identity of the former is more complicated and the participants who define themselves as Slovak construct their ethnic social world in a cognitively different way.

National and Comparative Identities in Scotland and England in the UK
Interest in national identity has been stimulated in the United Kingdom by new constitutional arrangements, which devolved government to a Scottish parliament and a Welsh Assembly in 1999, widely seen as political concessions to nationalist demands.
The conflict in Northern Ireland has long encouraged studies of Irish nationalism and of the interaction between religious and national identity in Northern Ireland. Because of our study sites, in this review, we focus only on recent work on Scottish and English national identity.

Scotland and England became one state after the Union of Parliaments in 1707. The union, however, was a union of a small, relatively poor society (Scotland) with a much larger and more prosperous one (England), resulting in the site of government for the former residing in the latter. Given the dominance in size and power of England, it has perhaps always been easy to confuse Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) and the United Kingdom (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) with England, if you are not Scottish, Welsh or Irish (McCrone, 1998, 37-38). By end of the twentieth century, the terms Great Britain and the UK were rarely used in common everyday speech in England or Scotland. Arguably, the words ‘Great’ and ‘Kingdom’, if not ‘United’ have become awkwardly dated and unfashionable. The most common inclusive term in Scotland for the whole is ‘Britain’ and it is often unclear whether the speaker is intending to include or exclude Northern Ireland. In England, the terms England and Britain were often used interchangeably, as if they mean the same thing, a practice that has always attracted criticism from other parts of the UK. Scottish and Welsh nationalism are often explained in terms of reaction to the position of relative subordination to the larger and more powerful England. In the late twentieth century, the campaign for a Scottish parliament gathered momentum because of a strong sense of ‘democratic deficit’, in the years of the Conservative government of Thatcher and Major. In these years there was a complete mismatch between the way the majority of Scottish voters voted and the political colour of the government, elected by the more numerous English voters.

A number of indicators suggest that national identity may have heightened in importance and become important for more people in Scotland across the last decades of the twentieth century. In surveys of the Scottish population since 1979, respondents have been asked, ‘If you had to choose, which one best describes the way you think of yourself: British, English, European, Irish, Northern Irish, Scottish, Welsh, None of these?’ The adapted Moreno question, ‘Which if anything best describes how you see yourself, Scottish, not British, more Scottish than British, equally Scottish and British, more British than Scottish, British not Scottish, none of these?’ has been asked at intervals since 1992. Summarising the results, Lindsay Paterson et al. (2001, 101-120) note that the pattern of answers confirms an increase in the incidence of people seeing themselves as Scottish rather than British and suggests that constitutional change amplified rather than diminished Scottish national identity. However, the authors also note that there is considerable flux in how people answer such questions suggesting that national identity is rather more fluid than is commonly supposed (2001, 107).

The results of these questions in the most recent Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (2000. 2001) are given below, in comparison to the 1997 Scottish Election Survey (Bond and Rosie, 2002). Note that people were no longer forced to choose only one category from a list of possible national identities but were invited to choose as many as they thought
relevant. ‘Scottish’ was chosen by the overwhelming majority and only a small minority chose ‘European’, far fewer than those who chose British, despite ‘European’ being allowed as an additional choice. However, there was a slight increase in the number of people describing themselves as European over the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>1605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It has previously been hypothesized that Scottish people are more ready to identify themselves with Europe than English people. The reasons for this assumption include the emphasis in Scottish National Party rhetoric of the 1990s on ‘Scotland in Europe’. However, the empirical evidence has not been entirely consistent with this hypothesis although there is some weak evidence in its support. For example, the British Social Attitudes Survey and the Scottish Social Attitude Survey (Jowell et al, 1999, 2000 Park et al. 2001), annual surveys of public opinion, have suggested a marginal but not always statistically significant relationship between identifying with Scotland and identifying with Europe and dis-identifying with Europe. However, in 1997, Huici et al found that allegiance to Europe in Scotland is not significantly higher than in England. There is no simple positive correlation between Scottish and European identity but there is a simple negative correlation between Scottish and British identity (Huici 1997).
Because of the specific history of the relationship between Scotland and England, it has often been assumed that Scottish nationalism is a form of nationalism that has been nourished by the distinctiveness of Scottish civil society rather than a more ethnic nationalism. After the Union of Parliaments of Scotland and England in 1707, Scotland retained a separate legal system, a separate church and a separate educational system. These are seen as the key elements that enabled the flourishing of a distinctively Scottish civil society, which in turn, nourished a sense of being Scottish, as different from being English, despite the common British state.

There are relatively few studies attempting to analyze English identity prior to 1999. Susan Condor's (1996, 1997, 2000) work is one of the few exceptions. She found that neither the English holiday makers nor the English university students she interviewed were willing to strongly assert an English identity because both tended to have a very negative perception of English nationalism and felt that to assert a strong English identity would be to identify themselves as rather extreme and possibly racist individuals. Commentators have been looking for a rise in more civic and socially acceptable expressions of English identity as a response to the clearer marking of separate nationalisms within Britain following the new forms of devolved government.

Rebecca Langlands (1999) argues that ‘Britishness’ should be seen as a kind of ‘added value’ to the cultural identities of the various nations on the territory of the British state. The evidence suggests that it remains more likely to be seen in this way in England than in Scotland. The position of ‘ethnic minorities’ in the two parts of the British state may reflect this difference. For example, some research suggests that in England the designation ‘British-Pakistani’ may be preferred over ‘English-Pakistani’ by English people with Pakistani parents or grandparents but the situation is less clear for people with Pakistani parents or grandparents in Scotland. David McCrone has reviewed the evidence of a growing use of ‘English’ rather than ‘British’ by white English residents and and associated avoidance of the term ‘English’ and preference for ‘British’ by non-white ethnic minorities. ‘Whereas, for example, in 1992 twice as many people in England said they were ‘British’ compared with ‘English’, by 1999, the proportions were even (Scottish and British Elections Surveys, 1992; and Scottish and British Social Attitudes Surveys, 1999). This might, of course, be artefactual insofar as people's identities may not have changed; merely that they use a different vocabulary, but it is an interesting change of terms nonetheless. It seems that people in England are more willing to adopt the national descriptor of ‘English’. For ethnic minorities, however, this is a problem. Only 6% of people self-styling themselves as ‘black’, and 7% ‘Asian’ say that they are ‘English not British’, or ‘more English than British’, compared with 32% of the English population as a whole (Curtice and Heath, 2000). On the other hand, fully 36% of ‘blacks’ and 38% of ‘Asians’ say that they are ‘British not English’ (compared with 14% of the English population as a whole. What this suggests is that the term ‘English’ is reserved largely for white ‘natives’; almost an ‘ethnic’ identity which the non-white population in England feel excluded or exclude themselves from’ (McCrone, 2002, 305).
Saeed et al (1999) researched 63 people aged 14-17 who were of a Scottish-Pakistani background. They used a ‘Twenty Statement Test’ to locate identities of the young people. They found that given a list of statements about their identity, the young people reported being Muslim (97%) followed by Pakistani (46%) then black (26%), Scottish (22%), British (9%) and Asian (8%). When asked which statements were most significant when used to describe them, ‘I am Muslim’ was the most commonly chosen (85%) followed by ‘I am Pakistani’ (30%) and ‘I am black’ (11%). When asked to freely note what they thought their ethnic group to be, most of the sample chose double ethnicities such as Scottish-Pakistani (22%) or Scottish-Muslim (19%) before Pakistani (17%) or Muslim (16%). Fewer people made the combinations of Pakistani-Muslim (8%), Asian-Muslim (5%), British Pakistani (5%), Scottish Asian (5%) or British-Muslim (3%). When given labels by the researcher respondents tended to choose Scottish Pakistani (63%) in the main followed by Scottish Asian (11%).

A number of studies have also explored the extent of people’s attachment to more local centres of population such as cities, towns, or smaller scale units like neighbourhoods, as part of trying to understand their significance relative to national identity. MORI (Market Opinion and Research International) have undertaken a series of research for different organisations (Worcester, 2002). In 1998 they interviewed 896 adults for the Institute of Citizenship Studies and the Natwest Bank. They found young adults (15-24) were less likely than older adults to feel that they belonged to the local community (65% in comparison to 74% of adults aged over 24), to Britain (66% in comparison to 78%) but there was very little difference in terms of whether they felt they belonged to Europe (32% in comparison to 35%).

The social psychologist, Martyn Barrett, has developed a body of research on children in England and their sense of national and European identity (1992a, 1992b, 1996, 2000). He has used a variety of techniques to explore national identity. These include showing children cards with words that could be used as descriptions of them (e.g. "6years old", "girl", "white", "Christian", "person from London", "English" "European ") and then asking them to choose the one that was ‘most important to you’. That card is then removed from the set, and the child is then asked to choose the next most important card and so on until all the cards have been selected. He has also used knowledge of geography as an indicator of national and European identity. He found that from the age of 10, people began to identify with being European and that they saw this as a positive thing (30% of 6 year olds, 80% of 10 year olds and 65% of 14 year olds). They also identified with being glad to be English/British at the age of 6 (85%), 10 (80%), and 14 (75%).

