Social psychologists have produced a voluminous and diverse literature on national identity. Researchers working within a variety of theoretical traditions have sought to understand the psychological processes associated with identification with the nation. Work in this area has increased particularly rapidly in the last decade or so, resulting in a need to assess the range and scope of extant research, as well as identifying limitations and suggesting ways of proceeding with future research.

Central to this review will be an analysis of the ways in which different researchers have constructed both 'nation' and 'identity' in contrasting, and sometimes incompatible, ways. Indeed, I will argue that 'national identity' is defined and operationalized in such a variety of ways as to render analysis of 'national identity' as an objective feature of individual psychology highly problematic. This is not to suggest that the differences between social psychological constructions of 'national identity' are random or haphazard. Rather, I will explore some systematic trends in these constructions before arguing in favour of an approach which explores the way in which people account for their actions in national terms (or resist them), and how they themselves construct national identities.

What was included in the review

PSYCHINFO searches were conducted for the terms 'national identity', 'patriotism', and 'nationalism'. The latter two terms were used in order to ensure that researchers studying related constructs but who may also use the 'national identity' construct were included. Furthermore, while it was expected that 'national identity' may be constructed differently by different authors, it was also necessary to assess the extent to which terms such as 'nationalism' and 'patriotism' were used by some authors where others use 'national identity'.

For sake of manageability and comparability it was decided to review only empirical journal papers. However, reference will be made to work which falls outside the criteria of inclusion where it illuminates aspects of included work. The initial results list was edited of non-psychology journals, such as those in the fields of sociology, anthropology and history. Interdisciplinary articles were included provided psychology was one of the disciplines represented. Investigations of European identity were included in the review as these often attempt to assess the impact of European identity on existing national identities. Although there are many applications of psychoanalysis to national identity and related issues these were not included. For practical reasons the extensive literature on national stereotypes was not surveyed, except where stereotypes were used to make inferences about identity. Every effort was taken to seek out studies which were
not listed in PSYCHINFO by, for example, searching references sections of relevant papers and visiting author's home pages. The decision to use 1970 as the starting point for the review was partly due to the availability of publications and partly because the current major approaches to the study of national identity have developed since then. Only English language papers were included, resulting in a total of 79 papers being surveyed in all. Lists of papers broken down by the various classificatory schemes used can be found in the appendix.

**Major Approaches**

In order to gauge the major theoretical approaches to the study of national identity in social psychology, the papers were sorted by approach. The most common approaches are listed in Table 1. Some papers were classified as representing two approaches, for example Rutland (1999) combines Social Identity Theory (SIT)/Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) with a developmental approach and consequently is listed under both these categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Papers (%)</th>
<th>Papers (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity Theory/Self-Categorization Theory</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Representations</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cognition</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several other approaches which are represented by only a single paper, for example Identity Process Theory (Devine-Wright & Lyons, 1997), Perceptual-Representational Framework (Kelly & Ronan, 1987), Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius, Peña & Sawyer, 2001) and Terror Management Theory (Nelson, Moore, Olivetti & Scott, 1997).

While the task of assessing the scope of previous research on national identity may seem to be a relatively straightforward endeavour, it soon becomes apparent that not only are there differences in findings between approaches, but that different authors, and (broadly speaking) different approaches have made radically different assumptions about what national identity is, how it can be measured and how it relates to constructs such as 'patriotism' and 'nationalism'. However, the term 'national identity' itself seems to cause very few researchers any problems. Rather it is frequently taken for granted that it is obvious what 'national identity' is. This results in a construct which maintains the illusion of being a unitary whole, whereas it is in fact an elusive concept which seems to slip away at the very moment one attempts to pin it down.

There are several notable differences in how 'national identity' is constructed in different approaches. The papers can be broken down into three broad groups on this
issue: The Turnerian SIT/SCT papers, which tend to assume that national identity can not only vary in salience but that its content is also context-dependent over micro-time; the developmental papers, which tend to assume that identity changes over developmental time; and a group made up of some non-Turnerian SIT/SCT papers as well as attitudinal and social cognition papers which implicitly posit national identity as invariant. The construction of national identity in these three groups of papers will now be explored in detail.

**Three temporal varieties of national identity**

It is useful to shorten the distinction made above into one of temporality - national identity as variant over micro-time, variant over macro-time and invariant. While this taxonomy is undoubtedly subject to overlap and variation, it is nevertheless useful in capturing some of the central assumptions made regarding national identity. To begin with I will outline how each of these versions of national identity is constructed, using particular studies as examples. I will then argue that the use of the term ‘national identity’ can obscure fundamentally different, and indeed sometimes incompatible, versions of the construct.

**National identity as invariant**

Those authors who adopt an attitudinal or social cognition approach, as well as some versions of SIT (e.g. Brown & Haeger, 1999; Sennett & Foster, 1996), typically construct national identity as stable, enduring and invariant over time. While they may accept in principle that national identity may change over the lifespan of an individual, this is generally not seen as of particular interest. This version of national identity is typically seen as similar to a personality characteristic - something which an individual may have to varying degrees. This allows researchers to draw conclusions such as ‘the respondents were not hesitant to report that they consider their national-Palestinian identity twice as important as their civic-Israeli identity’ (Suleiman & Beit-Hallahmi, 1997, p. 227). This is compounded when it is considered that because 'identity' is constructed from 'attitudes', Suleiman and Beit-Hallahmi suggest that a Palestinian's attitude on any relevant issue will be the sum of national identity (Palestinian) and civic identity (Israeli) components. Therefore, irrespective of the context of the initial measurement or the context in which the relevant attitude is to be expressed, Suleiman and Beit-Hallahmi can be sure that their predictions will be correct. This illustrates a trend in the papers whereby authors who construct national identity as invariant typically either operationalize it as an independent variable, the impact of which on other variables can be assessed (e.g. Burris, Branscombe & Jackson, 2000), or argue that identity allows us to predict certain other psychological phenomena such as ‘attitudes’.

The production of national identity (from attitudes) as stable, enduring and invariant stems from the methodology used to ‘measure’ attitudes. Suleiman and Beit-Hallahmi (1997) administer their questionnaire once, and the authors provide no detailed description of the context in which it was presented, save to say that it was written in Arabic and handed to participants by an Arab research assistant. Indeed, detailed
consideration of context would be impossible as participants were allowed to take the questionnaire away to complete at their convenience. This neglect stems from the prior assumption that what was being measured was stable and measurable across situations. This assumption made it inevitable that the questionnaire would be administered once with no consideration of the possibility of contextual variation, which in turn made it inevitable that what would be found would be a stable, invariant identity. Assumptions about what sort of 'thing' national identity is lead to the use of methodologies which can only produce national identity as that sort of 'thing' (what Danziger [1985] calls the methodological circle).

National identity as variable over micro-time

Authors working within the SCT tradition stress the micro-flexibility of national identity, and indeed of all identities (e.g. Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992; Hopkins & Murdock, 1999; Hopkins, Regan & Abell, 1997; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). As already mentioned, one of the central tenets of SCT is the assertion that the actual content of identity and corollaries such as stereotypic perception is contextually variable, problematizing the assumption of national identity as an enduring psychological object. This is typically achieved by asking participants to complete scale items on more than one occasion, or to randomly allocate participants to different contextual conditions, with either an experimental manipulation of context (e.g. Hopkins et al, 1997) or more rarely at different 'significant' times (e.g. Haslam et al [1992] whose participants responded to scale items before and after the Gulf War of 1991).

In both these types of research identity (or sometimes stereotyping, which presupposes identification) is treated as a dependent variable and is 'measured' in different contexts in order to assess change. However, the predominance of questionnaire methodologies leads to a version of national identity being produced which, while variable, is ultimately static at each point of measurement. For example, Rutland and Cinnirella (2000, study 1) split participants into four conditions. All participants stereotyped the in-group (Scottish), but three conditions stereotyped an out-group first (English, Germans, Australians), while the fourth did not. Subsequently, each participant completed an identity measure for the identities Scottish, British and European. While this allows the context dependency of identities to be rendered visible, ‘identity’ becomes crystallized at the moment of measurement\(^1\). Any sense of continuity or process is lost in favour of a ‘picture’ of identity at a single point in time (Condor, 1996a). For all SCT’s focus on context contingency and variation over time, the methods used result in static constructions of identity at different times. If we think of (national) identity as a film, in which the characters are placed in several different scenes, SCT can at best be described

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\(^1\) This ‘moment’ may of course be several minutes long, creating an illusion of synchronicity which is in fact reduced from a diachronic process (even a single-item questionnaire must be received, read, and filled in) to a two-dimensional ‘moment’ via a piece of paper or computer screen. It is then possible to return to this two-dimensional record at a later time in order to refamiliarize oneself with a previous ‘moment’, obscuring the fact that the information on the two-dimensional record was not collected synchronically, but over a period of time (however short this may be).
as stopping the projector and looking at two or three single frames in order to understand the plot. There is no understanding of how characters move from one scene to another, how the static images create moving pictures or how events before each frame result in the picture coming to be as it is.

While it is perhaps not worth stretching this metaphor too far, not least because the sensation of movement in a film is an optical illusion caused by the speed of static images, it nevertheless suggests that we may be losing the plot by focussing only on single points in time, and that simply increasing the number of times we administer the questionnaire does not lead to a better understanding of process.