Most of the work reported above relies on quantitative measures of national identity that necessarily make simplifying assumptions about the nature and significance of this complex social construct. However, it is increasingly argued that thoroughly exploring national identity requires a more open approach that is better suited to qualitative work such as those that researchers based in Edinburgh have undertaken. By choosing subjects whose circumstances problematise issues of national identity, they maximize their opportunities to produce an insight into how national identities are constructed in
everyday practices. Their studies ranges from in-depth interviews with large land-owners and those in elite positions within the Scottish Arts, some of whom are of English origin, to interviews and participant observation in the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, which lies (only just) on the English side of the Scottish/English border. (Berwick-upon-Tweed has changed hands 14 times between Scotland and England in its history). They focus on the negotiation between people's own claims to identity, how they attribute identity to others and how they receive the claims of others. They seek to uncover what people regard as the basic markers of national identity, the social processes that render markers visible and the socially negotiated rules, which make them accepted or rejected in identity claims and attributions. Basic markers of national identity often claimed are birth, ancestry, residence, upbringing and commitment, but social contexts can render each of these basic markers irrelevant. People living in Berwick-upon-Tweed, powerfully illustrate this. For example, claims of Scottishness can sometimes be made despite what would in other contexts be decisive markers of Englishness: being born in England, to English parents and living in England (Kiely et al 2000). Local identity, that of someone from Berwick-upon-Tweed, is sometimes also used strategically to sidestep both Scottish/English and British national identity.

In-depth interviews and observation have also been used to explore the relationship between gender, ethnic and national identity in a small number of British studies. School-based studies (eg. Connolly, 1998; Mac an Ghaill, 1988, 1994; O’Donnell and Sharpe, 2000; Sewell, 1997; Troyna and Hatcher, 1992) provide insight into the complex and different relationships between ethnic and national identity for Asian, Afro-Caribbean and more or less advantaged sectors of the white majority. In his later work on an English secondary school, Mac an Ghaill describes white middle-class boys who think of themselves as ‘the Real Englishmen’, the future professionals, and superior to other working-class and non-white boys. In their confidence in their individuality, autonomy and superiority, they were also cynical about the more liberal and/or socialist attitudes of their parents. O’Donnell and Sharpe’s work in four London schools argues that their findings support the earlier study of Modood and Berthoud (1997) in showing that, for Afro-Caribbeans and the main Asian groups, ethnicity is ‘almost as common a self-descriptor as nationality’ (O’Donnell and Sharpe, 2000, 40). Studies of girls’ school-based friendships have also shown uses of ethnicity and racialising of others in everyday interactions (Griffiths, 1996; Hey 1997).

**Citizenship**

**Citizenship and Citizenship Identity in Germany**

The rules, which a state uses to decide who is and is not entitled to full citizenship, send out powerful messages about national identity which may or may not resonate in the lives of those who can take their citizenship for granted. In Germany, citizenship is of a
considerable importance for the relation between ethnic and national identity.\textsuperscript{27} Like all other European states, various ethnic groups live side by side in the FRG. However, the German discussion about ethnicity is less focussed on regional ethnic groups, and mainly on immigrated foreigners. Migration research in Germany distinguishes between three general categories: refugees and persons seeking asylum, German resettlers from Eastern and Middle Europe (‘ethnic Germans’), and former foreign workers together with their families.\textsuperscript{28} The last mentioned (group) represent the greatest proportion of immigrants. However, independent of their duration of stay in Germany, they do not enjoy rights of political participation. In contrast, resettlers award the status of citizens in a political sense comparatively fast and without difficulties. Responsible for these differences is the German right of nationality which is primarily based on the \textit{ius-sanguinis} principle. Therefore, ethnic group not territory is regarded as the central criterion of membership. German ancestors (‘consanguinity’) are decisive for the award of German citizenship. Political participation is just one important aspect of integration into a state; following the mainly British and American discussion about citizenship there are further civil rights.\textsuperscript{29} However, a divided picture arises for Germany: Has long-standing residents and employed foreigners are allowed to participate in certain civil rights (for example, social contributions like children’s allowance), while other civil rights are denied (for example, political participation). Immigrants continue to be denied equal rights.\textsuperscript{30}

In Germany a large-scale project explored the relationship of young people to politics: the studies of the \textit{Deutsches Jugendinstitut (DJI)}.\textsuperscript{31} Here you could find extensive data about the development of political interest of youths in East and West Germany, their ideologies, their attitudes towards democracy and certain institutions, their political engagement, as well as their opinions towards immigrants and their general value preferences and gender-role orientations.

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{28} At the end of 1998 approximately 7.3 million foreigners lived in the FRG. This amount is equivalent to a proportion of 8.9 \% of the altogether 82 million people living in Germany. Barely one fifth of these foreigners is to assign to the group of refugees and persons seeking asylum. The rest are foreign workers and their families. Additionally, there are approximately 3.5 million German resettlers (see Bade 1992, 1996, Münz, Seifert & Ulrich 1999, Treibel 1999, Seifert 2000, Terkessidis 2000).


\textsuperscript{30} In the year 2000 a new citizenship right has come into force in which the traditional ancestry principle is supplemented by elements of the territory principle (‘ius soli’). According to this law, German-born children of foreign parents are getting the German citizenship automatically in addition to their ‘origin’ citizenship, if at least one parent has a valid residence permit and lives permanently in Germany. But until the age of 23, one of the two citizenships has to be given up; the dual citizenship remains limited. A naturalization is connected with certain conditions (language skills, duration of stay, giving up the retiring citizenship) and in comparison to other European states relatively rare. Naturalization and dual citizenship in the long run remain exceptions which could be seen as one expression of the political intention to make a durable immigration into the FRG possible only for political refugees and ethnic Germans.

\textsuperscript{31} In 1992 and 1997 the German Youth Institute (DJI) questioned 7.000 youth and young adults from East and West Germany in a replicative panel study to their political attitudes and the subjectively percepted changes within the German-German relations (see Hoffmann-Lange 1995, Gille & Krüger 2000).
\end{flushleft}
Voting Patterns in Germany

In order to get an impression about the level of political participation and the kind of party preferences of youths in Germany, this section will examine their voting behaviour at the last two nationwide elections.

In September 1998 the last election for the German parliament has taken place. The German suffrage decrees a personalized proportional representation, in which the second vote is decisive for the strength of parliamentary parties and with it for the composition of the parliament. Table 3 contain the results of this election – the official result for the Federal Republic of Germany (1. line) and the corresponding estimation results for the group of youth voters at an age of 18 to 24 in West and East Germany (2. to 5. line).

Table 3: Proportion of second votes at the German parliamentary election 1998
(in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>youth voters (FRG - total)</th>
<th>youth voters (West Germany)</th>
<th>youth voters (East Germany)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first look already shows some significant differences in voting behaviour between all voters and youth voters. On the one hand, both great people’s parties – the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) – seem to be less attractive for young voters. On the other hand, smaller parties like the Green Party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the Liberal-Democratic Party (FDP) and the various right-wing extremist parties (Republikaner, DVU, NPD) have achieved a higher share of votes among youths, perhaps enjoy a higher level of trust within this age group.

Another point refers to the partly extreme differences between West and East Germany. At first, the support for the two great parties have turned out still worse among East German youths as well as the agreement to the Green Party. In contrast with that, the socialist PDS and the right-wing extremist parties have achieved two-figure results. All in all, the PDS as successor of the SED (the state party of the German Democratic Republic) is the third strongest party in East Germany and can be characterized as a regional party. Not least, this result can partly be attributed to a “nostalgic” East German identity.

Something different is the situation of right-wing extremist parties. Particularly young people vote for these parties – the only explicitly anti-European parties in Germany. That is why none of these parties are over the required minimum share of votes for moving into the German parliament (5 %), but among young voters the corresponding share of votes is up to 10 % in West and 15 % in East Germany.

The last national election for the European Parliament in June 1999. Every person entitled to vote had exactly one vote to appoint the 99 German deputies from the altogether 23 allowed parties. Analogous to Table 3 above, Table 4 shows the final
results for the five most important parties and the corresponding estimated results for youth voters.

Table 4: Proportion of votes at the European parliamentary election 1999 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU/CSU</th>
<th>Greens</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth voters (FRG - total)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth voters (West Germany)</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youth voters (East Germany)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results do not really differ from the results of the national election. The most important change is the turning back of the proportionate majority for the CDU/CSU – among all voters as well as among youth voters. In Table 4, the share of votes for other parties is not completely identical with the strength of right-wing extremist parties. But their results ought to be similar to the national election. In the opinion of most political scientists, the results of this European election are mainly interpreted as a kind of warning for the national politics of the socialdemocratic-green government. In this way, the voting behavior reflects much more national issues than European concerns.

A last point worth mentioning is the very poor polling. In Germany even 27.5 million people out of just under 61 million persons entitled to vote have taken part in the European election. This equals a turnout of approximately 42 %. In comparison to the corresponding rate of participation at the national parliament (82.2 %) this number is alarming small for a suitable legitimacy. And if you look at the young voters the situation is worse still; all (only 31.7 %) persons aged 18 to 24 went to the European polls. Only five years ago (1994) this share was considerably higher – at that time almost every second youth person were voting. In this connection, the question raises why so many youths refuse voting: Is it because of a lack of political interest or does it represent a conscious decision? Table 5 shows some interesting information with regard to this problem. The data come from the representative Shell-study “Youth 2000” and refer only to German youths who are entitled to vote.

Table 5: Turnout among German youths (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>conscious refuse of voting</th>
<th>no participation because of political indifference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>youths (FRG)</td>
<td>64.1 %</td>
<td>8.2 %</td>
<td>27.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youths (West Germany)</td>
<td>65.2 %</td>
<td>8.2 %</td>
<td>26.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youths (East Germany)</td>
<td>59.7 %</td>
<td>8.6 %</td>
<td>31.6 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent that the main reason for non-voting among youths is a simple lack of political interest. More than a quarter of all youths in West Germany and almost a third of all youths in East Germany say that they do not have any interest in such political participation. So the agreement to the general question for political interest is continuously decreasing among young people since the German reunification; from 57 %
YES-answers in 1991 to only 43% in 1999. And once again, East German youths show a significantly lower level than their West German peers.

Citizenship and Citizenship Identity in Spain

Moran and Benedicto (2000) analyze three aspects of citizenship among young people: the values of interpersonal trust and tolerance, civic morals, and the degree of social justice in the sociopolitical system. Two out of three young Spaniards between 15 and 29 are of the opinion that “one can never be too careful where others are concerned”. Such mistrust decreases as the educational level of young people rises. Thus, the civic links established by young people lack the cohesive strength that provides social trust. Nevertheless, tolerance towards others has become one of the trademarks of their civic orientations. Secondly, the moral reprobation of young people is quite strict with aspects that affect negatively and directly the members of the community, while moral permissiveness increases in response to negative behaviors in citizen-State relationships, such as tax evasion or failing to pay traffic fines.

Finally, socio-political criticism is highly intense. Three out of four young people consider Spanish society to be unjust. Between 60% and 70% of young people consider labour conflict and inequality in the distribution of social welfare as serious or very serious conflicts. According to these authors, these factors hinder the active participation of young people in the public sphere. Moreover, in the last two decades there has been increased interest among young people in the conditions in which their individual biography develops, rather than in political participation (Alvarez, Azofra and Cuesta, 1999).

In this context, it is not surprising that the Spanish population manifests a very low tendency for associative behavior. To the question of whether the respondent is a member of different associations, from 1995 to 2001 the data show constantly low levels of association (CIS, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2001). The highest level tends to be around 10% for citizens’ associations, sports groups and local and regional societies, and the lowest is around 1.5% for ecologists’, pacifists’ or women’s movements.

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32 Data from the survey carried out by Orizo (1995), who used a sample of 2,530 young people, representative in the national ambit of young people aged 15 to 24.
33 Representative studies at national level and also by gender. The CIS study of 1995 is study # 2154, with an N of 3976. The 1996 CIS study is # 2.206, carried out with 2486 subjects. The 1997 CIS study is # 2240, carried out with 2,490 subjects. The 1998 CIS study is # 2286, carried out with a N of 9,988 subjects. Finally, the 2001 CIS study is # 2419, carried out with an N of 2,493 interviewees.
34 See Table 6.
Table 6: Trends in the Percentage of Associationism in Spain between 1995-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIC ASSOCIATION</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE UNION</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPORTIVE GROUPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOMEN MOVEMENTS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (N)</td>
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<td>(2482)</td>
<td>(2490)</td>
<td>(9989)</td>
<td>(2493)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table produced by authors after data from CIS, surveys # 2514, # 2206, # 2240, # 2286, # 2419, (1995-2001).

Young people aged 18 to 24 differ from the older age groups in that they are more likely to be affiliated to sports and cultural groups, local and regional societies, and educational and youth groups, and the least likely to be affiliated to political parties and trade unions. Moreover, since 1998 their association with political parties and trades unions has decreased significantly in relation to that of other age groups\(^{35}\).

\(^{35}\) See Table 7.
Table 7: Temporal Series of Percentage of Affiliation to Associations in Spain by Age Groups

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<tbody>
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<td>35 &amp; above</td>
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<td>18/24</td>
<td>25/34</td>
<td>35 &amp; above</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLITICAL PARTIES</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>SPORTIVE</td>
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<td>YOUTH GROUPS (SCOUTS, CLUBS)</td>
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<td>HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOMEN MOVEMENTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL (N)</td>
<td>(642)</td>
<td>(780)</td>
<td>(2554)</td>
<td>(389)</td>
<td>(515)</td>
<td>(1578)</td>
<td>(395)</td>
<td>(511)</td>
<td>(1584)</td>
<td>(1493)</td>
<td>(2038)</td>
<td>(6457)</td>
<td>(325)</td>
<td>(516)</td>
<td>(1652)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table produced by authors after data from CIS, surveys # 2514, # 2206, # 2240, # 2286, # 2419, (1995-2001).
The data for the Basque Country on registers of associations shows a similar predominance of sports and cultural associations (54.8%) over political associations (10.4%). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the relative level of political associationism in the Basque Country is much higher than the Spanish mean for the same year (Eustat, 2001)\textsuperscript{36}. González (2000) also provides evidence of a low level of associationism in young people aged 15 to 25, on analyzing data from the survey by Elzo and Orizo (1999). However, there is a notable and highly favorable attitude in these same young people to movements for: human rights, aids victims, ecology, pacifism and women’s support; however, the antecedents of this discrepancy between attitude and conduct are not studied. In line with the results of the CIS surveys mentioned above, the studies by Elzo and Orizo (1999) also finds that young men aged 18 to 24 show a tendency to participate more than women of the same age, in political parties, trade unions and sports associations.

The Report on Spanish Youth (2000)\textsuperscript{37} also reflects, first, the low level of participation of young people in political associations and social movements in Spain. A breakdown of this data by region, see Table 8, shows that membership of political parties and trade unions in the Basque Country, 3.7% and 3.1% respectively, is greater than in Madrid, where membership is 1.2% for parties and 1.9% for trade unions. The same is not true for social movements (Human Rights, Pacifist, Feminist and Ecologist), for which Madrid shows a membership index higher than that of the Basque Country, with the exception of feminist associations. With respect to interviewees claiming to participate in sociocultural associations, the Basque and Madrid means are similar, except that more of those interviewed in the Basque Country participate in youth clubs.

While participation in political movements tends to increase with age, participation in social associations begins to decrease in the age range 21-24. Participation in sociocultural associations, on the other hand, shows no relationship to age. In the regional ambit, it is important to point out the higher percentage of membership of political parties in those aged 15 to 17 in the Basque Country. In Madrid, on the other hand, no participation in these associations is appreciated until age 18. The greater participation found in the sample of young Basques might be attributable to a higher level of politicization and everyday mobilization, as well as the existence of politically active and committed youth organizations.

\textsuperscript{36} The register of Associations of the Basque Country for the year 2000 included 25,832 associations. 54.8% were devoted to Cultural and Sports activities, 14.4% to Political and Socioeconomic activities, 10.9% to activities related to Education, 5.6% to Neighborhood activities, 5.4% to Charitable activities, 5% to Consumer activities and 3.7% to Leisure and Free Time.

\textsuperscript{37} See Table 3.
Table 8: Membership in social, cultural and political associations - 1999. Reported % of membership in each type of association by gender and age. Basque Country & Madrid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Madrid Men</th>
<th>Madrid Women</th>
<th>Basque Country Men</th>
<th>Basque Country Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29</td>
<td>15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29</td>
<td>15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29</td>
<td>15/17 18/20 21/24 25/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>(396)</td>
<td>(67) (99) (101) (129)</td>
<td>(386) (81) (74) (105) (128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace movement</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalism</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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<td>Regional culture</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and traditions</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and education</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth movements</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Survey nº 2.370: Informe sobre la juventud española [Report on Spanish Youth], 2000\(^{38}\).

\(^{38}\) Study carried out in 1998 with a sample of 6,492 interviews; the sample was distributed in a non proportional style among the sixteen AC’s; the sample is representative both at a national level and for the Basque Country and Madrid.
Analysis by gender shows that the participation of young women in political organizations is much lower than that of men. Women appear more likely to opt for associations with social content or aimed at helping others.

With regard to the relationship between type of association and young people’s perception of their position on the ideological spectrum, it is noteworthy that those positioning themselves on the *left* show a greater tendency for participation both in political and social associations. In contrast, those young people that place themselves on the *right* belong mainly to associations of a socio-cultural nature.

In this context, we can observe a greater identification of young Basques with the left of the scale (40.9%) as compared to young people in Madrid (31.7%). In Madrid, no relevant differences are observed with regard to perception of ideological position by gender or age. However, in the Basque Country there is a higher proportion of men on the left as against a more central ideological self-perception among women and also an increase in the age of men placing themselves on the left$^{39}$.

**Voting Patterns in Spain**

In order to study political participation in Spanish youth, we analyzed the post-electoral surveys carried out by Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, CIS) at the last general elections (1996$^{40}$ and 2000$^{41}$).

CIS (2000b) shows that young people present the stronger trend for abstention among those interviewed. Sixty-nine percent of interviewees in the age range 18-25 reported having participated in the elections, as against a mean participation of 83% for all age groups (actual participation at these elections was 69%). No significant differences were found according to gender.

Also, those who reported abstention were asked when and why they decided not to vote. We shall draw attention to the fact that among the 22% of interviewees reporting abstention, 28% of men and 33% of women stated that they “never voted” - when asked about when they made the decision. As regards the reasons for abstention, those most frequently reported were: “there is no alternative that satisfies me”, “neither parties nor politicians inspire confidence in me” (this reason is less frequently reported by women), and “it doesn’t matter whether you vote or you don’t, it is worthless”. An additional reason, “to show my displeasure” was frequently reported among the total population but not among the young people.

$^{39}$See Table 8.

$^{40}$Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Survey nº 2,210: *Postelectoral - Elecciones Generales y Autonómicas de Andalucía, 1996*. Representative sample of Spain (N= 5,350, including N=635 at Madrid region and N=280 at the Basque Country).

$^{41}$Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Survey nº 2,384: *Postelectoral - Elecciones Generales y Autonómicas de Andalucía, 2000*. Representative sample of Spain (N= 5,600, including N=694 at Madrid Region and N=270 at the Basque Country).
### Table 9: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 1996
#### Spain Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote behaviour</th>
<th>Actual Elections' Results¹ 1996</th>
<th>Post-elections poll 1996²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Population N=4,959</td>
<td>Total N=774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth (18-24 years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

### Table 10: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 2000
#### Spain Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote behaviour</th>
<th>Actual Elections' Results¹ 2000</th>
<th>Post-elections poll 2000²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Population N=4,391</td>
<td>Total N=500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth (18-24 years)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
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<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
It should be stressed that the rate of electoral participation among young people (aged 18 to 25) according to the survey of 2000 (69%), is significantly lower than that reported by the post-electoral study of 1996 (79%) – see tables above.