Not only does SCT suffer from a neglect of process, but it also fails to locate the micro-variability of national identity within a wider conceptualization of change. For example, while Rutland and Cinnirella (2000) suggest that embryonic identities may be more contextually contingent than more longer established ones, this is not in itself the focus of study, but an explanation for the findings of a micro-variability study. The question of the processes involved in the transition from embryonic to established identities is not addressed. Instead, macro-social processes are only considered important in terms of their effects at the level of the SCT experiment, rather than being of interest in themselves.

The third group of studies do measure long term change, but only a particular variety of it – developmental change.

*National identity as variable over macro-time*

Developmental studies typically aim to track the development of national identity over several years. All the studies in the present review do this with synchronic sampling. Rather than following individuals through development, individuals at different points in development are sampled at around the same time. This approach is subject to similar criticisms regarding the construction of apparently synchronic 'moments-in-time' to those levelled above at SCT, but because of its acknowledgment of the possibility of continuity, it is able to examine long term change. The problem with developmental approaches is that change is not only operationalized as a series of synchronic moments, but that the change is specifically developmental. Thus three assumptions are made: Firstly it is assumed that children are the appropriate focus of investigation; secondly it is assumed that once adulthood is reached, change ceases; and thirdly it is assumed that what are of interest are the internal psychological processes of developmental change, rather than the social world in which the child is embedded.

The methods typically used to investigate the development of national identity also differ significantly from those used in other approaches. Whereas attitudinal or SCT research tends to favour the use of self-report measures, developmental research tends to supplement these with other techniques. Rather than only ask children direct questions about their national identity, a range of different measures are usually taken which are assumed to be indicative of the relative presence or absence of national identity. Indeed these measures are sometimes correlated with self-report measures in order to assess the
age at which children’s identity can be said to be subjectively present. For example, Bennett, Lyons, Sani and Barrett (1998) found that national in-group favouritism develops before subjective identification with the in-group in a study involving six, nine, 12 and 15-year-olds. A clear picture of developmental change over time emerges. However, once subjective identification is established, there is no reason to believe that it should change. In other words, development is complete and national identity is fully formed. Thus the only approach which takes long-term change seriously is found wanting as it reduces change to individual development, resulting in a neglect of social change.

*Incompatible identities*

It is perhaps worth stating the obvious by pointing out what all three temporalities have in common - the use of the term 'national identity' with reference to the particular construction which is achieved. Crucially, differences between constructions are not explored. This is particularly important when it is considered that some researchers combine approaches which entail potentially conflicting versions of national identity. For example, Rutland (1999) takes a SCT-influenced developmental approach to national identity but casts identity as changeable over macro-time with no serious consideration of the variability over micro-time which is a central tenet of SCT (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).

The lack of recognition of the different constructions of identity that are presupposed means that the research is not caused any overt problems. However, when contextual variation is mentioned it is suggestive of the problems associated with a merging of constructs. For example, when Rutland (1999, p. 66) suggests that '[i]ntergroup discrimination and stereotyping are more likely once children have developed an understanding of the ideological meaning associated with a particular social category and this category is salient within the social context' (my italics) he unwittingly posits an empirical paradox. On the one hand, developmental approaches assume that whatever psychological object develops is available for us to study providing we have the appropriate methods of investigation, but do not allow for significant variation over micro-time. On the other hand, SCT has been largely developed and tested on adults and assumes that whatever psychological structures are required have already developed, allowing us to study change over micro-time. The problem with Rutland's statement above is that we have no way of knowing if a child who appears not to 'possess' a national identity does so because it has not developed yet or if we have failed to provide a context which makes national identity salient. Similarly, when a child appears to have a national identity and this identity changes, how can we know whether the changes are due to development or contextual variation? The possibility that techniques which can tease these apart could someday be developed matters little, as I am not simply arguing for an improvement in research methodologies, but that extant research has failed to even recognise these fundamentally different constructions of national identity, let alone attempt a synthesis based upon such a recognition.
For all his incorporation of elements of SCT, Rutland's construction of national identity is clearly developmental in that it is assumed to change over macro-time, while the possibility of micro-variation, while alluded to, is precluded by the use of research technologies to measure British self-categorization, in-group favouritism, national prejudice and self-stereotypes which eradicate any evidence of micro-variability in order to produce a single 'response' or 'score'. National in-group bias and prejudice, for example, is measured with a photograph evaluation task in which children rate the same photographs of people in labelled and unlabelled conditions. The labels used are British, American, German, French and Russian. The measure is counterbalanced such that half the children rate the photographs in the unlabelled condition first, while the other half rate them in the labelled condition first. However, this creates a problem for Rutland because those children who complete the labelled condition first cannot then rate the same photographs without labels immediately after. He solves this by leaving a gap of two weeks between the labelled and unlabelled conditions for this half of the sample only. While this difference in time between conditions in the sample may be problematic for a variety of reasons, the relevant issue here is that children in both groups end up with a single prejudice score which then contributes to the mean bias score of the child's age group. A single bias score for each age group in each condition is then produced which allows the developmental course of national in-group bias and prejudice to be plotted.

The possibility of contextual variation is therefore denied in two ways. Firstly, the use of the same group labels ensures that the comparative context remains the same, despite SCT's insistence that identity is contingent upon comparative context. Secondly, the collapse of the two halves of the sample into a single measure results in the creation of a single group out of children who have been treated in different ways.2

Similarly, Rutland & Cinnirella (2000) use Cinnirella's (1997) measure of national (and European) identity which is adapted from Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade and Williams' (1986) measure of group identification. However, whereas Rutland and Cinnirella (2000) aim to show (and indeed to an extent do) that self-categorization is variable across contexts, Brown et al's (1986) measure assumes a certain amount of cross-situational stability. The measures taken of the scale's reliability and validity entail this, as does Brown et al's concern for 'tapping aspects of people's affinity to their group' (Brown et al, 1986, p.278). That Rutland and Cinnirella (2000) use such a scale to measure contextual variation is problematic, particularly in light of their findings. Rutland and Cinnirella found that only European, and not national, self-categorization was context contingent. They interpret this in terms of category accessibility, fragility, and perception of psychological relationships between categories. However, it may be the case that the instrument they used to measure identification, designed as it was with some level of cross-situational stability in mind, was not sufficiently sensitive to contextual variation. Regardless of the validity of this as a possible explanation for Rutland and Cinnirella's results, it nevertheless indicates the problems inherent in

2 Although Rutland does not claim to measure national identity directly, this does not cause problems for my argument as researchers studying national identity in children frequently measure its presumed corollaries and use these measurements to make inferences about national identity.
conflating two versions of national identity - one which assumes stability across time, the other which assumes contextual variation.

This neglect of the difference between versions of national identity may be most notable when researchers attempt to apply insights generated with one version of the construct to another version, but it is equally problematic when the general term 'national identity' is unproblematically mobilized without acknowledgement of its fractious nature. Thus two researchers who claim to be studying the same thing, namely national identity, may in fact be working with completely different constructions of it.

However, thus far I have merely demonstrated that constructions of national identity can be clustered into three broad groups. Further examination of the instruments used to measure national identity, and other constructs such as 'patriotism' and 'nationalism', raises several more issues about the underspecification of 'national identity' in social psychological research.

Measurement technologies and the content of identity

The sort of thing which national identity is assumed to be is often evident in the construction of scales and other measurement technologies. For example, it may be assumed that national identity can be measured with a single item (e.g. Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian & Hewstone, 2001), or it may take 120 attitudinal items to assess the attitudinal corollaries of patriotism and nationalism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). While for most researchers national identity and identification can be used interchangeably, others draw a distinction between the two. Feather (e.g. 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) 'measures' national identity by simply asking participants to ascribe themselves a national label, while national identification involves notions of strength of feeling.

Equally importantly, the actual content of measures (e.g. wording of scale items) can tell us what are considered to be components of national identity. Some scale items are potentially problematic for relatively simple reasons. Again, Feather (1981, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) asks participants “In general, how much would you say being Australian means to you? How much do you care about being an Australian?” (Feather, 1993, p. 184, italics in original). The presence of two questions in a single item is compounded by the response options which refer only to the ‘meaning’ question, and make no mention of ‘caring’. However, while this sort of scale construction may be worrying, it is not such issues which concern me in the present review. Rather, I will argue that the assumptions about national identity which are inherent within the questions used to assess it provide further evidence of the many versions of the construct passing as a single psychological entity. Again, the distinction between developmental and non-developmental work provides a striking contrast, but I will begin by examining research which uses questionnaires to gain some direct measure of national identity.