Analyzing by region the post-electoral survey of 2000, in the Madrid Region, 90% of young men interviewed reported having voted, as against 69% of young women. The reported participation rates were much lower in the Basque Country, 28% among young men and 41% among young women. Moreover, whilst these participation rates were similar to those of the post-electoral survey of 1996 in the Madrid Region, the rates in the Basque Country were much lower than in 1996 (55% for men and 67% for women).
## Table 11: Reported and actual participation and vote in General Elections 1996 & 2000

**Madrid Region & Basque Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote behavior</th>
<th>General Elections 1996 – Total population</th>
<th>General Elections 2000 - Total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madrid Region</td>
<td>Basque Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vaccinated population</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<td>EH</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


Reported vote for different political parties

Continuing with the post-electoral survey by CIS (2000b), the figures of vote for Spain were: 42.7% of young people between 18 and 24 (42.0% among men and 43.5% among women) reported having voted for the Popular Party (Partido Popular - PP), 28.4% (23.2% and 33.6%, respectively) for the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE), and 9.2% (13.4% and 4.9%) for the United Left (Izquierda Unida - IU). These vote figures were very similar to those of total sample (all age groups), with the exception of a slightly higher percentage of reported vote for IU. It is noteworthy that young women reported a vote closer to the political centre (reported vote to IU was higher among young men while the reported vote for PSOE was higher among young women).

The sample size of these CIS studies does not allow us to carry out an analysis by region of the reported vote for the different political parties in the age range 18-25. For all age groups, the distribution of reported vote in Madrid was: 50.2% for PP, 31.7% for PSOE, and 12.3% for IU. In the Basque Country, it is worthwhile to note that a high percentage of interviewees were reluctant to report their vote (40%), which may reflect a certain political climate of fear and/or polarization in the region. Furthermore, 37.9% of interviewees reported having voted for the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco - PNV), 19.0% for PP, 12.7% for PSOE, 9.8% for Basque Alliance (Eusko Alkartasuna - EA) and 9.0% for IU. The gap between reported vote and actual electoral results was significantly larger in the Basque Country. There, the reported was greater than actual participation; furthermore, the reported was smaller than the actual electoral results for PP and PSOE, and was greater for IU and PNV (see table above). This gap may also be attributed to the political tension between regional nationalists and supporters of a centralized Spain in the Basque Country. This feature of the local political culture should be taken into account in the design of any study in the region.
Table 12: Ideological position - 1999. Reported % in left-right scale by gender and age.
Baseline Country & Madrid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15/17</td>
<td>18/20</td>
<td>21/24</td>
<td>25/29</td>
<td>15/17</td>
<td>18/20</td>
<td>21/24</td>
<td>25/29</td>
<td>15/17</td>
<td>18/20</td>
<td>21/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>25/29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3-4)</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5-6)</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
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<td>30.2</td>
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<td>22.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7-8)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>(9-0)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.C.</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>(396)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>(386)</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(128)</td>
<td>(323)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Survey nº 2.370: Informe sobre la juventud española [Report on Spanish Youth].
Citizenship and Citizenship Identity in the Czech and Slovak Republics

International research has examined adolescents' perceptions of the economic changes and the justice of the new “social contract” in Hungary, Bulgaria and Czech Republic (Macek, Flanagan, Gallay, Kostron, Botcheva & Csapo, 1998). It was conducted in 1995 among high school students (aged 12-14 and 15-18) who were presented with a list of Likert-type items. The participants, were in their early childhood during an era of a state controlled economy, and were teenagers when market mechanisms, providing more autonomy but less security, were introduced.

The responses differed significantly according to age, gender, social class, value orientation and country. The Czechs were the most positive in their assessment of costs of the social change, while the Bulgarians were the most negative. Girls were more sensitive to increased economic disparity than boys were. Values were even more important than gender in predicting perceptions of increasing economic disparities: whilst youth who endorsed a strong social welfare role for the state were more likely to feel that economic disparities were increasing, liberal views were related to beliefs in the efficacy of individual initiative and hard work. Perhaps because of the apparent success of market reforms in the Czech Republic at the time, the Czechs perceived the lowest levels of economic disparity.

In all three countries, youth from better-educated families felt that their communities were less caring and cohesive places. Across all countries as youth got older, they were less likely to believe in the value of initiative. The Czechs were the most optimistic of all in the assessment of their own future possibilities. According to the authors, one issue that should be of concern is the perception by young people that their communities are not caring places. While this might be a natural response of adolescents to a time of turmoil, if it represents a significant change in these societies, it might be a danger for social stability and civil society.

Civic culture

Klicperová, Feierabend & Hofstetter (1997) used Q-factor analysis of “civic culture” in a sample of Czech, Hungarian and American university students. Contrary to the hypothesis, the Czechs exhibited a robust civic culture (Klicperová, 1997) and formed, together with a half of American students, the ”civic” factor of ”participative and loyal” political culture. Whilst Americans were stronger in its participative component (active involvement in political issues), Czechs were stronger in its loyal component (interest in and loyalty to the civic principles and virtues). On the other hand, the majority of Hungarian presented a relatively weak civic culture. Although a number of phenomena in post-communist countries indicate the existence of a “post-communist syndrome” – corruption, learned helplessness and ethnic nationalism (Klicperová, 1998), this research failed to support its existence. The participants perhaps belonged to the strata that typically favoured transition and might have been the least affected by the post-communist syndrome: they were young and educated people, residents of large cities, high achievers and represented future elite.
Jantočšiaková (1996) realised the same research with Slovak students. In comparison with the above samples, the Slovaks manifested strong alienation from the state and passive discontent. In fact, the data were collected during the period of the Mečiar government (1994 –1998) that put Slovakia into political isolation. Many people, especially the young generation, were deeply deceived by this situation and were rather pessimistic about the country's future.

**Roots of citizenship**
The social contract study (Flanagan, Jonsson, Botcheva, Csapo, Bowes, Macek, Averina & Sheblanova, 1999) focused on the roots of citizenship and the ways young people develop a commitment to the commonwealth. The authors argue that engagement in the voluntary sector helps young people to develop an understanding of themselves as civic actors. The findings are based on a survey of more than 5600 12-19 years olds from 7 countries (Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Sweden and the US). There seems to be a universal function of service in fostering a civic ethic and integrating youth into the broader polity. Whilst in the US the service connotes charitable work that compensates for the shortfalls of the private and public sectors, during the Soviet era in Central and East Europe, the voluntarily sector functioned as one of the few ”free spaces” for expressing political opposition (ibid, p.151).

**Meanings of “the individual” and ”community”**
Moodie, Marková, Farr & Plichtová (1997) examined the meanings of the terms “individual”, “community” and “local community” in Slovakia and in Scotland, amongst participants aged 18-23 and 40-45. For Scots but not for Slovaks, the concept “local community” evoked positive associations and was perceived as meaningful and positive. The authors argue that local attachments and loyalties were destroyed in Slovakia during communism. In the semantic space of the Slovak sample, “the individual” and the “local community” were integral parts of two distinct clusters of political values – democracy and dictatorship. Furthermore, Slovak associations to “the individual” referred also to “loneliness” and “isolation”. However, for the Scots, the individual was associated with the self and with a sense of agency.

**Social representations of democracy**
Czech and Slovak samples (18-23, 40-45) were compared according to social representations of the concept of democracy (Tyrlík, Macek & Plichtová, 1998; cf. also Plichtová & Hrabovská, 1992). The respondents rated on scales different concepts according to the fact if these concepts help to explain to term of democracy or not. After they rated on five-point scales their degree of satisfaction with changes in various parts of social life.

The concepts of private security, fraternity and profit were more emphasised by older Czechs and young Slovaks. The concepts of public interest, independent decision-making and freedom were more emphasised by young Czechs and older Slovaks. Both Czech and Slovak participants of lower education emphasised the relation between democracy and nation and Czech/Slovak nationality. The participants with higher
education stressed close relation between democracy and the following issues: the individual, political parties, personal responsibility, opposition, private security, public opinion, minority rights and independent decision making, etc.

Representations of individual rights and basic human rights
Plchťová & Štulrajter (2001) studied how the youth considers the privacy, the individual rights and responsibilities. Discussions of 8 focus groups (aged 16-18 and 19-24) on the problem how to stop spreading HIV/AIDS while preserving medical confidentiality were analysed. Two main types of conceptualisation of responsibility were identified: the authoritarian and the autonomous one. The authors argue that the authoritarian conception of responsibility still dominates even among educated youth, probably due to prevailing practices both in the public and in the private spheres. The language for expression of the autonomous responsibility and protection of the individual rights was less developed than the language for the authoritarian responsibility and the students used only a very limited repertoire of arguments for the individual rights' recognition. Plchťová (2001) also compared the representations of responsibility and rights of patients and doctors in discussions with Scottish and Slovak students. While the Scots understood responsibility in the terms of individual choice and rights, the Slovak spoke about the responsibility in the terms of the duties towards someone else.

Macek, Osecká & Kostoň (1997) studied the representations of the basic human rights in the Czech Republic. Over 400 Czech university students (19-23 years old) rated the articles of the Declaration of Human Rights on various scales, according to their degree of understanding, personal relevance, consequences for individual responsibility, for government, political parties, etc. The results showed, among other, that the students consider that the government and the political parties are likely to be more effective than individuals in enforcing respect for these basic human rights.