Firstly, it is notable that a wide variety of items have been used to measure national identity. Indeed there is no scale which appears to be agreed upon by more than
a few researchers. There are, however, similar items which appear several times in the scales of researchers working in the same theoretical tradition, and sometimes across traditions. One such similarity is the inclusion of items measuring national pride. For example, Feather (e.g. 1994) asks ‘How proud are you to be a member of the Australian nation?’ (p. 471, italics in original). Interestingly, national pride, while apparently being indicative of national identity in some studies, is a component of patriotism or nationalism in other studies. For instance, while Sidanius, Peña and Sawyer (2001) include the item ‘I am proud to be Dominican’ (p. 837) in their patriotism scale, Bonaiuto, Breakwell and Cano (1996) include the item ‘I am proud to be British’ (p. 175) in their nationalism scale. Müller-Peters (1998), on the other hand, distinguishes patriotism and nationalism as different types of national identification, and posits national pride as a separate construct from each.3

While commonsense may place ‘national identity’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ as related constructs, if they are to be posited as distinct psychological constructs it would seem that a relationship needs to be theorized. While there are attempts to distinguish the three (e.g. Mummendey, Klink & Brown, 2001; Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999; and see below for a discussion of such approaches), it is more common for researchers to measure one or the other. Some authors appear to consider national identity, patriotism and nationalism as interchangeable. For example, Bonaiuto et al (1996) claim to measure ‘nationalism’, but refer in their introduction to ‘nationalistic and patriotic attitudes’ (p. 158), and to ‘national identifications’ in their discussion (p. 171). Similarly, it is sometimes difficult to see why particular terms are chosen over others. Sidanius et al’s (2001) four-item patriotism measure4 claims to be based upon previous research, including Kosterman and Feshbach’s (1989) attempt to distinguish between nationalistic and patriotic attitudes. However, it would seem to be the case that ‘nationalists’ in Kosterman and Feshbach’s terms would score equally as highly on Sidanius et al’s patriotism measure as would Kosterman and Feshbach’s ‘patriots’. The ‘patriotism’ measure could therefore constitute an equally good measure of ‘nationalism’.

This is not meant to detract from the value of Sidanius et al’s or Bonaiuto et al’s work, but it illustrates the lack of any serious consideration of what the terms ‘national identity’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ actually mean. I do not claim any privileged knowledge concerning the ‘true’ meaning of these terms, but the way in which authors tend to use these everyday terms unreflexively when discussing psychological concepts suggests that the assumptions of everyday language may be imported into psychological discourse. Thus the national pride exhibited by Dominicans in Sidanius et al’s study is part of a healthy ‘patriotism', while that felt by the British in Bonaiuto et al’s study is a component of a more worrying ‘nationalism’. It is no less problematic when authors do attempt to distinguish the meanings of these concepts as the accusation of lending

3 Interestingly, ‘nationalism’ is sometimes used to mean simply national in-group bias. For example, studies examining bias in advertising and consumer decisions (e.g. Levin & Jaspar, 1996; Pedic, 1990) term this ‘nationalistic’ bias rather than ‘patriotic’ bias.

4 Sidanius et al’s items are: ‘I find the sight of the Dominican flag very moving’, ‘Every time I hear the national anthem, I feel strongly moved’, ‘I have great love for my country’, and ‘I am proud to be Dominican’ (2001, p. 837).
scientific weight to everyday terms can be levelled (see the discussion of research which casts national identity as multidimensional below).

**Particular constructions of universal identity**

One problem with extant attempts to measure national identity is that some level of generality is usually assumed despite particular constructions of national identity being entailed by measures used to assess it. There may be problems, for example, in cross-cultural research if scale items are simply administered with different national labels substituted. For example, Cinnirella (1997) conducted research on national and European identities with British and Italian samples. His national identity measure consists of seven items, two of which assume that high identifiers will perceive themselves as similar to a national type. Question four, ‘How similar do you think you are to the average British/Italian person?’ and question six, ‘How much are your views about Britain shared by other British/Italian people?’ (Cinnirella, 1997, p. 23) both follow from the SCT principle that group members will seek to act in accordance with group norms of behaviour following self-categorization. However, it is unclear whether all national groups necessarily follow this principle.

Evidence from studies of English (Cinnirella’s participants were recruited from a university in southern England) national identity (Condor, 1996b, 2000) suggests that there may be an English norm of heterogeneity such that people who denied being similar to the average British person could still be identifying highly with Britain. If there is a group norm which values diversity, then to deny similarity to a national type is clearly in conformity with the norm. While this is problematic in cross-cultural work, it is equally so in research conducted with a single national group when the results are used to make general conclusions about national identity. For example, Verkuyten (1998) measured national identity with the single item ‘In many respects, I am like the Dutch’ (p. 399). However, the particular nature of this as a viable measure of Dutch national identity is not entered into. The subsequent discussion of the effects of identity saliency on causal attributions for ethnic discrimination makes no attempt to go beyond the general notion of group identification into a discussion of the particularities of Dutch nationhood. Indeed, the reader who knows little of Dutch national discourses is left to assume that a discourse of ‘similarity to type’ is available to the Dutch.

This is not the only sense in which universalist assumptions are made about identity. It is common, particularly in work which follows the SIT/SCT approach to identity, to use adapted versions of scales developed for the measurement of one type of identity for the measurement of national identity. As SIT/SCT aim to provide general theories of intergroup behaviour and group membership, it is assumed that all identities are equivalent and subject to the same psychological processes. However, this results in the neglect of the specifics of particular identities, and in the case of the studies sampled in the present review, of the particularities of specifically national identity (cf. Reicher, Hopkins & Condor, 1997). It is this which allows researchers to use adapted versions of

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5 The question of what may count as a specifically ‘national’ identity to a ‘British’ sample will be discussed later.
instruments initially developed in work on other types of identification. For example, Cinnirella (1997) measures national identity with an adapted version of Brown et al's (1986) identity measure which was developed to assess identification in an occupational setting, and which was itself based on Driedger's (1976) scale of ethnic identity. Identification is thus understood as a psychological object which relates to particular identities only insofar as general processes of identification are involved. Moreover, it is these general processes which are typically considered as worthy of study, rather than the difference between identities (see also section on European identity below).

The interest in general processes is not only manifested at a conceptual level. In terms of the participants who are sampled in the vast majority of papers the assumption that what is of interest are the general processes, rather than specific variations, is also evident. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the samples used by the papers.

Table 2  
Samples used in studies of national identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample composition</th>
<th>Papers (%)</th>
<th>Papers (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children/adolescents</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media texts</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The split between children/adolescents, students and adults is fairly even. While the criticism of social psychology's over-reliance on students has been made before (e.g. Sears, 1986), it is worth emphasizing that students are the largest group sampled by the papers covered in the present review. This in itself is evidence of the presumption that national identity involves general processes, but when the exact make-up of the adults sampled is considered, the criticism can be extended. While there are a few studies which address specific groups within a nation for their own sake (e.g. Boski, 1991, samples Polish immigrants to Canada; Devine-Wright & Lyons, 1997, sample members of Irish language organizations and Irish political parties), the overwhelming focus is on attaining a sample which allows conclusions to be generalized to as many people as possible within a particular 'nation'. This results in a neglect of the possibility of variation amongst subgroups within national groups. Similarly, studies which sample children and/or adolescents typically aim to make general points about identity and its corollaries. There is, however, one way in which developmental research differs markedly from work conducted on students and adults.

6 Many studies, particularly developmental ones, use a wide age range, resulting in the collapsing of children and adolescents into one category.

7 While not all researchers who sample children/adolescents claim to be doing developmental work, the majority do.
In contrast to technologies for measuring national identity in adults, developmental research tends to favour a more indirect approach. As mentioned above, while self-report questionnaires are used, developmentalists also tend to incorporate a wider range of measures with which to draw inferences about national identity. These include photograph evaluation tasks (e.g. Rutland, 1999; Tajfel, Nemeth, Jahoda, Campbell & Johnson, 1970), and tests of 'factual' knowledge (e.g. Barrett & Farroni, 1996; Johnson, 1973; Johnson, Middleton & Tajfel, 1970; Rutland, 1998). While some of these measures appear at first glance to have little to do with national identity, it is clear from various theoretical syntheses that factors such as geographical knowledge (Barrett & Farroni, 1996; Rutland, 1998) are considered to be important indicators of the development of national (and sometimes European) identity (e.g. Barrett, 1996, 2000; Rutland, 1996). The fact that the absence of social psychological papers which address, for example, adults' geographical knowledge does not at first strike one as a gaping hole in the literature is testament to the differing assumptions made about national identity in children and adults. The incorporation of geography into national identity indirectly acknowledges the importance of spatial and territorial components which are frequently neglected in work on adults, which tends to focus more on 'cognitions', 'affect' or 'attitudes' (although as ever there are exceptions, e.g. Devine-Wright & Lyons, 1997). Equally, on the rare occasions when knowledge is measured in studies on adults, it is typically seen as a variable which may have some relation with national identity, patriotism or nationalism rather than actually being a component of it (e.g. Schatz et al, 1999).

While we may wish to applaud this broader conceptualization of national identity, it is worth remembering that the reason such measures are included is because it is assumed that children will not yet have a fully developed national identity and thus may not be able to answer self-report measures. The measures of knowledge can thus be correlated with self-report measures (often glossed as measures of 'subjective' identification) to provide data on the relationship between supposedly 'objective' and 'subjective' components of identity. However, when the measures of 'objective' knowledge are examined in greater detail, it becomes apparent that what counts as accurate factual knowledge is heavily constrained by the researcher.

For example, Barrett and Farroni (1996) asked English and Italian children to choose from a list of countries those which are 'near your own country' (p. 273). The responses to this question were then compared with a list of countries which the researchers defined as being 'adjacent' (p. 265) to Italy and the United Kingdom. Barrett and Farroni neglect to discuss the extent to which the notion of countries being 'adjacent' to the UK is equivalent to countries being 'adjacent' to Italy. Instead they simply assign a score to the English children based on the number of countries correctly identified out of
Ireland, France, Belgium and Holland, and to the Italian children based on the number of
countries correctly identified out of France, Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia.

However, whereas the countries which are classified as being adjacent to Italy all
share a land border with it, only the Republic of Ireland shares a land border with the
UK. It is therefore unclear how one should define adjacency (or 'nearness', to use the
language of the questions rather than the analysis). If France is the closest country to the
United Kingdom in mainland Europe, and Belgium and Holland are treated as adjacent as
well, we are then faced with further countries such as Germany, Denmark and Norway
which are directly accessible by sea from the United Kingdom (as are the three nearer
countries), but are simply further away. All the countries which are classified as adjacent
to Italy are however, by definition of sharing a land border, the same distance from Italy.
Indeed, if countries on mainland Europe are to be classed as adjacent to the UK, countries
accessible by sea from Italy should be classed as adjacent to Italy. This would not only
include countries such as Albania and Greece, but also Tunisia, Libya and several other
North African countries which can all be classed, under this definition, as being 'adjacent'
to Italy.

It appears that in attempting to measure supposedly objectively verifiable
knowledge, Barrett and Farroni import a set of assumptions about what counts as
'adjacent' in two different contexts and treat these as equivalent. The 'factual knowledge'
is thus not so objective after all, but dependent upon the researchers' flexible definition of
'adjacency'.

The inclusion of knowledge questions also introduces an interesting element of
difference over time between constructions of identity. Whereas relatively recent studies
of children's knowledge of their own and other countries (e.g. Barrett & Farroni, 1996;
Rutland, 1998) tend to focus on knowledge of Europe, primarily because of 'the current
political and economic debates within the European Union' (Barrett & Farroni, 1996, p.
257), an earlier study (Johnson, Middleton & Tajfel, 1970) includes a question which
tests children's knowledge of the skin colours of other nationalities, and one which asks
whether the countries 'fought on the same side as England' (p. 234) in the Second World
War. That which a child might know, or be asked, thus appears to be heavily constrained
by the current (or relatively recent) political and ideological climate.

It seems that while the construction of developmental national identity as variable
over macro-time would imply that we could use measurement techniques which assume a

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8 Barrett and Farroni treat the countries of the former Yugoslavia as one country due to the uncertain nature
of the situation in the Balkans at the time their research was conducted. This practice is adopted in the
present discussion to avoid confusion.
9 The problems of adjacency become even more complex when we consider that the English children had
been free to choose whether they came from 'England', 'Britain', 'Great Britain' or 'the United Kingdom'.
The number of adjacent countries varies depending on the answer given by the child. For example, if the
child stated that his/her country was England, then Scotland and Wales would surely count as adjacent
countries. Barrett and Farroni do not comment on this issue.
10 It should be noted that Barrett & Farroni (1996) do not explicitly gloss their study as concerning national
or European identity, but that Barrett (1996, 2000) considers knowledge to be an aspect of
European/national identity.
micro-contextual stability (reliability), we would in fact continuously need to update our measures in order to keep pace with political changes. Even tests of apparently more stable geographical knowledge face this problem - anyone wishing to replicate Barrett and Farroni's (1996) study at the present time would have to replace Yugoslavia with Slovenia on the list of countries adjacent to Italy. This of course raises the possibility that we are no longer measuring the same thing as we were 30 years ago, 3 years ago, or three days ago (cf. Gergen, 1973).

**Attitudes as measurable consequences of identity**

There is, however, a group of studies which offers a potential escape from this problem. Attitudinal approaches measure 'attitudes' to potentially transitory objects (even if the attitudes themselves are relatively stable), which means that the underlying construct of 'identity' is not troubled by a dynamic world in constant flux. For example, Wober (1981) explored British attitudes towards Europe. While the focus on Europe as having relevance for national identity is certainly familiar (see below), some of the attitudes that could be held towards Europe by Wober's participants are now outdated. For instance, one item is 'European armies should get together so that we should become a third force as strong as those of America and Communist countries' (p. 184). While over twenty years later the issue of a united European army and the strength of the American military could still be things that people could have 'attitudes' towards, the collapse of the Soviet Union renders the part of the item about 'Communist countries' relatively meaningless. While it may be possible to adjust the item to simply exclude this out-of-date element, the attitude object would bear little resemblance to Wober's, which presupposes the context of the Cold War. Whichever present day concerns inform our 'attitudes' towards the prospect of a European army and the power of the American military are likely to be irreconcilable with those which informed respondents in the early 1980s.

While the inclusion of historically transient concerns in 'identity' (as in some developmental work) poses problems for the supposed relative stability of identity, the distinction between the stable attitude as a temporary phenomenon and the enduring underlying identity allows the maintenance of the construction of identity as stable and invariant. The 'content' of identity is thus secondary to the attitudes which it is assumed to entail, and crucially any potentially variable content concerning transitory politico-historical phenomena is relegated to the domain of the attitude-object.

While a diverse array of domains have been used to construct measures of national identity, the use of the term 'national identity' obscures the enormous variability between these constructions. 'Identity' may involve 'pride', or be distinguished from it; it may involve viewing the self as similar to a type regardless of the possibility that this itself may vary contextually as an available discourse; it may be entirely subjective, or involve allegedly verifiable 'knowledge' components; it may involve knowing about things which are relevant to a particular time and place, or these may be removed from 'identity' to be located in 'attitudes'. Thus far I have only considered ways in which national identity is constructed as a singular entity. People may be said to identify
strongly or weakly with the nation, but these are fundamentally quantitative variations. There are, however, researchers who have attempted to distinguish between qualitatively different types of national identification.

**Patriots and nationalists: National identity as multidimensional**

There are seven papers (8.9%) which attempt to distinguish multiple dimensions of national identity, including two which do so within a SIT framework (Müller-Peters, 1998; Mummendey et al, 2001). Table 3 presents a list of the dimensions distinguished in each of these papers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baughn &amp; Yaprak (1996)</td>
<td>Nationalism, patriotism, economic nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis (1999)</td>
<td>Type A and type B national attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosterman &amp; Feshbach (1989)</td>
<td>Patriotic and nationalistic attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller-Peters (1998)</td>
<td>Nationalism, national patriotism, European patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mummendey et al (2001)</td>
<td>Nationalism, patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routh &amp; Burgoyne (1998)</td>
<td>Cultural and instrumental attachment to national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schatz et al (1999)</td>
<td>Blind vs. constructive patriotism</td>
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</table>

Most of these distinctions are, in one form or another, attempts to demonstrate that identification (or in some cases 'attachment') does not necessarily lead to ingroup bias. Typically this is the key distinguishing feature between two types of identification, with one dimension exhibiting the relationship (e.g. Kosterman & Feshbach's [1989] & Mummendey et al's [2001] 'nationalism'; Schatz et al's [1999] 'blind patriotism'; Routh & Burgoyne's [1998] 'cultural attachment to national identity') and one not (e.g. Kosterman & Feshbach's [1989] & Mummendey et al's [2001] 'patriotism'; Schatz et al's [1999] 'constructive patriotism'; Routh & Burgoyne's [1998] 'instrumental attachment to national identity').

For example, Schatz et al (1999) separate 'patriotism' into two constructs: 'constructive patriotism' and 'blind patriotism', and used a separate measure of 'national attachment' (intended to measure 'positive identification with and feelings of affective

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11 The main exception to this is Davis' (1999) Q-methodology study of Basque national identity. Davis derives two broad types of identification with the Basque nation. He terms them Type A identification ('guardian nationalism'), and Type B identification ('apolitical ethnicity'). The main difference between the two is that for Type B identifiers 'it is important to draw a distinction between the nationalistic movement and the Basque collective' whereas for Type A identifiers 'these two concepts appear to be inseparable' (Davis, 1999, p. 38).
attachment to country' [p. 155]). This correlates with both patriotisms. They also take a
measure of 'nationalism', which correlates with 'blind' but not 'constructive' patriotism.
National attachment (which includes national identification) is therefore an antecedent of
both 'blind' and 'constructive' patriotism, which are different expressions of the
underlying identity (this apparent shift from correlation to causation is Schatz et al's, see
p. 160). Items from Kosterman & Feshbach's (1989) 'patriotism' scale are used in Schatz
et al's 'national attachment' scale, but items from Kosterman & Feshbach's 'nationalism'
scale are transferred unproblematically to Schatz et al's 'nationalism' scale. Thus
Kosterman & Feshbach's 'patriotism' is part of Schatz et al's 'national attachment'
('identification') whereas both 'nationalism' scales draw upon the same pool of items.
'Blind patriotism', while correlated with 'nationalism', is distinct from it (see Schatz et al's
note 7, p. 161), and 'constructive patriotism' is clearly not reducible to Kosterman &
Feshbach's 'patriotism' because 'patriotism' items are used to measure 'national
attachment'.

This demonstrates the cross-pollination of constructs between two papers which
empirically derive two apparently compatible dichotomies. While it may appear
reasonable to assume that 'blind patriotism' is equivalent to 'nationalism' and 'constructive
patriotism' is equivalent to 'patriotism', this in fact not the case. The construct
'patriotism' is splintered into 3 components: 'blind'; 'constructive'; and 'national
attachment'. However, 'national attachment' is also the pre-existing identification,
resulting in 'patriotism' being both the underlying feeling and the expression.