Voting patterns in Slovak Republic
The Slovak sociologist Krivý (1999) showed in several studies that while people with higher education manifest stronger support for democratic political principles, people with lower education are more likely to support the antidemocratic political forces. The 1998 parliamentary elections represented a decisive moment for the future integration of Slovakia into Euro-Atlantic structures. Approximately 380,000 first-time voters played a crucial role in these elections and were mobilised by a huge get out and vote campaign organised by numerous NGO’s.

At that time, the young generation had a very critical attitude towards politics and politicians: as many as 85% of the first time voters in 1998 agreed with the opinion “politics is dirty” (ibid). In June–July 1998, 45% of first time voters were generally not interested in politics against 22% generally interested. Only 17% considered that their vote will contribute to significant changes and 33% were of opinion that their votes don’t have any weight (Gyárfášová, Kúska & Velšic, 1999).
The results of the elections showed that first-time voters did not vote in the same way as their parents' and grandparents' generation (ibid). Only 11% of first-time voters voted for the governing coalition (HZDS) that brought Slovakia into political isolation. 30% voted for the Slovak democratic coalition of opposition political parties (SDK). 18% of first-time voters voted for the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), 13% for the Slovak National Party (SNS) and 8% for the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK). The preference for parties representing democratic political principles was thus predominant amongst young people (Gyárfášová, et al., 1999).

In 1998, 65-70% of young people aged 18 to 25 professed democratic political principles against only a 5% of those who professed undemocratic principles. The SDK first-time voters stated that the main reason why they voted for is that “Slovakia needs a change” (the electoral campaign of the party was based on this slogan). On the other hand, the SNS first-time voters wanted to “protect the interest of Slovaks”. Finally, the SMK electorate reported that this party best defends their interest — they voted mainly on the ethnic principle (ibid).

Moreover, the first-time voters did not identify with values of paternalism, egalitarianism, isolationism, authoritarianism and Anti-Westernism. These were more endorsed by the age groups of 40-49, 50-59 and 60 years old. However, the first-time voters just like their parents and grandparents had relatively high scores for ethnic intolerance (ibid).

**Citizenship and Citizenship Identity in England and Scotland**

**Devolution and Citizenship**

The Scottish Parliamentary Election Survey of 1999 investigated how people living in Scotland would see entitlement to citizenship in Scotland, if Scotland were to become an independent state (Paterson et al, 2001). Most believed that Scottish citizenship should be awarded to those who were born in Scotland and who were currently living there (97%). Many also felt that people born in Scotland but not living (79%) and people living there regardless of country of birth (52%) should be citizens. Some people thought having a Scottish parent (34%) or grandparent (16%) was enough to qualify for Scottish citizenship.

As a contribution to debate about ‘social capital’, Lindsay Paterson (2002) has also used the above survey material to explore a set of issues that are highly relevant to discussion of citizenship. He has used comparative data for Scotland and England to explore norms of neighbourly and civic behaviour, trust in others and political and civic engagement and the relationship between them. As noted in the previous section, it has often been presumed that Scottish nationalism is a civic form of nationalism. Paterson does not find significant differences between Scotland and England in terms of levels of trust, support for neighbourly and civic behaviour and political and civic engagement. People had very slightly higher levels of trust in neighbours and lower levels of trust in strangers in Scotland and slightly lower levels of membership in organisations or political activism than in England, but, as already noted, these differences are not significant. However, those who are most trusting of others are more likely to be members of local, national and
international organizations, more likely to be engaged in informal political and community action and less likely to be cynical about formal politics. However, this constellation is negatively not positively associated with Scottish nationalism. In other words, those who were most nationalistic did not fit the stereotypical profile of ‘civic virtue’.

Young People’s Views of Citizenship

A recent programme of research on Youth, Citizenship and Social Change [http://www.tsa.uk.com/YCSC/index.html] was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. (The ESRC is the main funding body for social science research in the UK). Many of the projects within this programme adopted a relatively broad definition of citizenship, focusing attention on the extent of engagement that young people have with their local environment, neighbourhood and community as well as involvement in political campaigns and more conventional politics.

Smith et al (2002) undertook longitudinal work with young people in Leicester, England, recruited in three age groups, around age 16, age 19 and age 22, in contrasting socio-economic circumstances. One group, described as ‘insiders’ were well qualified and on track to satisfactory employment and a successful transition to adult citizenship. The other group, referred to as ‘outsiders’, were unqualified and either unemployed or under-employed. Outsiders were more likely to say that they would not vote in future elections. Ignorance of the issues was one reason for not voting and lack of faith in the political system was another reason. Young people, and particularly ‘outsiders’ were more likely to be optimistic about the effectiveness of informal community-based political action such as campaigning than about the effect of voting or engagement with formal political systems. In this research, everyday neighbourliness was included in the definition of being a participating citizen. The authors found that life chances determined not only what people thought of citizenship but also the degree to which they felt a citizen. They also suggested that understanding and identification with what citizenship means and conveys is not ‘linear’ but ‘dynamic’ in that it can change or revert to former ideas depending on the life experiences of the person.

Eden & Roker (2002) focused on young people who were already connected with youth organizations, using interviews, focus groups, diaries and participant observation with young people aged 13-25. Many of the young people initially interviewed (n=74) were followed up in a second interview (n=56). They wanted to learn why the young people were involved in youth organisations, some of the motivations for being a member, how long they had been members, whether they had links with other organizations, some of the problems encountered by the organisation. They found that young people were political but didn’t always see themselves such and that they had a ‘rooted citizenship’, which was directly linked to their everyday worlds. Osler and Starkey’s (2002) study of 10-18 year olds in Leicester, also emphasise that how young people see citizenship is set firmly in the local community. They concluded from young people’s emphasis on multiculturalism that the young people had a ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ that was rooted in their local community.
The importance of the immediate social context for young people’s sense of citizenship is probably not unique to young people. In fact there are some reasons to think of young adults in the 16-24 age group as potentially less rooted than some younger and older age groups because they are often geographically mobile (MORI, 1999). In a survey that MORI conducted for Nestle Family Monitor (1997), 984 British adults were asked at interview about their sense of belonging to their village, town or city, to their neighbours and to their friends. The younger adults (15-24) felt a stronger attachment to their friends (64% felt very strongly attached to them) than the sample as a whole (50%) but less attached to their residential area (48% very strongly attached vs. 58%) or their neighbours (34% vs. 52%).

There is big difference in the picture of young people who are deeply involved in their communities generated by qualitative studies such as those reported above and some pieces of quantitative work. This is partly because more nuanced and inclusive measures of community involvement are used in qualitative work. It may also be because more specific populations and different age groups are being studied. The 2001 Scottish Household Survey (2002) suggests that young adults in Scotland do not feel very involved in their community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16 to 24</th>
<th>25 to 44</th>
<th>45 to 64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fair amount</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base</strong></td>
<td><strong>633</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,653</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,223</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,037</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,546</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scottish Household Survey, 2001

The fact young people tend not to see their behaviour or opinions as political is also reported in the work of White et al (2002) who studied young adults, in England, Wales
and Scotland, aged 14-24, through focus groups and interviews. Like Eden and Roker (2002) they found young peoples’ interests covered a broad political agenda but that issues outside of party politics were not typically recognized as ‘political’. They also noted that young people report high levels of distrust of politicians and problems in feeling involved and listened to, especially when aged below the current voting threshold of 18.

In a survey of the adult population (MORI, 1998), respondents were asked to choose from a list those items that were in their opinion the most important to ‘good citizenship’. Young adults chose: ‘respecting others’ (51% vs. 41% of older adults); ‘caring for your environment’ (41% vs. 30%); ‘obeying the law’ (40% vs. 39%); ‘setting a good example to others’ (23% vs. 20%). Older adults were more likely than younger adults to chose ‘being a good parent’ (40% of older adults vs. 26% of young adults) and ‘being a good neighbour’ (30% vs. 26%). In another question in this survey (MORI, 1998), young adults were less likely than older adults to know about what rights they were entitled to as a citizen. Only 34% of young adults said that they knew a great deal or a fair amount in comparison to 51% of the whole sample. 66% of young adults said that they knew little or hardly anything about their rights. Similarly, young adults tended to have scant knowledge of citizenship responsibilities in comparison to the whole sample. 50% of young adults knew little or hardly anything about their responsibilities in contrast to 34% of the whole sample.

The finding that young people lack knowledge about citizenship is repeated in work on European citizenship. The process of developing the EC White Paper ‘A New Impetus for European Youth’ involved consultation exercises with young people in all of the member states. In the UK this resulted in The National Youth Survey of young people aged 15-25 (Epps, 2001) and The Young Citizens Survey of 9-14 year olds (Olle, 2002). Both reports stress that young people in the UK want the chance to be part of civic and political decision-making but feel they lack both the necessary information and the opportunities to participate. The report of the National Youth Survey calls for: more education in politics and decision-making; a proper debate about reducing the voting age to 16; greater efforts to make information about the EU available to young people (Epps, 2001, Olle, 2002). The Young Citizens Survey concludes that ‘Young people in Britain are growing up up as European citizens – even if they hardly seem to know it. The findings of the YCS suggest that, although 9-to-14 year olds do care about a range of social issues and would like to have more say on matters that affect them, Europe has, as yet, made little impact on them’ (Olle, 2002, 27).

Voting Patterns in Britain
In terms of voting, as the table and the graph below illustrate, those aged 18-24 are in the age group least likely to vote. Figures taken from 2001 British General Election show that only 53% of 18-24 year olds voted compared to 25-34 (57.5%), 35-44 (70%), 45-54 (78.5%), 55-64 (80.5%) 65+ (87%) all (72.4%) (Park, 1999). Similarly in the Scottish Election, only about 50% of 18-24 year olds voted. Moreover, as the table below shows, the decline in voting in the 2001 British General Election has been particularly marked by young women.
Table 14: Voter Turnout by age and gender (Percentages) Great Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: British Election Study, National Centre for Social Research, University of Essex.