Implicated in this discussion are the evaluative glosses attached to the varieties of
national identification which produce ingroup favouritism and those which do not.
Authors may, for example, turn their attention to suggesting ways in which 'bad' national
identity can be reduced, and 'good' national identity can be encouraged. Schatz et al
(1999) display something of an individualistic bias by speculating that 'early socialization
experiences that promote autonomy and independence might engender a more
constructive orientation towards one's country' (p.170). Similarly, in a theoretical
discussion, Feshbach (1987) argues that parental attachment in childhood predicts
patriotism and nationalism in later life. It may therefore be possible to suggest that a key
element in the division of national attachment/identity into 'good' and 'bad' forms
continues the longstanding individualistic bias in social psychology. Individual
autonomy forms the bedrock of the 'good' form of national identity while a lack of
autonomy may lead to 'bad' national identity. Moreover, it is the form of identity most
consonant with western individualistic societies which is considered desirable, while the
collectivistic identity of the non-western other is cast as potentially more pernicious (cf.
Sampson, 1993).

Finally, it is worth noting that while the majority of the multidimensional papers
in Table 2 involve distinctions between 'nationalism' and 'patriotism', the only all-UK
study prefers cultural and instrumental attachment (Routh & Burgoyne, 1998). Indeed, of
a total of ten studies which involved measures of 'patriotism', only two used a UK sample
(Mummendey et al, 2001; Müller-Peters, 1998), and the only UK-based researcher
involved was Rupert Brown, who was third author on Mummendey et al. It is worth
speculating that perhaps the absence of the term 'patriotism' from UK studies of national identity and associated constructs reflects a more general absence of a distinct conception of 'patriotism' in British (English?) discourses of nation (see Condor, 1996b, 2000).

These are just a small selection of the ways in which constructions of 'national identity' differ, but they nevertheless offer an indication of the problems associated with attempting to study 'national identity' as a psychological object. While it would be easy to dismiss such variability as simply the product of different theoretical positions or methodological preferences, it is my contention that the problems associated with the construct run far deeper. Rather than uncovering an underlying mental object called 'national identity', much social psychological research appears to have transferred the concept 'national identity' (as well as 'patriotism' and 'nationalism') from commonsense discourses, located it in the mental life of the individual, constructed particular versions of it through the use of a variety of technologies, and then returned its findings and conclusions to problems which seem unavoidably to concern general processes of 'national identity'.

However, so far I have only told half a story. Up to now I have been focussing primarily on the way in which the 'identity' in 'national identity' is constructed. It is now time to focus on the specifically 'national' element.

**The Location of Research**

In order to explore the constructions of nationhood implicit in social psychological studies of national identity, it was decided firstly to identify the 'nations' which research on national identity takes its samples from. It was necessary to distinguish between those papers which involved research on a single nationality, and those which carried out cross-national work. The outcome of this process is presented in Tables 4a and 4b.

<table>
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<th>Table 4a</th>
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<td><strong>Single country papers broken down by country</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett &amp; Farroni (1996)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown &amp; Haeger (1999)</td>
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<td>Burris et al (1998)</td>
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<td>Chryssochoou (2000a)</td>
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<td>Cinnirella (1997)</td>
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<td>Farah (1978)</td>
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<td>Feather (1981)</td>
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<td>Huici et al (1997)</td>
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<td>Jahoda &amp; Woerdenbagh (1982)</td>
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<td>Jetten et al (2002)</td>
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<td>Kim &amp; Oh (2001)</td>
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<td>Luña-Arocas et al (2001)</td>
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<td>Mlicki &amp; Ellemers (1996)</td>
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<td>Müller-Peters (1998)</td>
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<td>Mum mendey et al (2001)</td>
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<td>Poppe &amp; Linssen (1999)</td>
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<td>Rivenburgh (2000)</td>
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It is clear from Tables 4a and 4b that the majority of the research on national identity is carried out on samples from the West. While several other countries were sampled only once or twice, only seven papers (8.9%) sampled non-Western cultures. This may well reflect the frequently observed Western bias in psychology, or it may result from the use of search techniques better suited for identifying research in the West (such as only including articles published in English). Either way, it is worth
remembering that the present review focuses largely on work carried out on mainly Western samples. However, this is hardly a limitation of the review. As I am arguing that 'national identity' is generally taken-for-granted in social psychology while also being constructed in a variety of ways, it does no harm to suggest that the construct would appear even more fractious if a comprehensive review of non-Western studies was performed. The dominance of Western psychologies is underlined when it is considered that the non-Western studies sampled adopt frameworks developed originally in the West. Again, it does not matter whether this is because Western psychologies have been adopted in (or imposed on) cultures other than those in which they were developed, or whether the only non-Western psychological research which appears in Western academic journals is that which 'Westernizes' itself. Whichever of these is the case, Western dominance is apparent.

For example, Kim and Oh's (2001) work on the national identities and attitudes of South Koreans and North Korean defectors to South Korea is interesting not only for the unique way in which the authors operationalize national identity, but for the use of adapted versions of priming tasks originally developed by Social Cognition researchers in the USA to measure prejudice. This alerts us to the potential problem of the simple Western/Non-Western distinction, which is further troubled by the institutional affiliation of the authors, one of whom is at an American university, the other part of a committee of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Seoul. Needless to say, the criteria used for the 'location of research' in the present review is only one of several available.

Kim and Oh distinguish between two types of national identity, implicit and explicit. Explicit national identity was operationalized with a single item in which participants were required to indicate 'how strongly you associate yourself with either North Korea or South Korea' (Kim & Oh, 2001, p. 278, italics in original). The response scale ranged from -3 (North Korean identity), through 0 (neutral), to +3 (South Korean identity). Implicit national identity was assessed with a priming task adapted from Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz's (1998) Implicit Association Test (IAT) in which participants were required to respond correctly to stimuli which fell into four categories: 'North Korea', 'South Korea', 'self', and 'other'. In one block of trials the response required was the same for 'South Korea' and 'self' stimuli, with a different response required for both 'North Korea' and 'other' stimuli. In another block of trials these were reversed such that 'North Korea' and 'self' stimuli required the same response, and 'South Korea' and 'other' stimuli required the same response. Correct responses are then measured in terms of reaction times. The assumption is that 'when the two concepts that share a response are strongly associated, the sorting task is considerably easier than when the two concepts are either weakly associated or bipolar-opposed' (Kim & Oh, 2001, p. 272).

Kim and Oh draw heavily on the distinction between implicit (automatic) and explicit (controlled) social cognition (e.g. Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980; Devine, 1989a, 1989b; Dovidio, Evans & Tyler, 1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwarz, 1998;
Locke, Macleod & Walker, 1994; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997, 2001) which casts doubt on the validity of self-report measures for accessing underlying cognitions. However, despite the previous application of several implicit social cognition tasks similar to the IAT to a variety of social psychological concepts such as prejudice, stereotypes and attitudes, the distinction between implicit and explicit national identity appears to be novel (although see Pelham & Hetts [1999] for a distinction between implicit and explicit identity in general). This raises the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Approaches such as SCT see identity as primarily subjective, whereas Kim and Oh (2001) would presumably accuse SCT research of assessing only (subjective) explicit national identity, while the (objective) implicit national identity goes unmeasured. While there is merit in both types of approach, I do not intend to debate their relative value. It is sufficient for my purposes to point out yet another radical variation in the construction of 'national identity', a term which is used by many authors but appears to pertain to myriad different constructs. It is also worth noting that the difference in construction results from the social cognitive approach taken, and the associated methods employed. While Kim and Oh clearly wish to address the specific problems of nationhood on the Korean peninsula, they end up with the rather general conclusions that South Koreans identify more strongly with the South on both explicit and implicit measures, whereas North Koreans identify more strongly with the North on the implicit measure, but have a North-South neutral identity on the explicit measure. The particularities of these identities are not explored, nor is the possibility of identification simply with Korea, despite the authors' frequent references to the 'Korean people' (p. 266) and the assertion that 'Koreans have historically regarded themselves as a racially and culturally homogeneous population and a unified nation' (ibid).

This again raises the possibility that, despite the proliferation of different operationalizations and constructions of 'national identity', researchers still tend to assume that the construct is transferable from nation to nation. Thus the particularities of nationhood in different national contexts are not explored, while the theoretical and methodological approaches employed result in the fracturing of a construct assumed to be universal. This can be examined further through the examination of national identity measures used cross-culturally.

The absence of the particular

It was noted above that Cinnirella (1997) based parts of his British and Italian national identification measure on the notion of 'similarity to type', neglecting the possibility that this may not play a part in British (specifically English) national identification. Central to this assumption is the notion that the same scale can be used to measure national identity regardless of the particular nation involved. Several authors make this assumption. For example, Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe (2002) measure American (US) and Indonesian national identification with three items: "I am glad to be an [American versus Indonesian]", 'I identify with my fellow [Americans versus Indonesians]' and 'I feel connected with my fellow [Americans versus Indonesians]' (Jetten et al, 2002, p. 193). Identification with nations as different as the USA and Indonesia is thus reduced to variation on a three quantitative measures, serving to obscure
any qualitative differences between conceptions of nationhood and national identity in the two countries.

The failure to address particularity is apparent in the variation in what is taken to be a 'nation' across authors, and indeed sometimes quite strikingly within the work of a single author. This is compounded by the absence in much of the literature of any explicit discussion of what a 'nation' actually is. Considering that this question has been the subject of heated debate in the social sciences for a number of years (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1991) this seems rather surprising. Rather than explicitly addressing this issue, many social psychologists offer constructions of nationhood which appear to be based on prior assumptions, or even ad hoc selection. Indeed, the question of what may count as a 'nation' to participants in social psychological research is usually neglected, with a particular nation imposed on participants. What is of interest is how strongly someone identifies with the nation, and any differences in identification are generally only conceptualized in terms of strength of identification. While there are various miscellaneous exceptions to this rule (e.g. Feather, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996), the only consistent group of exceptions was in work carried out in areas of conflict or which are undergoing or have recently undergone radical political change.