Table 15: Whether voted in Scottish Parliament election in May 1999 by age, Scotland

![Bar chart showing percentage of people who voted by age group]


The low turn out of the age group might suggest a lack of interest in or alienation from the political process. The Scottish Household Survey (2000) found that people in the 16-24 age group were the least likely to know who their local councilor was.
However, as already noted, authors have argued that it is too simplistic to accuse young people of being apathetic because many young people are interested in social and political issues even if they do not see these in party political terms (White et al, 2002). However many young people do appear to be alienated by the traditional political process in the UK. Around a third of 18-24 year olds were found to have no loyalty to any particular political party (Park, 1999). Only a third of the age group were likely to believe there to be a moral duty to vote, the majority believed that voting should only be undertaken if you are concerned about who gets elected. About 13% of the age group thought that there was no reason to vote (Park, op cit, 1999). Lack of voting is also in part due to the age group being the least likely to be registered to vote. Only 60% of young adults are registered to vote, compared to 92% of the population as a whole (Pirie & Worcester, 2000).

**Citizenship Education**

There has been recent debate in the UK about the extent to which a section of the school curriculum should be devoted to ‘citizenship education. The debate was largely instigated by government and mainly focused on the educational system in England and Wales. A national curriculum whose broad outlines are specified by parliament has been followed in all secondary schools in England and Wales since the enactment of the 1988 Education Reform Act. Scotland’s separate education system does not have a ‘national curriculum’. ‘Citizenship education’ was first named and discussed as a potential official subsection of the school curriculum in England and Wales towards the end of the twentieth century. The 1988 Act did not include ‘citizenship education’ in the standard curriculum but a subsequent official guidance issued by the National Curriculum Council in 1990 (Guidance 8) referred explicitly to citizenship education and specified specific objectives or learning outcomes and elements of curriculum content. Learning outcomes included knowledge, skills, attitudes, moral codes and values. Knowledge content included the nature of community, of roles and relationships in a democratic society and pluralist state, the duties, rights and responsibilities of being a citizen. Since 1990 there have been a number of reports on citizenship education in schools including the Crick report of 1998. The Crick report took a much broader view of citizenship education than teaching about politics and political institutions. It talked about fostering moral and social responsibility, community involvement and political literacy. Subsequently, schools in England and Wales typically covered the elements identified as ‘citizenship education’ in classes labeled ‘Citizenship’ and ‘Personal, Social and Health Education’ but since August 2002 ‘citizenship education’ has become a compulsory part of the national curriculum in England and Wales.

The curriculum in Scotland is not specified by statute to the same extent, mean that schools, theoretically, have more freedom. However, a system of statutory inspection and official guidance from the various arms of the governmental Scottish Education Department (since devolution, the Scottish Executive Education Department) effectively maintained a standard curriculum. The Scottish Executive commissioned a report on citizenship in 2001 headed by Pamela Munn, which concluded that it should not be a separate school subject but integrated into the curriculum, as the concern of all teaching staff and as the key purpose of the whole curriculum. ‘Its overall goal is summed up as
development of capability for thoughtful and responsible participation in political, economic, social and cultural life’. The ‘learning outcomes’ of citizenship education that were discussed in the Scottish context, overlapped with the earlier discussion in England and Wales but put a somewhat stronger emphasis on active citizenship and included ‘creativity and enterprise’. Thus, although not a legal requirement, the curriculum in a Scottish school is likely to include ‘citizenship education’.

Young people’s own views of citizenship education have been researched in England (Lister, Middleton and Smith, 2001). Given young people’s greater faith and interest in informal forms of politics, the authors recommend that citizenship education works with a broad definition of the political, ‘including community, social movements and protest politics’ (Smith et al, 2001, 57). The researchers found that existing attempts within schools to engage young people as active citizens through school councils and class representatives were often experienced as ineffective and tokenistic. Opportunities to do voluntary work while at school were valued by those who had participated but had not encouraged voluntary work once pupils had left school. ‘Insiders’ explained this in terms of being too busy and ‘outsiders’ in terms of their desire for paid employment and their unwillingness to settle for work without pay.

**Attitudes to multi-culturalism, Racism and Xenophobia**

**Austria**

In Austria, xenophobia may have had an important impact in politics in recent years with the gains made by the explicitly anti-foreigner Freedom Party (FPÖ) but surveys generally show that younger people, especially those with Higher Education are less xenophobic than other population groups. 42

The findings of the WVS 1990 indicate that 4% of the Austrian respondents would not like “people of a different race” as neighbours (11% in Belgium, 2% in the Netherlands). However, 17% would not like to have “immigrants/foreign workers” as neighbours (16% in Germany, 2% in Ireland) 43.

In the Austrian qualitative study on youth values (1999) the respondents were asked about the feelings they have when they meet members of the following groups at night: drunkards, drug addicts, foreigners, homosexuals, punks, members of the extreme right. Those who inspire most fear are the members of the extreme right. They are seen as a potential danger by one third of the respondents. Here, the picture of hooligans and skinheads, of violence, xenophobia and intolerance are associated and are seen negatively.


43 IARD (2001), Study on the State of Young People and Youth Policy in Europe, research report: Milan
The attitude towards foreigners is ambivalent. Most respondents can be described as neutral-neutral. Many talk about negative experiences with foreigners and at the same time they emphasize that one should not have prejudices. In the Austrian Youth Value Study (1999) the respondents distinguished clearly between tourists, refugees and foreign workers.\textsuperscript{44} This reflects also the continuing second-class citizenship of guest workers and their children in Austria, who are regarded as foreigners.

**Germany**

Renewed discussion of national identity followed reunification and the new Germany. Some commentators have called for a revitalization of national patriotism.\textsuperscript{45} Their argument reads as follows: Without an adequate national consciousness, the internal and external tasks for Germany are not solvable. Now it is time to overcome the reduced self-perception of the last decades and to find a new matter of course in dealing with themselves as nation. Another argument for a resuscitation of German national consciousness suggests that discussion about nation and its symbols must not be left to nationalistic and right-wing extremist groups. A typical example for this new ‘matter of course’ can be seen in the provoking public use of a slogan of right-wing extremists – ‘I am proud to be a German’ – by established politicians.\textsuperscript{46} Some authors recognize the demand for a recontemplation of national identity as a – conscious or unconscious – plea for an ethnic homogeneous German state. One example for this might be the contested thesis of a ‘German leading culture’ to which immigrant foreigners have to adapt. This demand, by one party leader from the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) implies the imagination of a cultural homogenous nation, the culture of which has to be separated and protected against foreign infiltration by other ethnic influences.\textsuperscript{47}

In Germany, there has been renewed concern about hostility to foreigners or xenophobia and right-wing extremism.\textsuperscript{48} During 2000, altogether 15,951 offences by right-wing extremists were officially counted, including 998 violence crimes with 3 killings and 15 attempted killing acts.\textsuperscript{49} The vast majority of right-wing extremist and xenophobic violence is carried out by male youth. Moreover, Eastern Germany represents a clear regional centre of this problem. It is not only the degree of right-wing motivated violence that is increasing, but the readiness for violence and the dissemination of right-wing

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\( ^{44} \) Youth Value Survey 1999. Chr. Friesl et al, Vienna 1999; p117

\( ^{45} \) Zitelmann 1994, Brands 1995, Schröder 1995

\( ^{46} \) The public statement by Laurenz Meyer (CDU) – ‘I am proud to be a German’ – provoked fierce reactions and led to a very polemical discussion about the right of the Germans to feel a national pride. For example, a member of the government (Trittin, Green Party) replied that Meyer have the mentality of a skinhead (see Der Spiegel 13/2001: 22ff).


\( ^{48} \) In a close connection to the discussions of right-wing extremisms and xenophobia there are analyses of related phenomena like racism (Zick 1997, Terkessidis 1998, Räthzel 2000) and antisemitism (Schoeps & Schlör 1995, Kurthen, Bergmann & Erb 1997, Bergmann & Erb 1998). However, these subject areas are conceptually to distinguish from each other.

\( ^{49} \) Bundesministerium des Inneren 2001
ideologies – especially among younger people – show alarmingly high levels. Besides a string of other theoretical approaches, theories of identity play a central role in the scientific search for reasons behind the influential socialization theory approach, by Heitmeyer, identifies the reasons for violence and juvenile right-wing extremism in processes of social change and individualization. In this view, the disappearance of definite norms and the various new demands result in an increasing lack of orientation, uncertainty and status fears among youths (‘disintegration thesis’). In the context of these potential identity crises the grab at right-wing extremist offers establishes an opportunity to deal with the individual threats. Because of the differences between males and females concerning xenophobia and right-wing extremism the gender-specifics come up to an outstanding importance in analysing processes of socialization. As well as in the approach of Heitmeyer proceedings of social change and connected perceptions of crisis and insecurity form a central part of explanation in the thesis of the ‘authoritarian reaction’. According to this understanding by Oesterreich human beings react in an authoritarian way to uncertain situations by fleeing to the protection of allegedly security offering authorities and by submitting to them. From the perspective of the ‘theory of social identity’ the perception of threats to the own identity plays a decisive role too. Therefore xenophobia is founded on the national respectively ethnic categorization of in- and outgroup. Does the positive national identity of the ingroup ‘Germans’ become threatened, a positive distinction of the in-group could easily be re-established by a depreciation and discrimination of the outgroup ‘foreigners’. Actually, a preference for national identity as German, correlates – directly or mediated by nationalistic pride – significantly with xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes. On the other hand, the connection between a preference for European identity and xenophobia shows a negative sign.