For example, studies conducted in Northern Ireland tend either to give participants a choice (whether forced or open) of national identity (e.g. Gallagher, 1989; Hosin & Cairns, 1984; McClenahan, Cairns, Dunn & Morgan, 1991), or refrain from applying any national label, preferring instead simply 'national identity' in questionnaires (e.g. Cassidy & Trew, 1998). The assumption seems to be that in areas where there has been conflict over what 'the nation' is, or should be, there is likely to be variation in what counts as a specifically national identity. It is perhaps all the more surprising then, that researchers in the rest of the UK are generally not sensitive to the possibility that what counts as a 'nation', and therefore a 'national identity', is itself worthy of study (although some studies have investigated the relationship between Scottish and British identification, see below). It is more common for researchers to impose there own constructions of nationhood on participants.

Indeed, the apparently simple task of compiling tables 4a and 4b (above) is problematized by such considerations, as the simple classification of research as coming from the UK neglects the possible differences between its constituent parts. I will now turn to explore the ways in which nationhood is constructed in the UK.

Nations and regions: The construction of nationhood in UK studies of national identity

Because the nature of the UK state offers a particularly intriguing set of possible 'national' identities, and because the research reported in the present thesis is concerned with the UK, I will attempt to outline in more detail some trends in the construction of nationhood in social psychological studies of national identity in the UK. However, first it is necessary to illustrate that although trends can be identified, there can be a great deal of seemingly haphazard variation within the work of single authors.
While some researchers attribute nationhood to the same political entity consistently throughout their work (e.g. Rupert Brown's studies count 'Britain' as a 'nation' e.g. Brown & Haeger [2001]; Brown et al [2001]; Mummendey et al [2001]), others appear to move from one construction of nationhood to another. For example, in four papers by Nick Hopkins and various colleagues, Scotland is ascribed the status of 'nation' only twice. Hopkins et al (1997) attribute nationhood to Scotland (and by extension England) alone, while Hopkins and Moore (2001) offer participants 'Scottish' and 'British' as potential national identities in a questionnaire. However, in two further studies, nationhood is attributed solely to 'Britain' (Hopkins & Murdoch, 1999; Huici, Ros, Cano, Hopkins, Emler & Carmona, 1997). Furthermore, Huici et al (1997) construct Scotland as a 'region'. I do not wish to argue that Brown's consistent approach is preferable to Hopkins' more fluid construction of nationhood, but that there is a real lack of consideration of what counts as a nation in both bodies of work (although see Reicher & Hopkins [2001] for such a consideration). Instead of imposing assumptions (whether consistent or not) of nationhood upon participants in social psychological research, central questions which research should address is what do people count as a nation, and how do people go about constructing an entity as a nation?

Even in research where participants are given a choice of 'nation', the implications of this choice are frequently not taken seriously. For example, Barrett & Farroni (1996) asked children what country they came from, and counted 'England', 'Britain', 'Great Britain' and 'United Kingdom' as correct answers. While this may seem preferable to imposing nationality on the children, Barrett & Farroni used 'Britain' in the questions they subsequently asked the children, regardless of each child's initial answer (see note 9 above). The possibility that different responses may be indicative of fundamentally different understandings of nationhood is not explored.

Similarly, Bennett et al (1998) explored Scottish and English children's subjective identification as English/Scottish and British. The authors report that '63 children … were found either to deny national group membership (i.e. stating "not at all English/Scottish") or to express ignorance of it (i.e. "don't know")' (p. 904). While the authors take a paragraph to explain their theoretically grounded rationale for combining those children who denied national group membership with those who expressed ignorance of it, there is no exposition of the decision to combine Scottish and English children who gave these responses. The assumption, once again, is that what is of interest is a general process of national (dis)identification, and the particulars of English and Scottish identity which may lead to different meanings associated with their denial are neglected. The assumption, based on these denials, that 'subjective identification' with the ingroup has not yet developed in these children is also problematized by Condor's (1996, 2000) finding that adults born and resident in England frequently deny the personal significance or relevance of national identity. Faced with this, it appears possible that the only reason why children who deny national identity are deemed not to have developed 'subjective identification' is because the researchers know that they are children and are thus likely to be less 'developed' than adults. But if a 'fully developed' English identity can involve the denial of English identity, children's denial of national identity cannot necessarily be taken as evidence of it not yet having developed.
The general lack of attention to the specifics of identification in different parts of the UK is compounded by a notable trend across studies - identification with England is very rarely a concern. Since the work of Tajfel and his colleagues on the development of national identity and national attitudes in children in the early 1970s (Johnson et al, 1970; Middleton, Tajfel & Johnson, 1970; Tajfel et al, 1970; Tajfel et al, 1972) very few studies have focussed on specifically English national identity (see Condor [2000] for an exception). This is in stark contrast to the burgeoning number of studies which focus on specifically Scottish identity and its corollaries (e.g. Abrams & Hogg, 1987; Hopkins et al, 1997; Rutland & Brown, 2001), or which focus on the relationship between 'Scottish' and 'British' identity (e.g. Hopkins & Moore, 1999; Huici et al, 1997; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). It is far more likely that 'British' identity will be imposed on samples recruited in England (e.g. Barrett & Farroni, 1996; Bonaiuto et al, 1996). The exceptions to this are studies which sample the whole of Britain (e.g. Wober, 1981) or the UK (e.g. Müller-Peters, 1998; Müller-Peters et al, 1998; Pepermans & Verleye, 1998; Routh & Burgoyne, 1998) and then impose the identity 'Britain' or 'UK' on the sample. This of course results in the construction of different versions of British identity, in that some studies construct it from a specifically English sample, whereas others construct it from a sample made up of any or all of English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish participants (indeed five papers offer no more than 'British' to describe their sample, making it impossible to determine what parts of the UK contribute to 'British' identity).

However, while the specifics of identification in the UK are often neglected, there is a growing literature focussed on European identification, which frequently examines the relationship between national and European identities.

European identity

Before entering into a discussion of the ways in which social psychologists have operationalized European identity, and the assumptions which have been made about it, it should perhaps be explained exactly why a review of the national identity literature should be exploring European identity. After initially gathering together studies concerned with national identity, it became clear that a significant minority of these studies were also concerned with issues surrounding European identity. It was therefore decided to examine studies of specifically European identity, and it soon became apparent that many of these studies also have a concern with national identity. As the present review aims to take a broad-based look at how social psychologists have constructed national identity, rather than focus solely on those studies which claim to be taking a measure of national identity, studies centred around the notion of a European identity were therefore included.

In total, 23 papers were overtly concerned with Europe and European integration, 10 of which took some measure of European identity, and two of the meanings associated with it. The other 11 were included, on the same criteria as studies of national identity, as they manifested a concern for 'identity' despite taking measures of 'attitudes' (e.g. Wober, 1981), or took some measure of 'knowledge' (e.g. Rutland, 1999) or 'awareness' (Jahoda & Woerdenbagch, 1982) of Europe.
When and where?

There is a notable trend over time in studies which address Europe and European identity. There are only two published studies between 1970 and 1992, neither of which include measures of European identity (Wober, 1981; Jahoda & Woerdenbagch, 1982\textsuperscript{12}). However, from 1992 there are 21 papers, all but one of which have been published since 1996\textsuperscript{13}. This perhaps reflects the increase in processes of European integration during the 1990s, particularly the prospect of a single European currency, and the prevalence of debates (in the media at least) concerning the nature of the European Union (EU) and the possibility of a federal European government.

It will hardly be surprising that all the work on European identity originates from within Europe - not least because in order to study European identity, one needs to study people who might conceivably have a European identity. However, it certainly appears that non-Europeans have not devoted much time to studying European identity. There thus appears to be a European bias in work on European identity to the extent that, with the exception of a few studies which use Europe as a convenient superordinate category with which to address theoretical issues in SIT (e.g. Brown & Haeger, 1999), most studies are concerned with the potential future impact of European integration, which is often constructed as either a specifically desirable process, or at least as inevitable. It is worth exploring these constructions in more detail.

European assumptions

It is not uncommon for authors to address their research findings to European policy makers with the aim of 'making a scientific contribution to the historic change currently taking place in Europe' (Müller-Peters, 1998, p. 702). For example, Kokkinaki (1998, p. 776) argues that understanding public opinion towards issues such as European Monetary Union (EMU) is an essential step in the implementation of the Maastricht reforms. Politicians and policy makers need to understand the discrepant views that people within and across countries might hold, in order to avoid the social conflicts that the integration process might engender.

\textsuperscript{12} Indeed the inclusion of Jahoda & Woerdenbagch's (1982) study is the most borderline in the present review. Whereas other studies which assess children's knowledge of national or supra-national groups (e.g. Barrett & Farroni, 1996; Rutland, 1998) clearly play a part in their authors' overall theorization of national or European identity (see Barrett, 1996, 2000; Rutland, 1996), Jahoda & Woerdenbagch offer no such conceptualization. It was however decided that since Barrett's and Rutland's studies of 'knowledge' were included, it would make little sense to exclude Jahoda & Woerdenbagch's.

\textsuperscript{13} Six of these papers (Kokkinaki, 1998; Müller-Peters, 1998; Müller-Peters et al, 1998; Pepermans & Verleye, 1998; Routh & Burgoyne, 1998; van Everdingen & van Raaij, 1998) are from a special issue of the Journal of Economic Psychology (1998) detailing an EU-wide study of attitudes towards the single European currency (the Euro) and their correlates/predictors. While there is some overlap in the data used by some of these papers, there can be no question that they should be counted separately as several papers involve contrasting theoretical frameworks, analytical paradigms, and focus on different aspects of the data.
Psychologists' task is therefore to ease the process of European integration by offering advice on ways to avoid intergroup conflict which may result. Kokkinaki clearly values the enterprise of European integration, and indeed aims to contribute to it.

When the aim of contributing to European integration is not explicitly stated, it is sometimes nevertheless apparent that the EU is viewed in a positive light. Chyssochoou (2000b), for example, defines the 'group beliefs' of the EU as set out in the preamble of the Maastricht Treaty. Thus the EU's 'group beliefs' include the promotion of 'economic and social progress' (Chyssochoou, 2000b, p. 405) for the people of member countries, the 'desire to deepen solidarity' (ibid) between peoples and the commitment to creating a 'closer union among the peoples of Europe' (ibid). The use of a source prepared by those in power in the EU for public consumption as evidence of 'group beliefs' results in an explicitly favourable construction of Europe. It is also interesting to note the empirical distinctions made by Müller-Peters (1998). Müller-Peters (1998) distinguishes between national patriotism and nationalism as forms of national identification, but accounts for European identification with only 'European patriotism'. No European equivalent of the opprobrious nationalism is posited. In this scheme a high level of identification with Europe is desirable ('patriotic'), and incapable of entailing negative connotations, unlike national identification which can be 'nationalistic'.

Even when European integration is not given any explicit evaluative gloss, it is sometimes treated as an inevitable process which psychologists can only help prepare for, and indeed warn of the consequences of not preparing sufficiently. For example, Rutland (1998b, p. 63) argues for the importance of studying children's social representations of Europe by referring to recent socio-political and economic changes (e.g. European Integration, the Single European Currency, enlargement of the European Union) [which] mean that Europe will probably be even more central to people's everyday lives, including children who will soon be entering into an adult world increasingly centred around a European job market and integration across the European Union.

Europe may not be glossed as explicitly favourable, but it is accepted that Europe will inevitably come to play a larger part in children's lives.

Indeed, even those studies which neither provide an explicit evaluative gloss or assume that European integration is inevitable, tend to avoid problematizing the project of European integration. This may seem surprising, but two factors, one practical, the other ideological, help shed light on this curious absence. Firstly, eight of the papers (including the six in the special issue of the Journal of Economic Psychology) received funding from European bodies. This necessitates that the research produces 'results' for those working towards European integration which are not inimical to the project.

This cannot, however, account for the general acceptance of the EU. The second, ideological, factor, may do though. As Reicher (1997) comments on Hewstone's (1986) book *Understanding Attitudes in the European Community*, there appears to be a tendency to polarize debate on European integration such that one can either be a pro-
capitalist pro-European or a nationalistic, xenophobic anti-European. The evaluative
glosses typically attached to European integration by psychologists favour the pro-
capitalist position, relegating those who may have reservations about European
integration based on the largely economic nature of the project to the position of bigoted
xenophobe. Concomitantly, it may be the case that some psychologists may be unable to
avoid this polarized version of the debate and position their research as pro-European in
order to avoid the opprobrious position of being seen to be nationally anti-
European.

Related to this is the assumption that a European identity and identification with
the EU (or European Community [EC] prior to Maastricht) are equivalent (although see
Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996, for an exception). This results in a version of Europe based
only on the EU, or to borrow Hansen's (2002) term, 'EUrope'. More often than not
authors will introduce the issues surrounding European integration and the EU before
going on to measure identification with Europe rather than with the EU specifically. For
example, Huici et al (1997) discuss issues of European integration extensively but their
measure of European identification asks simply 'to what extent do you think of yourself
as being European?' (reconstructed from p. 102). Similarly Müller-Peters (1998)
measures European identity (European patriotism) with the items 'I feel more involved
with matters relating to other European countries than to countries outside Europe' and 'I
feel attached to Europe and its people' (p. 708). The discussion of results derived from
these measures then turns back to the EU. The possibility that people can have any
conception of 'Europe' other than the EU is not accounted for. In the worst case scenario
it is possible that participants may be answering questions based on a construction of
Europe as a continent, while the researchers interpret them as being based on a
construction of Europe as the EU. While it may be the case that people use 'Europe' and
'the EU' interchangeably in everyday talk, this is surely an empirical question which may
well produce contrasting results across different European countries (for instance those
which are not yet members of the EU). It may be useful to investigate, for example, how
people mobilize a European identity in order to argue against the EU.

**Nations in Europe**

It is common for researchers to cast national identity as posing potential problems
for European integration and the development of a European identity. For example, van
Everdingen and van Raaij (1998, p. 722) predict that 'national identity may lead to a
negative attitude towards the euro'. However, a few authors have drawn attention to the
vastly differing relationships between national and European identities manifested by the
people of the various member states of the EU. For example, Chryssochoou (2000b)
argues that whereas for her French participants 'defining oneself as European is not so
much an issue as French seems to equate to being European' (p. 409), her Greek
participants 'try to justify … their inclusion in the European Union' (p. 413).

A consistent finding is that people in the UK tend to view European identity as
incompatible with their existing national identity. Cinnirella (1997, p. 27) suggests that
his 'British respondents tended to feel that their national identity was under threat from
European integration, and its associated European identity’. Similarly, in analyzing the data from an EU-wide study, Müller-Peters (1998, p. 707) argues that ‘in Great Britain, nationalism and European identity are looked upon as incompatible’. Even in developmental studies which focus on knowledge of Europe it is frequently found that samples drawn from the UK are less knowledgeable about Europe than those drawn from parts of mainland Europe. For example, Jahoda and Woerdenbagch (1982) found that Scottish children and adolescents were less knowledgeable about Europe than their Dutch counterparts. Barrett and Farroni (1996) found that Italian children had a much higher level of knowledge than English children and speculate whether this may be ‘a product of the different social representations of Europe which prevail in Italy and in England’ (p. 270).

Bearing in mind the assumptions about Europe (outlined above) which are frequently, if sometimes tacitly, made, it is worth pondering the implicit construction of the UK which is made available. The incompatibility between national and European identity becomes a ‘problem’ because psychologists have, on the whole, taken the view that European integration is a broadly positive process. The UK (or sometimes England, Scotland, or more often Britain) is thus constructed as an obstacle to European integration. Because of the incompatibility between national and European identities manifested in the UK the problem is understood as one specifically of nationalism. The anti-EU/nationalism assumption is thus produced as a ‘finding’ by social psychology. However, as it appears that many studies begin with this assumption, it would seem unreasonable to believe any other finding could be produced.

A further way in which the UK is produced as nationalistically anti-European is in the neglect of the possibility of differences between Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland. It was noted above that studies of specifically English national identity are rare, whereas studies of Scottish national identity are more common. In studies of European identity in the UK this trend is repeated. There are no studies which explore English and European identities, while two explore the interrelation of Scottish, British and European identities (Huici et al, 1997 [although Scotland is 'regional' while Britain is 'national’]; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). Samples recruited in England tend to be used in investigations of only 'British' (e.g. Cinnirella, 1997), or 'UK' (Müller-Peters et al, 1998), and European identity. Equally, the possibility of differences between constituent parts of, or sub-groups within, the UK is rarely attended to.

Measures of European identity

In order to assess the way in which 'European identity' was operationalized, it is necessary to explore the scales used in the 11 papers which explicitly measured European identity. As European identity is often juxtaposed with national identity, it also seems sensible to assess how the relationship between national and European identity is operationalized. Indeed, it is with the nine papers (see Table 6) which take measures of both European and national identity that I shall begin.
Table 6
Papers which measure national and European identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>National Identities Measured</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cinnirella (1997)</td>
<td>Britain &amp; Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huici et al (1997)</td>
<td>Britain &amp; Spain (Scotland &amp; Andalucia measured as 'regional' identities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokkinaki (1998)</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mlicki &amp; Ellemers (1996)</td>
<td>Poland &amp; The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller-Peters (1998)</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland &amp; Cinnirella (2000)</td>
<td>Scotland, Britain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overwhelming tendency in these studies is for questionnaire items to be adapted to measure both national and European identity. For example, Kokkinaki (1998) measures national identity with 'I feel attached to Greece and its people' (p. 793), and measures European identity with 'I feel attached to Europe and its people' (p. 794). Greek and European identity are assumed to be essentially the same type of 'thing', and indeed both are operationalized as involving a notion of 'the people'. Similarly, Mlicki and Ellemers (1996) assume that identification with Poland, the Netherlands and Europe are all essentially the same. National identity is measured with the items 'I see myself as a Dutchman/Pole'; 'I am glad that I am Dutch/Polish'; 'I feel strong ties with the Dutch/Poles'; 'I am like other Dutchmen/Poles' and 'I identify with the Dutch/Poles' (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996, p.114). To measure European identity, the national term is simply replaced in each item with 'European'. Indeed, each of the papers which measure national and European identity employ scales which are altered in this way.