One empirical finding that illustrates some of these points comes from the already mentioned Shell-study ‘Youth 2000’. It shows that the majority of young people think there are too many foreigners living in Germany. In answer to, ‘In your view, the number of foreigners living in Germany is too high, just right or too low?’ approximately 60 % of the West German youths and even 70 % of the East German youths said ‘too high’. Especially young persons who see worse chances for themselves in the future or feel underprivileged strongly express this view. The higher the educational level and the better the personality resources, the smaller is the number of stereotypes against

50 The comparatively high extent of right-wing orientations among youths reflected for instance by the election results of right-wing extremist parties. It is true that the right-wing extremist parties DVU, NPD and DIE REPUBLIKANER only achieved 3 % of the votes at the latest parliamentary elections, but among the youth electors at an age of 18 to 24 years these proportions approximately lay at 10 % in West Germany and 20 % in East Germany (see Möller 2000: 9). A multitude of empirical investigations and analyses endorse the high level of right-wing extremist and xenophobic attitudes among young people (see Butterwegge & Isola 1990, Fuchs, Gerhards & Roller 1993, Willems 1993, Otto & Merten 1993, Falter, Jaschke & Winkler 1996, Dünkel & Geng 1999, Dollase, Kliche & Moser 1999, Petry, Kalb & Sitte 1999, Schubarth & Stöss 2000).
foreigners. These stereotypes are not necessarily identical with anti-alien feeling or xenophobia. But while looking at such attitudes, the same underlying pattern is to observe. While there are numerous empirical studies with different priorities, theoretical backgrounds and methodical approaches, there is a far-reaching agreement about the main features of anti-alien feeling or xenophobic attitudes. Firstly, xenophobia is more often found among East German youths. Secondly, there is no significant difference between male and female youths concerning attitudes against foreigners, but male youths show a considerably higher level of anti-alien behaviour. Thirdly, xenophobia has not increased among youths during the last years, but tends to stabilize at a certain level. And fourthly, xenophobia in Germany is not a genuinely youth-specific phenomenon. Admittedly, there is a minority of youths whose rejection of foreigners is extremely marked; (up/down) to a manifest xenophobic and right-wing extremist behaviour.\textsuperscript{56} Considering the main socio-demographic determinants for refusing attitudes towards foreigners, the expected factors turn out to be of importance: a comparatively low level of education, a low set of parental resources (parental level of education, status of employment, satisfaction with the financial situation etc.), a subjective feeling of under privilege (“relative deprivation”), a high level of anomie feelings and a high preference for conventional values (duty performing, achievement etc.). Against this background it is fair to assume that the higher level of xenophobic attitudes among East German youths is mainly to be attributed to the particular socio-economic situation in East Germany. With the political upheaval after German reunification, the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic were confronted with completely new requirements. The conditions of everyday life changed fundamentally and rapidly, the individual drafts of life could not longer be based on usual securities (training, employment etc.). All important youth surveys give a report on the significant effects of these uncertainties on young people in East Germany. Especially poorly educated and unemployed youths perceive foreigners as unwelcome competitors. The core of xenophobia respectively anti-alien feelings among German youths seems to be fears of deprivation, fears of defeating in the increasing competition for jobs and future chances. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that especially in areas with a small share of foreigners, the level of anti-alien attitudes is explicitly higher. That applies – above all – to East Germany, but also to rural areas and small towns. Frequent personal experiences with foreign people obviously lead to more foreigner-friendly opinions. In East Germany, where the share of foreigners is the smallest, the dimension of xenophobia is most serious. The particular East German situation of economic competition and uncertainty is also important for the adoption of xenophobic attitudes and motives.

Spain

Legislation

In Spain the Immigration Law of 1999, modified in 2000, represented an advance against discrimination, as compared to the previous law passed in 1985. This first law for foreigners in Spain had been drawn up on the basis of the legal axis migration-employment: it focused on the administrative processes in the initial phases of

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\textsuperscript{56} see page 8 in Workpackage 1
immigration (crossing of borders, entry, requirements for residence and work, etc). In contrast, the *Ley Organica 4/2000 sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integracion social* (Law of rights and freedoms of foreigners and their integration in Spain) of 1999 focused on the social-civil rights to be enjoyed by immigrants living in Spain. Among the changes this law represents, the following are noteworthy:

- Basic rights, acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (health, education, housing and social security benefits) are ensured.
- Immigrants are allowed to regularize their situation, after a period of two years.
- The administration must give reasons for the rejection of visas, while restriction and control of entrance persist.

During the final phase of development of this law, some critical voices were raised within the government, raising an alarmist discourse with regard to the potentially undesirable effects of the law (which it was argued would promote the flow of illegal immigration). Finally, the criticisms led to its amendment, through Law 8/2000, which came into force on 23rd January, 2001. The new law does not acknowledge the rights of association, assembly, trade union membership and strike to irregular (“illegal”) immigrants. Given these restrictions, some critics questioned whether the new law was compatible with the Spanish Constitution.

The legislation was completed with two Decrees: On the one hand, the Royal Decree (*Real Decreto*) 142/2001, of 16th February, which established the requirements for the regularization of immigrants without a residence permit, which had been established in the Law 8/2000. This decree regulated the review procedure for refused applications, and defined the requirements for those interested in the regularization of their status in Spanish territory. On the other hand, the Royal Decree 864/2001, of 20th July, regulated the application of the Law 8/2000.

The regional governments of Madrid and the Basque Country introduced the following noteworthy regulations on immigration:

- **Madrid:**
  - Regional Plan for Immigration 2001-2003, establishing social welfare measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants in Madrid.
  - Education Orders introducing the issues of cultural diversity and inter-cultural relations, and defining the integration of pupils in socially and culturally disadvantaged situations as the main aim of the educational system: Madrid Council Order, 15th October 1999 (BOCM, 25th October, 1999) and Resolution, 4th September 2000 (BOCM, 12th September, 2000).
  - Regional Plan for Educational Compensation, 2000 (as a result of the legislation above).
• The Basque Country:

**Immigration in Spain**

According to figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior (2000a), the number of foreign residents in Spain increased from 198,042 in 1981 to 938,783 in 2000. The most substantial increases were registered in the late 1990s. The number of foreign residents per 1000 census-registered inhabitants in Spain at the end of the year 2000 was 22.28 - that meant an increment of 2.17 in relation to the 20.11 foreign residents per 1000 inhabitants at the end of 1999. Table 4.1 shows the change in the number of foreign residents by continent of origin from 1999 to 2000. For either year, the largest numbers of foreign residents came from Europe, followed by Africa, the Americas, Asia and, finally, Oceania. Residents from Africa were those that showed the greatest rise in 2000 figures, with an increase of 48,373 (22.71%) in comparison to the previous year; the Americas came behind, with an increase of 19.95%. The numbers of residents from other continents rose by between 7% and 2.2%, with the exception of small decrease in the number of residents from Oceania.  

57 See table 8

**Table 16: Number of Foreign Residents by Original Continent – 1999 & 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>353,556</td>
<td>361,437</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>2.23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>166,709</td>
<td>199,964</td>
<td>33,255</td>
<td>19.95 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>213,012</td>
<td>261,385</td>
<td>48,373</td>
<td>22.71 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>66,340</td>
<td>71,015</td>
<td>4,675</td>
<td>7.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>-111</td>
<td>-10.96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>45.49 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>801,329</td>
<td>895,720</td>
<td>94,391</td>
<td>11.78 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By 1,000 of population</td>
<td>20.11</td>
<td>22.28</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>10.79 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Number of Foreign Residents by Original Continent – 1999 & 2000
Madrid Region & Basque Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continents</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>48,765</td>
<td>49,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>58,459</td>
<td>63,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>33,530</td>
<td>33,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>17,701</td>
<td>16,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>158,885</td>
<td>162,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 1,000 of population</td>
<td>31.21</td>
<td>31.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Our elaboration based on:

The number of foreign residents at the end of year 2000 was 162,985 in Madrid Region and 18,822 in the Basque Country\(^{58}\). These figures represented a much higher proportion of foreign residents in Madrid (31.68 per 1000 inhabitants for year 2000) and much lower in the Basque Country (8.96 per 1000 inhabitants for year 2000) than the global figure for Spain. In regions, the proportional increment in the number of foreign residents between the end of year 1999 and the end of year 2000 (2.58 for Madrid and 1.07 for the Basque Country) was smaller than for Spain, because the biggest increment in immigration figures was in Andalucia. There are also regional differences in the immigration composition according to continent of origin. In comparison to the Spanish total, there was a higher proportion of immigrants from America in Madrid (where they represent the biggest group of immigrants) and the Basque Country, while African origin was underrepresented among the immigrants in both regions.

With regard to the number of immigrants in Spain by nationality of origin, the Interior Ministry data for 2000 showed that 80% of the foreign population is concentrated in some 21 countries of origin, the first being Morocco (22.3% of foreign residents), followed by Great Britain (8.3%), Germany (6.8%), France (4.7%) and Portugal (4.7%).

\(^{58}\) See table 16
Another numerous group, though not recorded in the official statistics, are the immigrants without residence permit. According to estimates by the Ministry of the Interior itself (2000a), this population would be made up principally of immigrants of North African (38% of the total) and Latin American origin (25%).

As regards the occupations of the immigrant population, the four main areas of activity are, in order of importance, agriculture (33%), construction (15%), bars, hotels and restaurants (11%), and domestic service (15%). The labour market for immigrants with no legal residence has a different distribution (Ministry of the Interior, 2000a): street-selling (27%), domestic service (23%), bars, hotels and restaurants (16%), and construction (15%).