While this may make statistical comparison of responses easier, the assumption that both European and national (and 'regional' in the case of Huici et al [1997]) identification involve the same processes is yet another way in which generality is imposed. The particulars of different identifications are ignored due to the a priori assumption, often derived from SIT/SCT (the dominant approach in European social psychology), that identification is a general process which operates in largely the same way regardless of the entity which is being identified with. What makes European identity qualitatively different from national (or indeed any other form of) identity is simply not an issue.
While identification with Europe is often cast as accessible to researchers through self-report techniques, once again it is research on children which attends to the possibility that a wider conceptualization of identity may be needed.

Children and Europe

As with measures of national identity used on children, research on European identity in children tends to treat responses to self-report measures as indicative of the relative presence or absence of European identity, and seeks to explore the relationship between subjective identification and a range of other factors. Rutland (1996), for example, measures cognitive (knowledge of the EU) and affective (emotional response to Europe) components of European identity. He also takes indexes of children's European travel experience, social class and parents' attitudes to Europe, glossing these as socio-cultural factors, and explores their relationship with responses on the self-report measure.

While Rutland is not alone in constructing the affective and cognitive measures as 'components to the children's European identity' (Rutland, 1996, p. 154; see also Barrett, 2000), his emphasis on the importance of socio-cultural factors as part of his Vygotskian approach to development causes problems. Whereas the cognitive and affective measures are explicitly glossed as 'components' of identity, the socio-cultural measures are not. Thus 'identity' is understood as inherently contained within the individual, and made up of cognitions and affect. The socio-cultural factors considered are cast in the role of distal variables which may have an effect on identity, but are not a component of it. Rutland's analysis complicates matters further by treating cognitive, affective and socio-cultural measures as equivalent and using the self-report measures as solely indicative of European identity. These measures are themselves interesting as children had to respond positively when asked if they were 'proud or glad to be European' (ibid. p. 156) in order to be classed as identifying with Europe, even if they had answered the previous question, 'are you European?' (ibid.) in the affirmative. Identification is thus not simply seen as a matter of self-categorization, but to involve a level of 'pride'. How this can be dissociated from the apparently separate affective component of identity is not discussed.

Concluding remarks

It is worth emphasizing that in singling out particular research papers and particular researchers my intention is not necessarily to criticize individuals but to point out the assumptions about nations, Europe and identity which undergird research on national identity. While this necessitates critical analysis of particular pieces of research, it does not invalidate that research in the context of the tradition of work in which it was carried out. Such a gloss would encourage a view that improvements in our understanding of national identity can be made by simply improving the quality of research or the rigour of the methodologies employed. Rather, I would suggest that it is necessary for research to focus on exactly how people construct 'nation', 'identity' and 'Europe', what these constructions achieve in local contexts, as well as the more taken for granted, banal ideological assumptions which are both imported into particular constructions and sustained by them.
It is worth summarizing the main thrust of my argument before outlining my approach to the study of issues of nationhood and identity. Firstly, while researchers often claim their research to be motivated by a concern to understand problems of social conflict and change, the extent to which the majority of research is able to account for long-term social change is questionable. In order to do so, national identity must be conceptualized as not only variable over micro-time, but also as potentially displaying consistencies. However, these consistencies must not be overestimated to the extent that they become invariant. Equally, analysis of long-term change must not be confined to the realm of cognitive development, which is assumed to cease with the advent of adulthood.

Secondly, there is little or no attention paid in the vast majority of research to understanding the everyday meanings associated with the term 'national identity', or concepts such as 'patriotism' and 'nationalism'. Indeed these are frequently taken for granted as psychologically meaningful terms around which to base a social psychology of the individual's relationship with macro-political entities. When attempts are made to distinguish the terms from each other, there is the ever present danger of importing the assumptions of everyday usage. Thus when patriotism is distinguished from nationalism the former is healthy and positive whereas the latter is prejudiced and dangerous. The effort to show that one does not necessarily entail the other neglects the ideological system upon which both are predicated (cf. Billig, 1995; Hopkins, 2001).

Equally problematically, the tendency to assume equivalence at a variety of levels results in the creation of a series of general constructs which, while allowing for relatively straightforward comparability, misses the particularities involved. Psychological research largely assumes, and thereby sustains, a world in which nations are a general class of political entity, the members of which are subject to the same psychological processes as each other. Furthermore, not only is national identification assumed to involve the same processes across nations, but many researchers assume that national identification is the same as identification with any collectivity. Witness, for example, Müller-Peters' (1998, p. 702) definition of national identity as referring 'to a special form of collective or social identity, and in this case the collective which constitutes identity is the nation'. It is this same assumption which allows researchers interested in the study of identification in general to appear in the present review. For instance, Jetten et al (2002) conduct three studies on the influence of groups norms of individualism and collectivism, mediated by levels of group identification, only the first of which uses a measure of national identification. This does not cause problems for the researchers, however, as the general processes assumed to govern all identification are taken as the relevant focus of study rather than the particulars of the type of group, let alone the specifics of different national groups.

Indeed, what counts as a nation is often taken for granted in the same way as the meaning of 'national identity'. The present review focused on the construction of 'nation' in studies of national identity in the UK and demonstrated some of the assumptions of nationhood inherent therein. The myriad discourses of nation in the UK receive scant attention in the psychological literature, with interest centring on the processes of
The assumption of generality is often apparent from the utility accounting in which authors frequently engage in order to justify their particular projects. It is not uncommon for researchers to refer to a range of social problems which, it is claimed, can benefit from a study of general (national) identity processes. For example, Liu, Lawrence, Ward & Abraham (2002) assert the importance of their study of the relationship between ethnic and national identity in Malaysia and Singapore by referring to the fact that '[a]ll over the world, from Rwanda to Chechnya, from Indonesia to the former Yugoslavia, ethnic groups have been asserting themselves as a political force within nations' (Liu et al, 2002, p. 3).

Even in those studies in which national identity is used simply as a convenient case with which to examine generic intergroup processes, the study of general processes is justified in terms of its application to social problems. For example, Brown et al (2001, p. 81-97) begin their paper by stating that

"the goal of understanding better the antecedents of positive and negative attitudes toward outgroups has long preoccupied social psychologists. In the context of relations between citizens of different nations, achieving that goal has more than academic significance. The 20th century, like others before it, has been badly scarred by the effects of inter-nation conflict and enmity. The research reported here, set as it is in the domain of Anglo-French attitudes, represents a modest contribution to that social psychological endeavour."

While the challenge of making a social psychological contribution to various 'real world' issues must be a priority, there is a danger in assuming that the world is governed exclusively by general processes, or that it is these which are of most import. The ultimate aim of generalization is frequently referred to, even if only in cautionary notes about the generalizability of findings, and appears to be considered the raison d'être of social psychological research. It seems that finding out ways in which explanations, processes and theories are specific is not desirable, except in establishing the need for more comprehensive general accounts.

Finally, it is worth noting that national identity is generally assumed to be quite easily accessible to social psychologists. In order to find out about someone's national identity, we need only ask them (cf. Condor, 1997). The overwhelming majority of papers report research in which measures of national identity (or in some cases attitudes) were measured by direct questions. Even those authors who advise caution with the use of the term 'national identity' in scale items nevertheless assume that direct questions concerning nationhood can be asked in order to gain a measure of national identity. For example, Müller-Peters et al (1998, p. 671) argue that "since there is considerable variation in individual interpretations of the meaning of terms such as "identity" or "national pride", they were not used in the wording of the relevant items'. Examples of the wording of the items nevertheless indicate that respondents were asked direct
questions about nationhood: 'I feel attached to (COUNTRY) and its people' (ibid, capitals in original).

The only group of studies which consistently employs methods other than self-report measures (although as we have seen these are often employed as well) are developmental studies. However, the assumption here seems to be that children are less able to report identifications because these may not be sufficiently developed. While this rests on a cultural view of the child as necessarily less capable than adults, it also has the potential to lead to a neglect of children's commonsense conceptions of nationhood. Equally, as identity beyond adolescence is not a concern, developmental research never troubles the assumption that we can access adults' national identities by asking direct questions.

There are, however, a few studies conducted on adults which suggest that such assumptions may not be justified. As discussed above, Kim and Oh (2001) dissociate explicit national identity, which can be measured using scales, from implicit national identity, which is only rendered visible by the use of covert technologies. The need to make such a distinction is, however, challenged by Condor's (2000) qualitative study of English national identity. People born and resident in England frequently denied or de-emphasized the personal significance of national identity when answering direct questions on the issue. However, at the same time, a national frame of reference was frequently banally assumed by many respondents. The key to this finding was the focus on the participants' own words. The heavy restrictions placed on available responses in standard self-report measures result in a neglect of the possibility of exploring the underlying assumptions surrounding national identity. Kim and Oh's (2001) need to distinguish a separate implicit (cognitive) national identity thus arises from the restriction of responses on the (explicit) self-report measure.

The approach which I will adopt in the present research will attempt to address some of the shortcomings in extant research by focussing on articulations of nationhood across a variety of discursive contexts, assuming that such articulations are not primarily the result of isolated, private mental processes in the heads of individuals, but that they are fundamentally ideological in nature. This necessitates a focus on the specific details of particular contexts of articulation as well as qualitative textual analysis of talk itself.
Papers Include in the Review.
(n.b. Papers included in the review are marked with an asterisk and are listed here regardless of whether or not they were cited in the text)