**Attitudes of young Spanish people towards immigration**
Mateos & Moral (2000) carried out a study on youth opinions and attitudes toward foreign immigration. The study was based on a survey carried out by the CIS in 1997\(^59\). In the survey, interviewees were required to rate the relative size of the immigrant population. For 55% of the young people interviewed, the number of immigrants living in Spain was high, but not excessive (literally “a lot, but not too many”). On comparing young people with the total population, Mateos & Moral (2000) found that young people were more balanced in their judgement of the number of immigrants, that is, the proportion of young people considering that the number of immigrants in Spain is not excessive was higher than this proportion for the total population.

Within the youth group, main differences were due to educational level. On the one hand, 56%, of young people with university studies considered that, although the numbers of immigrants resident in Spain is high, it is not excessive; on the other hand, 37% of those with only primary education believed that there are too many immigrants in Spain. The only significant difference in these beliefs according to political orientation, was found among those self-defined at extreme right positions: almost half (49%) of this group perceived that the number of immigrants is “too high”.

In the same study, participants were also asked for their perceptions about the number of immigrants in other European countries (in comparison to Spain). The majority perception is that in France and Germany there are relatively more immigrants than in Spain. The situation in Italy is perceived as similar to that of Spain (28% consider that the number of immigrants is similar, whilst 25% consider there are fewer immigrants in Italy). Paradoxically, participants also report less knowledge of the situation in that country (28%).

With regard to the opinions in relation to the legal regulation of immigration, 70% of interviewees believed that the prerequisite of an employment contract for authorization of

\(^{59}\) Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Survey nº 2,257. Representative sample of Spain (N= 2,499), age 15 to 29.
entry into Spain is the most appropriate measure for controlling immigration. Six percent
considered that immigration should be prohibited, and only 16% believed it should be
made as easy as possible for immigrants to enter the country. As regards the legislation,
26% of the young interviewees considered the immigration laws appropriate, as against
21% with the same opinion among the total population. A similar proportion of young
people considered the legislation is tough (in comparison to 16% of the total population).
Worthy of note is the high percentage of interviewees, both among young people and in
the total population, who reported ignorance of the legislation regulating the entry of
immigrants (20% and 32%, respectively).

With regard to interviewees’ assessment of immigration, Mateos & Moral (2000) found
that young people had a clearly negative judgement of the potential consequences of
immigration. For 41% of interviewees, immigration had more negative consequences
than positive ones; for 18% it has “neither positive nor negative effects”; 28% believed it
to have positive effects; and 13% had no opinion on the matter. Differences about the
potential impact of immigration were found related to sociodemographic: A higher
percentage of young men (45%) than of young women (37%) considered that
immigration has negative effects. As regards age, the younger interviewees (aged 15 to
19) perceived negative impact far more frequently (43%), than the older ones. Whilst
50% of the young interviewees with only primary education perceived more overall
negative than positive effects, 41% of those with university studies perceived more
overall positive effects.

In a more specific study, Martin & Velarde (1996) found that, according to the
perceptions of young people aged 15 to 29, immigration would not adversely affect
morals and social customs in Spain (50% were of this opinion, while 12% expected
beneficial effects and another 14% prejudicial effects). On the other hand, 55% of the
interviewees expected some impact on the racial characteristics of the Spanish people
(especially, prejudicial effects for 26% as against 10% who expected beneficial effects).
Finally, 62% expected some impact on country’s economy (prejudicial for 34% and
beneficial for 12%). Gender differences are small in this study.

When asked about feelings toward immigrants according to their nationality, the young
people interviewed expressed more liking, proximity and trust with respect to
Argentinean, Italians, Germans and Portuguese immigrants; at the other extreme, less
liking, proximity and trust with respect to the French and the Moroccans immigrants.

Martin & Velarde also asked for an assessment of xenophobic political programmes (Le
Pen and Harder programs were cited as examples in the question). Xenophobic political
programs were clearly rejected by 84% of young aged 18-19 years (against 5% of clear
support), and by 82% of interviewees aged 20-24 years (against 4% of support). The
rejection was slightly weaker in the group older than 30 years (75% of clear rejection
against 3% of clear support).
In sum, the studies on the opinions of youth about immigration in Spain reflect a complex and paradoxical situation, characterized by: a) a strong majority rejection of xenophobic political programmes; b) relative ambiguity with regard to whether the current legal regulation of immigration is appropriate or too tough; and c) mainly unfavourable expectations with respect to the potential impact of immigration (especially in terms of the economy, and among young people with lower levels of education).

UK

In the introduction to their 1990s text on ‘Race’ culture and difference, Donald and Rattsani (1992) call for ‘careful analysis of contemporary political struggles over questions of representation, symbolic boundary formation and identification’ rather than glib use of ‘racism’ as an explanatory category. However, work that is theorizing race and racism (Black and Solomos, 2000) remains more extensive than documentation of the experiences, practices and political struggles that constitute ‘racism’ and its relationship to nationalism.

It has been argued that since the colonial period, racism has been an integral element of English nationalism (Colley, 1992; Miles, 1993). A ‘new racism’ developed in the 1960s and 1970s (Barker, 1981; Hall et al. 1978; Solomos et al. 1982), constructing ‘black’ and ‘English’ as mutually exclusive categories (Gilroy, 1987) in response to an increase in migrant labour from the Asian sub-continent and the Caribbean. A number of authors have also commented on ways in which UK government policies towards immigration (Goulbourne, 1991) and asylum seekers (Schuster and Solomos, 1999) have contributed messages about ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ and nationality that are open to racist interpretations. However, racism has often been perceived as a more English than Scottish problem. Some authors suggest that religious sectarian bigotry, particularly anti-Catholicism, is ‘Scotland’s shame’ (Devine, 2000). Miles and Dunlop (1986) have argued that there are historical reasons why racism and nationalism were not associated in the same way in political rhetoric in Scotland. The critical period for the rise of ‘new racism’ in England was also the period of the re-emergence of a Scottish nationalism focused on the perceived economic and political disadvantages Scotland suffered in comparison with England and as a consequence of the union with England. This focus pre-empted simplistic associations between the ills of industrial decline and the arrival of migrant labour. As a result, it has been suggested that racism was not as central to Scottish nationalism. Indeed, as Reciher and Hopkins (2001) have shown, the claim that Scottish nationalism has nothing to do with racism, is frequently made by Scottish political figures.

Concern about prejudice leading to uncivil behaviour towards non-white visible ethnic minorities has also been lower key in Scotland because non-white ethnic minority populations are much smaller than in England. Nevertheless, the limited evidence indicates that Scotland has no clear claim to being a less racist society than England and racism and exclusionary practices play an important part in structuring the lives of non-whites in Scotland (Walsh 1986; Bowes and Sims 1997; Hampton 2001, 1999). Reports
of racist incidents and attacks to the police have been on the rise (Central Research Unit, Scottish Executive). A small number of very violent attacks on asylum seekers shook public assumptions about absence of racism. In 2001, the Scottish Executive were sufficiently concerned to commission survey research and to conduct the first of a series of media campaigns which continued over the next couple of years. 25% of the residents of Scotland who were surveyed regarded themselves as mildly racist and 56% thought that racism was a problem in Scotland <http://onescotland.com>

People’s everyday practices do not straightforwardly reflect the tenor of national political rhetoric. Some authors have identified neighbourhood discourses of racism and nationalism that are out of tune with national discourses (Back 1996; Cohen 1988; Hewitt 1986; 1998). Les Back (1996) investigated racism and nationalism at the neighbourhood level in multi-ethnic areas of London with high proportions of ethnic minorities. He suggested that the association of Englishness with whiteness was breaking down in some multi-ethnic neighbourhoods, especially in relation to young people of Caribbean descent. At the same time, he found a hardening of divisions between whites and other non-white minority groups (Back 1996; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Modood 1997) denying other ethnic groups the right to lay claim to a reconfigured version of Englishness. Osler and Starkey (2002) have also suggested that an exclusive sense of Englishness is breaking down. They studied 10-18 year olds in Leicester exploring their views of where they lived using surveys, qualitative workshops with young people as researchers, and photo evidence created into posters. They found that Englishness was absent from the photos and from discussions, replaced by a sense of multi-culturalism, and awareness of other cultures and religions in the community. A rather less optimistic picture emerges from the earlier work of Carrington and Short (1995, 1996, 1998).

A number of pieces of research have demonstrated that racist stereotyping remains a common experience for non-white groups but different non-white groups are subject to different degrees and forms of stereotyping (Beishon et al, 1998; Cohen 1988; Brah 1992; Modood, Beishon and Virdee 1994; Parekh Report, 2000; Virdee, 1999). Survey evidence shows higher levels of racist prejudice against South Asians than Caribbeans (Modood et al 1997). Moreover, racist prejudice seems to be directed at some Asians more than others. Modood (1992) has argued that during the late 1980s and 1990s, Muslim Asians were increasingly subjected to a form of racialisation based on a prejudice against Islam. Detailed studies in school settings have provided insight into how discourses about ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’, sometimes interaction with discourses about nationality, gender, sexuality and /or class, influence and shape the identities of children and young people (Connolly, 1998; Mac an Ghaill, 1988, 1994; O’Donnell and Sharpe, 2000; Padfield, 2001; Sewell, 1997; Troyna and Hatcher, 1992). For example, Connolly (1998) shows that the popular discourse that Black boys are volatile and aggressive resulted in the over-disciplining of Black boys in the inner-city school he studied, in turn alienating some boys and reducing their academic performance. Almost all of this work has been conducted in England, and while new Scottish studies are now underway, these issues remain very under studied in Scotland.


**Discussion of Key Concepts**


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